"Rings and Things" in *Twelfth Night*: Gift Exchange, Debt and the Early Modern Matrimonial Economy

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Petruccio: I will to Venice. Sunday comes apace.
We will have rings, and things, and fine array;
And kiss me, Kate. We will be married o' Sunday.
(*The Taming of the Shrew* 2.1.314-316)[1]

Late in act 1 of Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, Olivia "returns" a ring Cesario has purportedly left with her. Declaring that she will have "none of it" (1.5.272), refusing to "hold him up with hopes" (1.5.274), Olivia rejects the ring only to impose it upon the object of her own suddenly emergent desire. Cesario's, "O time, thou must untangle this, not I. / It is too hard a knot for me t'untie" (2.2.38-39), not only registers dismay about the gender complications her cross-dressing has created, but also, I would argue, registers distress over the readily identifiable obligation imposed by the gift.

This paper examines the gift as part of the economic network in early modern England, focusing on the obligation such exchange imposed upon giver and receiver alike. Implicit with the gift, as Marcel Mauss has noted, is the expectation of return.[2] Both Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu[3] represent this obligation in terms of a symbolic exchange. To maintain the honor both of giver and receiver, the gift must be reciprocated and at an appropriate time. My paper takes the theories of Mauss and Bourdieu further, looking at this obligation as a form of debt within the early modern economy. While undeniably symbolic, the gift, as well as the obligation it imposes, was likewise part of a complex system of exchange governing economic as well as social interactions.

In the case of *Twelfth Night,* the gift that Olivia thrusts upon Cesario functions as debt instrument, creating an obligation to reciprocate by means of love, affection, and/or commitment. While such obligation necessarily carries a symbolic value, it must likewise

be read as economic given its potential to impact standing within the Illyrian credit network. Cesario may well be the unlikely, unhappy recipient of Olivia's convoluted gift exchange, but the ring nevertheless obligates the receiver to a return. To refuse the obligation of the debt threatens not only Cesario's tenuous place within the community, but to refuse repayment threatens the very network itself.

The gift has long been recognized as an important vehicle for cultural exchange. Marcel Mauss's landmark study, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, argued the importance of the gift to culture as a whole. Mauss demonstrated that the gift was not a disinterested gesture, but that the act of giving triggered a set of behavioral cues for the recipient. As Mauss notes, "Each gift is a part of a system of reciprocity in which the honor of giver and recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that every item of status or of spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone in the community as a whole. The system is quite simple: just the rule that every gift has to be returned in some specified way sets up a perpetual cycle of exchanges within and between generations."[4] Mauss links this mandatory reciprocity to individual as well as cultural honor. In other words, while a gift necessarily implicates a specific giver and receiver, it ultimately involves the community. Moreover, such gift exchange is never haphazard. The need for return, while left unrecognized by giver and receiver alike, is nevertheless implicit in the gift. To preserve the honor of giver and receiver, reciprocal exchange must occur. It is, in fact, during this cycle of exchange that cultural honor is rehearsed. To participate in the exchange is to pay homage to cultural values. To refuse to participate ultimately incurs dishonor to the community as a whole.

Pierre Bourdieu's important cultural study, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, explores the gift further, focusing on the obligation incurred during the process of exchange. For Bourdieu, the logistics of return are as significant as the necessity of the return itself. As he argues, "In every society it may be observed that, if it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be *deferred* and *different*, because the immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal."[5] In other words, the gift, as well as its return, must be rendered a disinterested act on the part of giver and receiver alike. The obligation propelling the exchange, while clearly apparent to both parties, must remain unrecognized if the honor attached to the gift is to be preserved. The obligatory exchange must not, in other words, feel like debt to the gift recipient.

This indebtedness, however, is only too apparent during the process of gift exchange in that the recipient remains encumbered, whether acknowledged or not, until the gift has been returned. As Hélène Cixous has observed, "The moment you receive something you are effectively 'open' to the other, and if you are a man you have only one wish, and that is hastily to return the gift . . . to owe no one a thing."[6] This unstated indebtedness, while at least partially offset by shared misrecognition, requires return. To return the gift too quickly underscores the uncomfortable indebtedness the exchange has incurred. As Bourdieu further observes, "To betray one's haste to be free of an obligation one has incurred, and thus to reveal too overtly one's desire to pay off services rendered or gifts received, so as to be quits, is to denounce the initial gift retrospectively as motivated by the intention of obliging one."[7] Moreover, returning a gift in kind argues a refusal of the originating gesture. It constitutes, in effect, re-gifting of an undesired object to the original giver. While Bourdieu notes that "a gift may remain unrequited, if it meets with ingratitude," such a response necessarily undermines cultural relations.[8] When it is delayed and different from the originating gift, the return is made to appear an original gesture rather than the repayment of a burdensome and pressing social obligation.

Both Mauss and Bourdieu treat the valuation of the gift largely in symbolic terms, overlooking, I would argue, the importance of the gift to economic systems of exchange. While objects and/or services are never entirely devoid of symbolic value (e.g., the ring represents at once the love, affection and commitment of Olivia to Cesario), they are likewise inevitably—indeed, necessarily—implicated in economic systems of exchange. As Jacques Derrida notes, "Now the gift, if there is any, would no doubt be related to economy. One cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to the money economy."[9] Indeed, because the gift is involved in systems of exchange, and because this exchange results in debt creation, I would argue, it participates in the credit economy.

Early modern England, as Craig Muldrew has noted, was a culture of credit. Coin had never been ready, so to speak, due in large part to the lack of a centralized banking system, which would not be created until late in the seventeenth century. What coinage existed was frequently clipped—a practice whereby a small bit of the precious metal was removed, devaluing the coin's worth—or hoarded, removing it from circulation. That clipping was a capital crime in early modern England and hoarding openly condemned

did little to bridge the gap between what was needed to acquire goods and services and the economic resources available to acquire them. Muldrew notes that conditions were made worse by "the combination of the expanding market and demand-driven inflation[;] by the end of the sixteenth century the demand for money had probably increased by something like 500 percent, while the supply had expanded by only 63 percent."[10] Polonius's seemingly sage admonition to Laertes to "neither a borrower nor a lender be" (*Hamlet* 1.3.75), in fact, appears to contradict the reality of economic life in early modern England.

Given the shortage of available economic resources, debt proved the necessary vehicle through which needed goods and services were acquired. While debt was important to the funding of large purchases, including mortgages and marriage portions, it was likewise used as a means by which to fund basic household expenses, including the payment of servants' wages. Small loans were often informal, oral agreements between friends and neighbors, recorded in account books or on slips of paper. Falstaff's unpaid tavern tab of "four-and-twenty pound" (*I Henry IV* 3.3.65) is representative of this kind of debt accounting.

Account reckoning was accomplished in a variety of ways. Although many debts were not settled until the deaths of borrowers, debtors such as Samuel Pepys and Ralph Josselin made concerted efforts to repay their encumbrances as quickly as possible.[11] The term *reckoning* itself describes how many debts were cancelled. Because debt was so pervasive in early modern England, borrowers and lenders frequently owed each other money. As John Blaxton observes in *The English Usurer* (1634), "Every man is to his neyhbour a debtor, not onely of that which himselfe borroweth, but of whatsoever his neyhbour needeth."[12] As such, borrowers and lenders often settled their accounts by crossing out reciprocal debt, paying only the debt that remained. The case of Adam Eyre is illustrative. As he records, "This day Edw. Mitchell and I cast up our reconings since he came hither, and hee payd mee 7 l. 9s., which was the full of Whitsunday rent for Haslehead, the rest, vzt. 15 l. 1s., being deducted upon accompts; and I payd for my meare till the 10 of June, and for fyre [fire] this present."[13] Given the pervasiveness of debt in early modern England, good credit proved crucial to personal as well as communal economic livelihood.

Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, I would argue, is very much concerned with the process of economic exchange. Indeed, from the opening scenes we encounter numerous references to economics as well as attempts to engage in the much needed process

of exchange. In the opening scene, Orsino's unrequited love for Olivia suggests dynastic ambitions, the joining of two families and thus of two estates. Viola's uncertain fortunes prompt her to offer her services to the Duke, lamenting, "O that I served that lady, / And might not be delivered to the world / Till I had made mine own occasion mellow, / What my *estate* is" (1.2.37-40; emphasis mine). Sir Andrew Aguecheek is duped by the money-grubbing Sir Toby into investing his "three thousand ducats a year" (1.2.18) in the misguided hope of achieving Olivia's love and thus her capital. Even before Maria and Sir Toby cruelly trick him, Malvolio fantasizes about fondling "some rich jewel" (2.5.54) after wedding the elusive, well-endowed Olivia. Indeed, it is this steward's dynastic ambitions which enable the pair's wickedly cruel design. And then there is the encumbered Sebastian who can hardly believe his good fortune when Olivia, after thrusting rich jewels upon him, quickly steers him to the altar and an unbelievably advantageous marital alliance. As he muses, "Yet doth this accident and flood of fortune / So far exceed all instance, all discourse, / That I am ready to distrust mine eyes" (4.3.11-13).

Although economics structures the play, Illyria as a whole suffers under a stagnant economy, one whose fundamental systems of exchange have essentially stalled. Moreover, the character most empowered to effect change refuses, at least initially, to participate in its networks of credit. Indeed, it is the miserly Olivia who withholds her affection "to season / A brother's dead love, which she would keep fresh / And lasting in her sad remembrance" (1.1.29-31), preventing much needed circulation within the credit economy. Olivia, in essence, hoards the capital needed to revive the economy within Illyria by enabling social transactions. The lethargic Orsino we meet in the opening lines of the play, in fact, comes to represent the Illyrian economy itself. It languishes under Olivia's haughty refusal to circulate the wealth, both material and symbolic, she holds in reserve.

The ring Malvolio flings at Cesario signals Olivia's long awaited entry into the Illyrian credit network. This gift, at once both an object of value as well as a symbolic gesture of love and affection, constitutes a much needed infusion of hoarded capital into the local economy; Olivia has, in principle, at last agreed to participate in the credit network by circulating her body and thus her estate within Illyria. The problem, of course, is that the object of her desire lacks the means by which to repay the debt Olivia's arguably magnanimous gesture has created. As the horrified and bewildered Cesario exclaims, "I left no ring with her. What means this lady?

The cunning of her passion / Invites me in this churlish messenger. / None of my lord's ring! Why he sent her none. / I am the man. If it be so—as 'tis— / Poor lady, she were better love a dream!" (2.2.15; 20-24). Not only is Cesario a woman masquerading as a man, but she represents Orsino in an equally doomed matrimonial transaction. Olivia may well refuse to "match above her / degree, neither in estate, years nor wit" (1.3.90-91), but she will, it turns out, agree to transact with one unable to repay the resulting debt the ring has imposed.

Rings present a special challenge to an understanding of the gift and its use in early modern England. Although just one of many types of gifts exchanged during courtship, the ring carried a symbolic significance which warrants closer scrutiny. Loreen Giese, in her study of London consistory court records, has concluded that the ring, although "the third most common gift prior to marriage," did not enjoy special status as a courtship gift.[14] She concludes that "the meaning of an item lay in the context of the exchange and the intent of the giver and the receiver rather than intrinsically in the specific item."[15] While there is some merit in Giese's assessment of the overall meaning of the gift—context and intent were important—the symbolic significance long associated with the ring, I would argue, challenges an easy conclusion regarding its value.

Diana O'Hara, however, who has extensively categorized the types and frequency of courtship gifts given in Kent between 1542 and 1601, complicates Giese's conclusions regarding the ring's significance. While noting the ring's third place position as gift most frequently given, O'Hara also observes that this third place position was "hardly surprising, given the symbolic status normally attributed to them."[16] As she notes, "The rings took various forms, and were presumably considered a far more customary choice of gift than knives, mentioned with some frequency, and those other types of jewellery and trinkets which were given occasionally. If the principal items within each of these three categories are compared, the giving of a ring (61 times) would seem to have been the most common."[17]

To suggest that the ring possessed no intrinsic value, in fact, would seem to ignore the centuries old symbolism attached to the ring. Henry Swinburne, the early modern Inns of Court commentator, devotes considerable attention to what the gift of a ring during courtship may signify. The ring's very shape, Swinburne notes, is meaningful. As he observes, "The form of the Ring being circular, that is, round, and without end, imposeth thus much, that

their mutual love and hearty affection should roundly flow from the one to the other, as in a circle, and that continually, and forever."[18] When placed on the fourth finger of the left hand, which "by received Opinion of the Learned and Experienced in Ripping up and anatomizing Mens Bodies, there is a Vein of Blood which passeth from that fourth Finger unto the Heart, called *Vena a moris*, Loves Vein," the evidence proves almost incontrovertible that the giver and receiver have committed to a matrimonial alliance.[19]

Yet this is where the meaning of the ring as courtship gift proves complicated. For while intrinsically symbolic given its uniquely circular shape, the ring must also be properly presented. As Swinburne further observes,

> "If also no words were uttered at or before the delivery or acceptance of the Ring, then we are to respect whether it were delivered in sport, or in earnest? If in jeast, it doth not betoken either matrimony or Spousals: If in earnest, then the manner of delivery and acceptance thereof is to be regarded; for if it were not delivered in solemn manner (as if he did not put it on her fourth Finger, but gave it otherwise into her hand) it doth not signifie Matrimony, no more than when a Man sendeth a Ring to a Woman by a Messenger, which is understood to be a Gift or token of good will, and not a sign of Matrimony or Spousals."[20]

Swinburne's legal background is most evident here as he wrestles with the intricacies of interpretation in a complicated early modern judicial system. Did language accompany the gift, and if so, was it uttered in seriousness? How does one determine seriousness? If no language accompanied the gift, what outward signs could be used to assist interpretation? May not these outward signs, if present, also be misinterpreted? Clearly, context is important in the matter of gift giving; yet, how does one factor in the significance of an intrinsically meaningful gift, such as the ring? Indeed, the ring, as Swinburne discusses at length, is not an empty signifier dependent upon the arguably ambiguous intent of giver and receiver for meaning. Unlike coins, ribbons and even knives, which may or may not be invested with larger meaning, the ring's circular shape connotes love and commitment, linking it to matrimony itself. No other early modern courtship gift, I would argue, possessed such intrinsic meaning.

Of course, from a legal perspective, virtually everything proves capable of challenge. As Martin Ingram notes, "The exchange of gifts was an especially slippery form of evidence, since defendants

often claimed that these were not 'tokens of marriage' but merely 'tokens of good will' or 'fairings' which had no matrimonial significance whatever."[21] This slipperiness is borne out in the numerous court cases which survive from the period, where those who had a change of heart often challenged the meaning of such gifts. In 1593, Richard Houghton attempted to enforce a matrimonial suit with Katherine Hawes, citing Katherine's acceptance of a ring from him. Katherine, however, denied that the ring represented anything other than a goodwill token from Richard. The court apparently agreed with Katherine's opinion on this matter, for she married someone else six months later.

That the court refused to support Richard's claim was not an unusual circumstance. As Eric Carlson has noted, "Gifts were universally understood to be only circumstantial evidence of a contract [and not binding in and of themselves]."[22] Ralph Houlbrooke supports this view, noting that "the importance of the ring. . .seems to have been much greater in the eyes of the parties, and more particularly in the eyes of male suitors, than it was in the view of the law."[23] Thus, as Laura Gowing concludes, "Women who accepted tokens and regretted it tried when they came to court to explain how they were received unwittingly."[24] As the case of Richard Houghton and Katherine Hawes illustrates, gifts did not always prove matrimonial intent. Yet, as Houlbrooke observes, "[The law] did allow that a confession on the woman's part that gifts had been received might prove 'just cause for litigation' entitling the plaintiff, even if he failed to prove his main contention, to be dismissed without paying costs, and to have his gifts, or their money value, returned to him."[25] Gifts aside, the deciding factor, as several critics have argued, was whether or not the requisite words had been exchanged. As Carlson notes, "Litigation in church courts which involved gifts was not about gifts; it was about words."[26] Did, in other words, a prospective husband and wife verbally agree to take each as such?

Yet even words, it would appear, were subject to failure as the case of Joan Harris and Nicholas Harris illustrates. On one of his numerous visits to her house in 1623, Nicholas "brought a ring with him which he offered to leave with her as gift from himself, and [Joan] divers times refused to receive any such thing of him. . . After many denials made by her to take it, the said Nicholas vowing and protesting that he did not give it thereby to bind her any way unto him, [she] at his great importunity or rather enforcement took it of him."[27] When Joan later attempted to return the ring, Nicholas refused to accept it. It was at this point that Joan

apparently made an apparently fatal error in judgment. Believing "it not fit for her to keep the said ring and not to give him something in recompense[,] thereof sent unto him in like manner a ring of small price."[28] When Joan later refused to marry him, Nicholas took his case to court, where the marriage was upheld. In the case of these gifts, the court viewed the reciprocal exchange as evidence of a matrimonial contract.

This particular case proves interesting in terms of gifts and their relation to the early modern credit network. Clearly, Joan felt indebted to Nicholas for the gift of the ring. That she rejected the ring several times reveals a discomfort with the prospect of becoming indebted to one she seemed to have no interest in marrying. It is clear that Joan recognized the gift of the ring as economically as well as symbolically significant. To receive the ring, in other words, was to incur an obligation to Nicholas requiring some form of repayment. Given the symbolism attached to the ring, I believe it reasonable to conclude that Joan recognized it as a token which could obligate her to marry her persistent suitor. Why she ultimately chose to accept it is thus bewildering. Was Joan merely worn down by Nicholas's repeated offers? He did insist that "he did not give it thereby to bind her any way unto him." That she gave a gift in kind is revealing. Certainly, this reciprocal act suggests a desire to be relieved of the obligation imposed by Nicholas's gift.

O'Hara has argued that "acceptance of a gift, in the widest possible sense, might place a constraint on the person receiving it and create a relationship of indebtedness whether of a moral, emotional, or economic kind."[29] The gift of a ring would seem to cancel out the debt imposed by Nicholas's gift: her gift of a "like manner [of] ring" merely a return of his unwelcome gift. Whatever her intentions, it is clear that Joan's reciprocal gesture backfired. Not only *did* Nicholas intend to bind Joan to matrimony with his gift, but the court which eventually heard this case ruled in his favor, most likely as a direct result of Joan's unfortunate miscue. In this case, the language of the gift became evidence of matrimonial intent: the exchange of rings signifying, from the court's perspective, both Nicholas's *and* Joan's consent to enter into marriage.

The case of Joan Harris and Nicholas Harris bears striking similarities to that of Shakespeare's principal characters in *Twelfth Night*. Cesario's horrified response upon receiving this gift from Olivia, "O time, thou must untangle this, not I. / It is too hard a knot for me t'untie" (2.2.38-39), betrays unambiguous

understanding of what this particular gift signifies. Her knot metaphor, in fact, is itself linked to the concept of matrimonial union. Moreover, as Cesario notes, "Fortune forbid my outside have not charmed her. / She made good view of me, indeed so much / That straight methought her eyes had lost her tongue, / For she did speak in starts, distractedly. She loves me, sure" (2.2.16-20). The convoluted story Olivia attaches to the ring, that it is, in fact, Orsino's "peevish messenger" (1.5.270) who forces his master's love token on her, does little to ease the obligation it imposes. If anything, the studied confusion surrounding the gift-giving merely adds to the dilemma faced by Cesario. To accept the object is to accept the obligation to return the gift in kind. This means, of course, an agreement to repay the debt by offering up love, affection, and commitment to Olivia, a clearly implausible scenario for Cesario.

On the other hand, to refuse the gift, to return it to one who has already disclaimed ownership of the item would, in early modern England, constitute no real assurance that affections have been rejected. As the *Batchelars Banquet* (1603) notes, "If he offers a ring, a girdle, or any such thing, at the first refuse it, yet kindly and with thanks; but if he urge it on you twice or thrice, take it, telling him, sith that he will needs bestow it on you, you will wear it for his sake. In no time the fool will be trapped and contracted."[30] Cesario's refusal or mere inability to repay this unanticipated and most unwelcome debt becomes more than a personal dilemma. Because this debt fails to bring about much needed exchange, it ultimately threatens the well-being of the Illyrian community as whole. What's this cross-dressed messenger of the Duke to do?

It isn't, in fact, until Sebastian's sudden, improbable appearance that the economic crisis immobilizing Illyria is finally resolved. Ironically, what this mostly mirror image of Cesario does is to "re-sex" the Duke's messenger, enabling not only acceptance of the gift—in this instance a pearl, which Olivia bestows upon him—but repayment of the resulting debt as well. To Olivia's, "Nay, come, I prithee, would thou'dst be ruled by me" (4.1.60), an awestruck Sebastian meekly replies, "Madam, I will" (4.1.61). Sebastian readily reciprocates Olivia's material gift with promises of love, affection and, perhaps most importantly, commitment, something Cesario is both physically and emotionally unable to do. In so doing, Sebastian both repays the debt Olivia imposes upon him, while at the same time finally circulating this elusive heiress within the local economy. It is worth noting that with Olivia's entry into the Illyrian credit network other exchanges rapidly follow. Maria marries Sir

Toby, while a newly feminized Viola at last gets the Duke of her dreams. What such a harmonious outcome does is to emphasize the importance both of giving and receiving to the overall economic life of the community.

In many respects, *Twelfth Night*'s emotional urgencies involving love and courtship mask the economic structures governing the play's many attempted, as well as actualized, exchanges. At the same time, however, the seemingly endless stream of coins, jewels and rings which trickle throughout the play should serve to remind us that the text is as much about material exchange as it is about symbolic emotional gestures. What such gifts reveal is the extent to which the credit network was implicated in the most fundamental of social transactions in early modern England. At the very least, the fact that *Twelfth Night* focuses on marital exchange should serve to remind us that the valuables Olivia and Orsino offer as tokens of affection are as much about contracting alliances in an unashamedly monetary marriage market as they are about signaling emotional commitment. Indeed, the gift here serves as debt, binding giver and receiver in an expected reciprocal exchange, which in early modern England carried contractual obligations. While such exchange proves impossible until Sebastian's fortuitous appearance, it nonetheless proves crucial not only to Viola's future in Illyria, but to the economic vitality of the community as a whole.

Notes

1. All Shakespeare citations are from *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).
2. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. Ian Cunnison (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967).
3. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
4. Mauss, *The Gift*, viii.
5. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*, 5.
6. Hélène Cixous, "Castration or Decapitation?" *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 7 (1981): 48.
7. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*, 6.
8. Ibid., 9.
9. Jacques Derrida, *Given Time: 1, Counterfeit Money,* trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 7.
10. Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 100.
11. Ibid., 108, 129.
12. Quoted in Muldrew, *The Economoy of Obligation*, 123.
13. Quoted in Muldrew, *The Economoy of Obligation,* 108.
14. Loreen L. Giese, *Courtships, Marriage Customs and Shakespeare's Comedies* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 91.

15. Ibid., 84.

16. Diana O'Hara, *Courtship and Constraint: Rethinking the Making of Marriage in Tudor England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 69.

17. Ibid., 69.

18. Henry Swinburne, *A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts* (1686) (Union, New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange, 2002), 208.

19. Ibid., 208.

20. Ibid., 210.

21. Martin Ingram, *Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 198.

22. Eric Josef Carlson, *Marriage and the English Reformation* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 136.

23. Ralph Houlbrooke, *Church Courts and the People during the English Reformation 1520-1570* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 60.

24. Laura Gowing, *Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 161.

25. Houlbrooke, *Church Courts*, 61.

26. Carlson, *Marriage and the English Reformation,* 136.

27. Cited in David Cressy, *Birth, Marriage and Death*: *Ritual, Religion, and the Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 265.

28. Cited in Cressy, *Birth, Marriage and Death*, 265.

29. O'Hara, *Courtship and Constraint*, 79.

30. *Batchelars Banquet* (1603), cited in Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death*, 263.