Puritan Relationships: Transformation and the Concepts of Virtue and Covenant in English Renaissance Literature

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Charles Trinkaus writes that there is not "a dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, the cleric and the layman, the mystical and the rational which generated factions and multifarious parties, but a search for ways of trying to bring together and reconcile the apparently conflicting values."[1] For the people during the Renaissance or early modern period, religion permeated how they lived their lives and formed their relations. Humanist education revived the classics, including Platonic ideals, where relationships and senses could lead to a greater relationship with God and a more equal relationship in marriage. Puritans also proposed the idea of companionate marriage during the English Renaissance by transforming the ideas of virtue and covenant to apply to marriage, family, the King and, of course, God. While the evolution or transformation of marriage was affected by both classical and religious, specifically Puritan, sources, this paper will focus primarily on Puritan influences. Puritan theorists helped transform the concepts of virtue and covenant to apply the idea of companionate friendship to marriage. This transformation was eventually applied to God and the King, beginning the movement toward proto-notions of democracy in England. The evolution of companionate relationships, based on the transformation and mutability of the terms *virtue* and *covenant* will be illustrated in the later Renaissance literature of Shakespeare and George Herbert's "Redemption," which transforms even more in Milton's *Paradise Lost.*

The transformation of the word *virtue* from "virginity and virility" to "moral excellence and chastity" established more egalitarian marriage as a pattern for societal and religious relationships. The term had specific gender connotations: for men,

coming from the Latin root *virtus,* meaning "manliness, valour, and military prowess," but for woman, "virginity." The division complicated marital relations, but as theorists started to use the term as "moral excellence," this evolution also included the idea of a single standard of virginity for men and women, under more egalitarian terms. Ultimately, Alasdair MacIntyre, along with others, discusses how *virtue* transforms to "chastity and moral excellence."[2] Gregory Chaplin expresses how Milton, a known part of the Puritan movement, described conversation as the noblest end of marriage. Chaplin believes that "in doing so, Milton assumes that women are indeed capable of the mental fellowship from which Montaigne and classical commentators on friendship disqualify them, and there are moments in his argument where hierarchical gender differences almost disappear."[3]

Milton's definition of marriage evolves toward a more democratic union, with both parties capable of conversation, intellectual discovery, moral excellence, and even virginity. According to this idea, the typical hierarchy in the marriage relationship could disappear because of the equality expected from both members. Milton in *Paradise Lost* portrays how God gave Adam Eve in "Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self (7.1086-87)."[4] This equality was also an essential idea and passage for Puritans on how they set up their marriages. Marriage should be between help meet, complementary partners. Later Adam professes the idea that Eve seems so perfect and divine that "her doing seem'd to justifie the deed" (7.142). Eve was Adam's partner, so he felt justified in following her example. James Johnson suggests that "for the Puritans the primacy of mutual help in marriage is tied to their conception of marriage as based on an essentially covenantal model, with an emphasis on the mutual agreement of man and wife to live together as meet helps."[5] This redefinition of virtue not only helped change the concept of virginity to chastity to redeem marriage, but evolved toward a less absolutist form of government as well.

The different gender connotations complicate or make equal friendship or true help meets impossible. Separate connotations encouraged virtue really becoming vices. Jean Gagen explains that the male connotation coming from the Latin root *virtus* "did indeed emphasize valor at the expense of virtue (that is, justice and reason)."[6] The repercussions from this emphasis, which contradicted Christian charity, consisted of the idea of fighting for personal military glory even for unjust causes or personal revenge.[7] Gagen notes that the male emphasis on prowess existed

even in Aristotle's day and was not a product of the Renaissance. Hugh MacLachlan talks about how the Christian knight in Spenser's "The Fairie Queen," also a prominent work during the Renaissance, sees the world in a pagan manner, ultimately making him "confront the spiritual and psychological problems inherent in a system of personal justice (and injustice)."[8] Male prowess or revenge can be taken to an extreme, devaluing real virtue. This connotation of virtue seemed to be incompatible with the female connotation of virtue.

Shakespeare, in his play *Othello*, illustrates how male *virtus* creates unequal relationships, requiring from women something different than from men. Othello, the Moor, wins Desdemona by telling her stories of his military prowess. Othello relates that "she wished she had not heard it, yet she wished / That heaven had made her such a man. She thanked me, / And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her, / I should teach him how to tell my story, / And that would woo her. Upon this hint I spake" (1.3.161-65).[9] Desdemona is attracted by Othello's stories of battle and brute strength. Othello reaffirms this idea of virility or prowess as virtue when he proclaims that it is the "plumed troops and the big wars that make ambition virtue!" (3.3.353-55). Othello's, and by extension Shakespeare's, idea of virtue for men, of course, does not include an idea of virginity or chastity. Marriage for men does not exact the same requirements; instead, physical valor was emphasized at the expense of cultivating other virtues for men. Jean Gagen also explains that valor or prowess, as we might call it, was so important "in the estimation of a gentleman's worth that it was often set apart for special emphasis and an honorable man was frequently defined as one who had never failed in justice or in valor?"[10] In Othello's case, he wins Desdemona through his military prowess, but that same *virtus* also caused Othello to end her life. Shakespeare illustrates how prowess or revenge taken to the extreme besmirches virtue. Othello's virtue becomes his vice. Men and women cannot have marriages of friendship or mutuality because male *virtus* will get in the way.

Milton's epic poem *Paradise Lost* shows an impulse to change this idea of *virtus* to one of moral excellence and chastity for both sexes, promoting the idea of companionate marriage and egalitarian tendencies. Chaplin explains how "Milton's theory of marriage thus represents the fusion of two discourses: Christian, as modified by reformed theologians and humanist scholars, and Renaissance friendship—the practice of classical friendship revived by humanist educators and the dissemination of classical texts."[11] Milton, along

with other theorists and activists, specifically Puritans and Humanists, redefined marriage as companionate or mutual friendship. Milton transforms war and prowess to charity and obedience to God's Holy Spirit in his works. His epic poem *Paradise Lost* becomes the pattern for this transformation to equality and a single definition of virtue. In the final book of *Paradise Lost*, Adam asks the angel Michael as they are about to be thrown out of the garden, "Who then shall guide his people, who defend?" (12.482-84). Adam is looking for physical protection and strength. Instead Michael replies to Adam's inquiry that

> . . . from Heaven
> He to His own a Comforter will send,
> The promise of the father, Who shall dwell,
> His spirit, within them, and the law of faith,
> Working through love, upon their hearts shall write,
> To guide them in all truth, and also arm
> With spiritual armor, able to resist
> Satan's assaults, and quench his fiery darts. (12.485-92)

In this reply, Adam, who has been living in innocence, relies on physical prowess. But when knowledge replaces innocence, that prowess becomes tainted and no longer virtuous. Adam must put his trust in the arm of God instead of the arm of the flesh. Also, Michael does not address just Adam, using the term *them*, not just *you*, to address both Adam and Eve. Not just Adam, but Eve will also receive the spirit. Russ McDonald proclaims that "the basis for conjugal mutuality was the doctrine of spiritual equality among men and woman,"[12] which Michael implies. This spiritual equality that Milton gives Adam and Eve in his poem stands as the basis for mutuality in marriage for all.

Othello also moves away from military prowess and revenge as virtue near the end of the play, but his virtue becomes his vice first. First, Othello declares lustfully as he strangles Desdemona that "had all [Cassio's] hairs been lives, my great revenge / Had stomach for 'em all" (5.2.51-52). When he believes Desdemona has betrayed her virtue, Othello leaps to defend or fulfill his. Emilia later reveals to Othello that Desdemona remained chaste. Othello realizes that his *virtus* has failed him, and he kills himself. Virtue in marriage must encompass more than military prowess because it so often becomes a vice and a tragedy. As Milton would have it, virginity and *virtus* become chastity, moral excellence, or love, as in *Paradise Lost*.

For women *virtue* meant virginity, which meant that without the move toward chastity, women lost their virtue in marriage.

Alasdair MacIntyre describes how most understand "chastity as virtue only because it is a useful device to secure that property is passed only to legitimate heirs, of those who believe that the passage of time confers legitimacy upon what was originally acquired by violence and aggression."[13] Women's virtue was lost through the use of men's virtue, but also lost in God's commanded covenant. It seemed inane. The jewel of Desdemona's dower is her virginity, which she offers in marriage to Othello. The characters hail Desdemona as virtuous even in marriage, but Iago expounds how he "will turn her virtue into pitch, / And out of her own goodness make the net / That shall enmesh them all" (2.3.334-336). Iago understands the idea that virtue as chastity ensures Othello's legitimate heirs. If Iago can "turn her virtue to pitch," he can make certain that Othello inverts his virtue by casting Desdemona away, never having children. Even though Desdemona may be virtuous and chaste, Iago twists her virtue and perverts Othello's military prowess into a sin by falsely murdering Desdemona. The differences that turn this former virtue to sin are Christianity and knowledge, as with Adam. To redeem and establish a more equal marriage relationship, virtue for all must include chastity and moral excellence.

Just like the movement from *virtus* to moral excellence for men, there was a movement to redefine *virtue* as "chastity" for women. Helena in *All's Well That Ends Well* possesses an idea of virginity as virtue and exclaims that "man is enemy to virginity; how may we barricade it against him" (1.1.112-13). Marriage under this former idea of virtue corrupts innocence or virtue, making it vulgar. Marriage strips women naked of their virtue. Considering that the people considered marriage as a God-given fulfillment of a covenant, it did not make sense. C. S. Lewis explained that "the word *naked* was originally a past participle; the naked man was the man who had undergone a process of naking, that is, of stripping or peeling . . . . Time out of mind the naked man has seemed to our ancestors not the natural but the abnormal man; not the man who has abstained from dressing but the man who has been for some reason undressed."[14]

Milton's *Paradise Lost* characterizes Adam and Eve's nakedness and marriage as Helena does—as unnatural or vulgar because of knowledge. Adam and Eve remain naked and innocent before they eat of the fruit, but eating the fruit changes their understanding of it. Adam explains to Eve how eating the fruit "leaves us naked thus, of Honour void / Of Innocence, of Faith, of Puritie / Our wonted Ornaments now soild and staind" (8.1074-1076). Their

nakedness, as well as their marriage, no longer symbolizes innocence, but vulgarity and unnaturalness; thus, their idea of virtue and marriage must change.

The people could not accept a definition of virtue that contradicted the idea of marriage. However, marriage can be virtuous if virtue is defined as chastity. Adam and Eve put on clothes and continue on their way in marriage. Parolles, in *All's Well That Ends Well*, explains to Helena that women should not keep their virginity against men's military assault. Instead, he suggests that losing their virginity in marriage might be seen as a "rational increase" (1.1.128). Women can be chaste and virtuous still and even gain virtue from marriage. If women refuse to marry and keep their virginity, "it is ever lost" because the virtue has gone out of it (1.1.131). True virtue for women is not lost, but gained in marriage. Helena later tricks her husband Bertram into fulfilling his marital obligations by consummating their marriage. The concept of virtue as chastity must replace the former knowledge or belief of virtue as virginity. Knowledge defiles male *virtus* and female virginity, so Puritans pushed to unite both genders' connotations of virtue under moral excellence and chastity. The union pushed toward companionate marriage as the template for relationships in general.

Charles Trinkaus expresses this struggle between Christianity and paganism regarding the role of virtue by stating that

> within this context of enormous confusion concerning the relationship sacred and profane, divine and human, the individual sought to possess power, again in some form or other . . . Particularly moral—for virtue is personal moral power, and the individual sought it by his own free will, or trusted it would come to him by grace, sufficiently, that is, to render him 'just' as well as 'justified.'[15]

Trinkaus sought to recover the definition of virtue as moral excellence and chastity in order to justify or redeem the actions of Humanists and Puritans, as well as the institution of marriage. The moral power that came from redeeming virtue or marriage as a more equal covenant, Puritans put into their relationships with the divine, government, familial, and all relationships.

The people of England formed these new relationships, as they did with marriage, on the basis of covenants. McGiffert argues that the covenant "strengthened their hand by bringing the unregenerate majority—every son of Adam and daughter of Eve—clearly within the covenantal design through a legal bond with the Deity."[16] The idea of covenant, like the idea of virtue, incorporated

a struggle for definition toward a more egalitarian system of marriage and relationships. Puritans, as well as others, "applied covenant thinking to the problems of a Christian understanding of marital union. A particular type of covenant doctrine results, or rather the doctrine of a particular kind of covenant, that between man and wife, which is closely similar to covenants between friends, within nations, and in the church."[17] That covenant was a covenant of friendship or mutual help. McGiffert cautions us to recognize that although "puritans of the Elizabethan era [from whom this concept originated] made something of covenant doctrine in their theological writings, they rarely put it to political use" because it usually backfired.[18] He further explains that "only a handful of militants before the seventeenth century dared broaden those precedents into a contract theory of the commonwealth."[19] Even if covenant descended from Puritanism as only an idea and not an active movement, it was still an idea that shaped social relationships as virtue did. Preacher William Whatley in 1624 declared the existence of "true contracts of mutual obligation of the relationships between ruler and people and between husband and wife. This implies that each relationship can be dissolved for non-performance of covenant duties: a king can be deposed, an errant marriage partner can be divorced. But as in the case of calling God to task, these ultimate implications of covenantal thought are approached gingerly by the Puritans."[20]

Covenants formed marriage, as well as all relationships with God and monarchy, along a more egalitarian model. Geller states that "all fundamental relationships—that of Britain to world history, that of king to country, that of husband and wife—are seen as based on the analogous relation of man to God within the covenant that leads to man's salvation."[21] James Johnson echoes that idea that "the doctrine of a particular kind of covenant, that between man and wife, . . . is closely similar to covenants between friends, within nations, and in the church."[22] These and other authors express how the covenant, especially the new companionate marriage covenant, spread to societal relationships like government, family, and the economy. The conflict between the different connotations of covenant, as promise and contract, defined how authority and duty were newly interpreted, especially in regard to covenants.

The idea of the covenant was not new, but the Puritans redefined it to help rationalize why an all-powerful God would care for mankind. Because the covenant included unequal parties, it incorporated ideas of equality and inequality, contract and

promise. The different connotations of *contract* and *promise*, as those of *virtue*, caused problems in establishing more equal relationships. Looking at definitions of *contract* and *promise* unlocks other nuances of covenant as well. *Promise* involves assurances to others, while *contracts* involve mutual legal agreements, including marriage agreements.[23] Christianity, as well as the feudal system, incorporates the idea of promise or endless obligation. In contrast, contracts were the system of business among foreigners and strangers. The different connotations do not seem compatible, but they existed.

Covenants form the basis of relationships, but different contexts make it difficult to know which connotation should take priority in application. Shakespeare's *King Lear*, for example, shows the tension between unequal and more egalitarian marriages caused by interpretations of virtue and covenant in governmental and familial relationships. Lear wants his daughters and subjects to promise endless love and obligation, or he will break his covenant or contract with them. The king acted with contractual obligation to his subjects, but believed his subjects had promissory obligations to him. Peasants had endless obligation, and the ending of one obligation was an invitation to take on more responsibility. John S. Coolidge explains that sovereigns are not actually bound by the covenant, but instead enforce the covenant. A subject cannot break the agreement by voice or actions, but "failure of the vassal to obey the conditions of the treaty may lead to his destruction, no doubt, but not to his ceasing to belong to the sovereign."[24] At the same time, the covenant seems to imply a measure of inequality and equality at the same time. Shakespeare shows how the struggle between contract and promise echoes in familial relationships.

The majority of people leaned more toward this egalitarian contractual system than a monarchial. For example, during Queen Elizabeth's reign, "Parliament jealously guarded its authority over taxation,"[25] even though the monarch supposedly had absolute control. Internal unrest like the Northern Rebellion is one example of how the people fought against the absolute system. Lear's subjects interpret their covenant with their king in a more contractual view when a relationship is fulfilled. Lear expects his older daughters' promise of obligation and love. Goneril delivers the promise of limitless obligation and love that Lear wants to hear when she replies, "I love you more than words can wield the matter . . . as much as child e'er loved, or father found" (1.1.53,57). Regan echoes the idea by responding that she consists "of the self-same metal" and finds "I am alone felicitate / In your dear highness love" (1.1.69, 75-76). When Lear's youngest daughter,

Cordelia, will not respond in similar manner, Lear disinherits her. Johannes Allgaier believes that Lear tries to demand what only God can demand, her will; and "to allow anyone, even a father or a king, to tear open that sanctuary with the brutality of power and authority means nothing less than submitting to spiritual rape; to accept a reward for it, even a kingdom, spiritual prostitution," which is why Cordelia refuses.[26] Then when Kent, who obviously loves Lear, tries to affirm Cordelia's love, Lear breaks their contract and banishes Kent. Lear says that Kent "sought to make us break our vow" (1.1.168). Kent still loves and recognizes the king's authority following the promise-based system. Cordelia follows a more contractual covenant—giving her husband first authority before her father and king. Puritan theology complicates the covenant by espousing going beyond the limitations of contracts, but also holding onto the idea of a king.

For example, Goneril and Regan see Lear's role as king, but redefine their obligation to Lear and not to his entourage—a more contractual or democratic model. The sisters do not feel endless obligation to the king or their father. Conversely, Kent and Cordelia continue to show obligation and promise to Lear even after Lear breaks the contract with them. Lear tells Cordelia that he "disclaims all my paternal care" (1.1.113) and tells Kent to take his "reward" (1.1.173) for interfering, banishment. Kent sneaks back in disguise to watch over Lear. Cordelia interprets her covenant with her king and father as a blend of contract and promise. She has basis to abandon Lear as he has abandoned her, but she tries to save him, pointing out in her clarification that she returns her duties "as are right fit" (1.1.97). Even though Cordelia distinguishes in her mind between her obligations to her father and her husband, she still struggles to understand her relationship with her father and her king, in light of her relationship to God.

The Merchant of Venice shows a similar struggle between family members, as well as in business, in relation to companionate egalitarian notions. Jessica's case interestingly seems to hold no real feelings of obligation for her father. Instead, Jessica expresses her sin: "to be ashamed to be my father's child! / But though I am a daughter of his blood, / I am not to his manners" (2.3.16-18). As Jessica refutes Shylock's authority as her head, she moves away from the more promissory system, but she does it to marry and become a Christian. These examples vividly show the tension between the promissory and contractual systems that occurred because Puritan covenant theology called for a blend of both.

Finally, different people use their imaginations to interpret business deals or relations in different ways. Shylock and Bassanio, with the Christians, define their *contracts* differently in *Merchant of Venice.* Charles Spinosa characterizes "Shylock as someone who conducts his business by instinct and gets results by developing relationships,"[27] adding that Shylock justifies his life to Antonio to develop their business relationship. When Antonio asks for money, he responds, "You spat on me on Wednesday last; / You spurned me such a day; another time / You called me dog; and for these courtesies / I'll lend you thus much moneys?" (1.3.121-24). While Shylock exacts a grave punishment for default, his willingness to consider the contract at all could be seen as magnanimous. Shylock leans toward a more egalitarian, contractual system; the Christians ultimately want a more Christian, promissory system, but a system without a place for the merchant. The Christians, Bassanio and Antonio, are known for their improvidence and benevolence because they are aristocrats and Christians—excluding Jews. When Antonio asks for the money, he tells Shylock to "lend it [the money] rather to thine enemy" (1.3.130). Shylock interprets his business deal as a contract and wants the punishment met, even if it seems cruel. Spinosa claims that "contractualism—the tendency to read intentions into all actions—will be constrained by a common practice and a common desire that require devotion more than reason."[28] Bassanio and Antonio work under a more promise-oriented business idea, a different intent; even though they tell Shylock they will abide by the terms of the contract, they expect mercy to be extended when the terms are not fulfilled. These examples show how the covenant becomes the basis for relationships.

The covenant has connotations of both contract and promise coexisting. While it seems that they should not be compatible, they both exist; and it is not always apparent which is more merciful, fair, or equal. William Ames, a Renaissance preacher, emphasized "God's ultimate control over the covenant, but also its status as 'firm promise' and 'gift,' rather than as bargain."[29] George Herbert also expresses this tension between contract and promise in his poem "Redemption." The persona in the poem acts under a contractual business transaction, which he wishes to cancel:

> Having been tenant long to a rich Lord,
> Not thriving, I resolved to be bold,
> And make a suit unto him, to afford
> A new small-rented lease, and cancel th' old.[30]

The persona cannot at first find him, but searches the cities where

> At length I heard a ragged noise and mirth
> Of thieves and murderers: there I him espied,
> Who straight, your suit is granted, said, and died.

The persona at first treats redemption like a contract, but obviously for the people, especially Puritans of the time, Christ's death exceeded any economic exchange ever made.

Lisa M. Gordis explains that the Christian Renaissance idea of covenant included the idea that God, and his extension the king, require obligation, but do not limit their power in any way.[31] The poem shows Herbert's own perception of the covenant by presenting "a rich Lord," who is also the Savior—combining the image of the king and God into one. For Herbert, the Savior acts under a promissory notion of covenant, while at the same time only demands contractual obligation. In all cases the covenant is not just contractual. Gordis explains how Herbert does not repudiate contractual and economic language entirely; instead, he limits it carefully, expending considerable intellectual energy to differentiate the covenantal relationship from an ordinary contract.[32] Herbert expressed that what people offer God is a contract, but he offers a promise of endless obligation; when humans operate under covenants of both contract and promise, as with virtue, their relationships are redeemed.

When looking at how the transformation of the terms of virtue and covenant played out in early modern English relationships of marriage, families, societies, or even religious relationships—illustrated through literature—we can see how uniting the connotations created more companionate or equal relationships. Men operating only on manly *virtus* used their prowess for unjust causes or revenge, and women lost their virtue as soon as they married. The connotations seemed incompatible, so they had to transform. When the people incorporated both moral excellence and chastity into virtue, they had more egalitarian redeemed relationships. When people worked only under a covenant conception of promise, it was one-sided, with endless obligation. When working under contract alone, relationships stay wooden. However, operating under both parts of the definition of covenant, their relationships reflected the divine covenant. The transformation of these terms created more egalitarian relationships and was the beginning of proto-democracy in England.

Notes

1. Charles Trinkaus, "Humanism, Religion, Society: Concepts and Motivations of Some Recent Studies," *Renaissance Quarterly* 29, no.4. (1976): 688.

2. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981).

3. Gregory Chaplin, "'One Flesh, One Heart, One Soul': Renaissance Friendship and Miltonic Marriage," *Modern Philology* 99, no. 2 (2001): 271.

4. John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 1677 ed. (Menston, UK: The Scholar Press, Ltd., 1972). Subsequent line references are to this edition.

5. James T. Johnson, "The Covenant Idea and the Puritan View of Marriage," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, no. 1 (1971): 109.

6. Jean Gagen, "Hector's Honor," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1968): 133.

7. Ibid.

8. Hugh MacLachlan, "A Study of Revenge and Atonement in *The Fairie Queen*," in *Spenser Studies: A Renaissance Poetry Annual I*, ed. Patrick Cullen and Thomas P. Ropche, Jr. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 137.

9. All line references to Shakespeares plays are to *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).

10. Gagen, "Hector's Honor," 131.

11. Chaplin, "One Flesh, One Heart, One Soul," 267.

12. Russ McDonald, *The Bedford Companion to Shakespeare* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 261.

13. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 231.

14. C. S. Lewis, *The Four Loves*, Signature Classics (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 104.

15. Trinkaus, "Humanism, Religion, Society," 689.

16. Michael McGiffert, "Covenant, Crown, and Commons in Elizabethan Puritanism," *The Journal of English Studies* 20, no. 1 (1980): 46

17. Johnson, "The Covenant Idea," 108.

18. McGiffert, "Covenant, Crown, and Commons," 32.

19. Ibid, 33.

20. William Whatley, "Advertisement to the Reader, in *A Care-Cloth Sermon*" (London, 1624), quoted in Johnson, "The Covenant Idea," 116.

21. Lila Geller. "*Cymbeline* and the Imagery of Covenant Theology," *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 20, no. 2 (1980): 254.

22. Johnson, "The Covenant Idea," 108.

23. "Contract" and "Promise," *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2006.

24. John S. Coolidge, *The Pauline Renaissance in England: Puritanism and the Bible* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), quoted in Lisa Gordis, "The Experience of Covenant Theology in George Herbert's 'The Temple,'" *The Journal of Religion* 76, no.2 (1996): 388.

25. McDonald, *The Bedford Companion,* 305.

26. Johannes Allgaier, "Is *King Lear* an Antiauthoritarian Play?" *PMLA* 88, no. 5 (1973): 1035.

27. Charles Spinosa, "Shylock and Debt and Contract in *The Merchant of Venice*," *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature* 5 (1993): 76.

28. Ibid., 81.

29. William Ames, *The marrow of sacred divinity drawne out of the Holy Scriptures, and the interpreters thereof, and brought into method* (London: Edward Griffin, 1642), quoted in Gordis, "The Experience of Covenant Theology," 389.

30. George Herbert, "Redemption" in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, ed. M. H. Abrams (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986), 1336.

31. Gordis, "The Experience of Covenant Theology," 297.

32. Ibid., 386.