UNDERGRADUATE PAPER

Marriage, Credit-Worthiness, and the Woman Chained in *The Comedy of Errors*

Jessica Huhn
Mount St. Mary's University

In his belief that Shakespeare's *The Comedy of Errors* is "a legitimate farce in exactest consonance with the philosophical principles and character of farce, as distinguished from comedy," Samuel Taylor Coleridge claims that the play is more reliant on situational slapstick than on the communication of a moral.[1] However, those who embrace Coleridge's labeling do not appear to discern that the play's illustrations of mistaken identity and debt, including its patriarchal resolution, are meant to criticize structures resembling what Craig Muldrew calls elsewhere "econom[ies] of obligation."[2] Literally, Muldrew's "economy of obligation" refers to the early modern English capitalist structure of commodity exchange. One's level of credit determined his or her credit-worthiness, or reputation, within society; a single accusation of failure to pay a debt often led to permanent damage to one's social status and economic power.[3]

Muldrew's concept is clearly in circulation in financial and social forms within *The Comedy of Errors*.[4] The legal accounting dilemma of the literal chain faced by the

Journal of the Wooden O. Vol 17, 182-212

ISSN: 1539-5758

Antipholi and Angelo parallels the difficulty that Adriana faces in preserving her reputation as a woman of her time. After all, in order to maintain a reasonable social status, Adriana is bound to pay a perpetual debt of obedience to her husband through deference and chastity.[5] She is bound by the contract of her marriage vows, which functions in a similar manner to an economic contract formed by an exchange and verbal promise.[6] As shown through the dilemma of the chain and the character of Adriana, the problematic societal construct of female reputation is synonymous with the credit-worthiness construct of accounting; a woman may instantly lose her credibility if others judge that she has stepped outside of the traditional female role or if her husband has violated the marriage-bond through infidelity. Shakespeare draws parallels between the commercial and marital bonds to criticize the fact that one's reputation, within both economies, is dependent on others' actions and judgments. Also, he reminds his audience that these economies, in their ideal forms, should not equal each other in method. While commercial transactions of credit are naturally one-sided in their government of the exchange of goods, with creditor and creditee defined through each respective exchange, marital transactions must be enacted with a mutual obligation of faithfulness between husband and wife in which both parties constantly fulfill roles as givers and receivers of credit.

Before analyzing the structures of debt and reputation within the play, I must discuss the concept of "economy of obligation" as outlined by Craig Muldrew. This structure of exchange based on credit preceded the modern institution of banking and was essential in an environment where cash-on-hand was scarce.[7] Credit, which gained its name from the Latin word *credo*, meaning "I believe" or "I trust," was defined by a trust in another's faithfulness to monetary promises. In fact, the words "credit" and "trust" were usually considered to be synonymous in this economic context.[8] If one granted credit to another, it "meant that [he or she was]

willing to trust someone to pay [him or her] in the future." Meanwhile, one who possessed credit-worthiness "could be trusted to pay back . . . debts" within his or her society.[9] As this system was grounded on the Christian God as the epitome of moral order, high credit-worthiness translated to a strong reputation and a formidable societal standing.

Conversely, if one was taken to court, arrested, or otherwise subject to legal consequence for defaulting on one's debts, he or she faced permanent damage to his or her social status and economic power, regardless of his or her previous reputation. Sadly, the "economy of obligation" depended on the judgment of others, often punished the innocent for acquired debts, and offered few to no opportunities for the publicly accused debtor to be redeemed. Even if debt was seen as a violation of God's law, reconciliation was rarely available; earthly forgiveness of debts in the spirit of Christ's mercy was usually not offered.[10] In one example, William Chaytor was "allwaise under a cloud and never [able to] appear publickly to make [his] fortune" after being arrested for failure to pay a single debt out of his several outstanding obligations.[11] None of these debts were self-incurred, though, as all were "inherited from his father."[12] These acquired debts weighed so heavily on him that, while he was being transferred from prison to prison, he dreamed of being violently pursued by the debtee who pressed charges against him; this debtee sought to "castrate him with a penknife while he slept."[13] As Chaytor's experience unfortunately shows, one's identity in this economy was subject to the opinion of peers within society. In addition, sanctioned, credit-based identity acquisition, or even condoned identity theft, could have disastrous consequences for the inheritors of debt.

In Shakespeare's adaptation of his original source material, Plautus's comedy *Menaechmi*, the dramatist eschews an anarchy-filled Epidamnum in favor of an Ephesus where the economy of obligation reigns without restraint. Within this Ephesus, individuals' interpretations of society's

harsh laws unjustly condemn the innocent through mistaken assumptions. As Colette Gordon explains, the Plautine Epidamnum is rife with thievery. From the start, everyone in this source play expects to steal and be stolen from, even before the non-native twin arrives. Distrust runs rampant, especially since no consequences are threatened for deceptions or other credit violations. The play ends with the same chaos, as the native and non-native twins escape responsibility for their numerous acts of theft; no debts or other penalties are incurred by either.[14]

In a reversal of the Plautine structure, Shakespeare frames his Ephesus in *The Comedy of Errors* as an environment where the law will be enforced at all costs. In this thinly veiled London, Shakespeare criticizes, rather than glorifies, the credit structures of society. The play opens with Duke Solinus sentencing the merchant Egeon to death because Egeon has violated the law that prohibits Syracusians from setting forth in Ephesus. This law prevails over compassion and even morality. As Solinus maintains, "Were it not against [Ephesus's] laws, . . . [his] soul would sue as advocate for [Egeon]" (1.1.142-45). Such strict interpretations of the law, caused by cases of mistaken identity, result in individuals' acquisition of debtors' roles.[15] In the most prominent example, Antipholus of Ephesus falls into debt after refusing to pay the goldsmith Angelo for a chain that he never received. Angelo assumes that the Ephesian twin is violating commercial trust in his refusal to pay because Angelo had mistakenly handed over the chain to Antipholus's twin, the Syracusian Antipholus. The judgment of Angelo is seen as binding and severely threatens the Ephesian Antipholus's marked reputation. It does not matter that the Ephesian Antipholus is innocent or that Angelo's accusation was motivated by his own need to pay an outstanding debt and protect his standing.[16] Angelo's erroneous assumption causes the blameless Ephesian Antipholus much suffering, as Antipholus cannot prove his innocence in the force of Angelo's case against him and as

the exchange of the chain stands as a legal contract and receipt. Antipholus thus forfeits all control of his credit-worthiness to a single external mistake.[17] Therefore, despite the common belief that the play's implausible twin plot is yet another mechanism of farce, Shakespeare did not enact such a reversal of legal structures from the Plautine source purely for comedic purposes. The same errors of mistaken identity in improbable situations that generate humor may simultaneously create situations in which the innocent are obviously wronged, and thus highlight systematic problems with debts created by assumptions. In his own characters' unjust plunge into debt, Shakespeare questions the seemingly immovable elements of credit-worthiness and the law, especially that of debt's permanent threat to one's reputation through others' accusations.

Shakespeare not only criticizes this commercial economy of obligation, but also draws parallels between this economy and societal expectations for married women, which form a formal credit structure in their own right. He observes that society can condemn a betrothed woman under its strict laws for any supposed violation of her marriage-bond and criticizes the idea that a woman can so easily be framed as a permanent debtor through the wrongful judgment of those who surround her. Shakespeare's decision to situate his work in Ephesus, rather than the Epidamnum of Plautus's play, is ideal for the exploration of problematic aspects of the legal-marital institution of obligation. According to Laurie Maguire, Ephesus's mythical origins were with the Amazons, domineering warrior women who refused to marry or otherwise submit to men. St. Paul was likely concerned that Ephesian women of his own time modeled their behavior on that of their mythical pagan ancestors, in opposition to the Christian way, which equated marital submission with human submission to God. Thus, St. Paul's directives on the woman's proper role in Christian marriage appear in his letter to the Ephesians.[18] Most notably, in Ephesians 5, St. Paul

admonishes wives to "be subject to their husbands as to the Lord . . . as the Church is subject to Christ," and insists that the husband and wife become joined as "one flesh."[19] Since Christ both reigns over and serves the church, though, St. Paul asserts that the husband must not subjugate his spouse, just as the wife must not dominate her husband. Instead, husbands must serve their wives and maintain complete devotion to them, in return for their wives' willing acquiescence.[20]

Also, in the same chapter, St. Paul maintains that anyone, male or female, who "indulges in sexual immorality" will not "inherit the kingdom of God." Thus, St. Paul advocates for a marital economy of obligation in which the wife and husband are joined in a responsibility to remain sexually faithful to each other and to submit themselves entirely to each other, out of profound love.[21] However, in the English conception of St. Paul's instructions, the "one flesh" union of marriage was understood as a moment when only the wife lost an independent identity. After all, while wives were under divinely enforced obligation to obey their husbands, husbands were to "love their wives as they love their own bodies," a directive that seemingly endorsed possession of the wife as if she were nothing more than an object.[22] With the above interpretation, the Ephesian letter supported and informed the flourishing Elizabethan concept that "love goeth downward [while] duty goeth upward." This idea established that a man must rule over those in his household with love, while the wife, as his submissive helper, must prioritize duty towards her husband over love for him.[23] In fact, ministers such as Robert Cleaver perpetuated the idea that "the husband ought not to be satisfied that he hath robbed the wife of her virginity, but in that he hath possession and use of her will."[24] Thus, the husband had absolute mastery in marriage, as God had full control over humankind; the "one flesh" was the male body. For these reasons, Shakespeare chose the location to which St. Paul first gave these directives for female marital duty for his own portrayal of marital economy.

In the early modern period, such Pauline directives had been retained as an integral part of English rules for ideal female deference, and social and Christian laws were linked. The state-sanctioned "Homily on the State of Matrimony," as well as the 1559 *Book of Common Prayer's* recommended sermon to be read after the sacrament itself, paired St. Paul's admonition with that of St. Peter, who stated, "Let wyves be subject to their owne housbandes." Furthermore, the homily reminded married individuals that "God," rather than Peter or Paul, "hath commanded that [the wife] should acknowledge the authoritie of the husband."[25] In addition, the "Homily on the State of Matrimony" asserted that the wife, as the "weaker vessel," must be treated with moderation, as love brings the wife's "heart in[to the husband's] power and will." Again, however, the wife was given the greater burden: she was directed to "obey [her husband], and cease from commanding, and performe subiection," as being "ready at hand at her husband's commandement . . . apply[ing] her selfe to his will . . . [and] seek[ing] his [contentment]" was thought to create an environment of concord.[26] The vows of marriage were explicitly viewed as a contract by the Anglican church, which further supported this idea of a nuptial credit structure.

To at least some degree, the marriage-contract was a mutual verbal promise of fidelity, and it suggested that the "one flesh" construction granted the wife and the husband equal power over each other's bodies.[27] However, the wife was also contractually bound to obey the specific female rules for deference mentioned above, which were considered to hold greater importance.[28] These Protestant ideas were in accord with the Catholic concept of matrimony, which also held marriage as a contractual bond with the greater obligation given to the wife. Notably, though, the Catholic sacrament contained a blessing directed towards the bride alone. This prayer named the woman as an "inseparable helpmate" to man "joined in . . . a yoke of love and peace,"

who must be "faithful and chaste," "fortify her weakness by firm discipline . . . be graceful in demeanour and honoured for her modesty. . . [and] fruitful in offspring."[29] While the Anglican rite redirected the nuptial prayer towards both spouses, it nevertheless retained the Catholic language in its references to ideal *godly* women. In both cases, a wife was directed to love her husband like Rachel and use wisdom like Rebecca. Notably, though, the Anglican prayer added explicit language of deference not present in its source. The phrase "long-lived and faithful like Sara" became "faithful and obedient like Sara."[30] That said, during the playwright's time, the significance of the one-sided interpretation of these rules had decreased.

In his exploration of these socially constructed bonds, Shakespeare establishes two firmly stratified spheres based on gender roles within the setting of *The Comedy of Errors,* the commercial world of obligation for men and the marital domain of obligation for women. The female "business" is firmly confined to the home and allows only for private transactions between the husband and wife. Meanwhile, the "business" which "lies out o' door" (2.1.11) is permitted to men alone, for only they may conduct commerce in public and build their reputation through the marketplace.[31]

Each of these gender-based spheres holds a corresponding bond. Men are bound by agreements enacted through the exchange of goods, exemplified by the obligation that binds Antipholus of Ephesus to pay Angelo for the chain and Angelo to pay the merchant.[32] Likewise, a man's loss of credibility in the sphere of the play can occur through a failure to pay a mercantile debt, but not through a failure to uphold marital fidelity.[33] In contrast, women in the drama are bound by the behavioral expectations of femininity and marriage. Perceived transgression of these rules alone poses a risk to a woman's station.[34] Through his decision to stratify each of the play's main obligation economies based on gender roles rather than to acknowledge the fact that each economy applied to

both genders, Shakespeare emphasizes the interrelatedness of domestic and commercial affairs by drawing parallels between the marital and mercantile economies of obligation. By this means, he exposes the traditional construct of male superiority, as well as problems facing the falsely accused in a society dependent upon following the letter of the law and seemingly predicated on commercial exchange. For Shakespeare, London should not become an Ephesus!

The playwright's focus on the marital economy of obligation and the perpetual debt it imposes on the wife is highlighted through the drama's portrayal of Adriana, who must constantly submit to her husband, Antipholus of Ephesus, to retain her social standing. Meanwhile, though, her husband can be as lustful as he desires without owing her any honor.[35] Shakespeare's focus on the female plight in the marital economy is highlighted through the simple yet powerful act of naming the wife Adriana, whereas Plautus calls his own wife character *Uxor* ("wife" in Latin) and denies her viewpoint in favor of those males around her.[36] Shakespeare allows for Adriana to state her own beliefs concisely in the face of patriarchy. Adriana resents having to ascribe to the binding regulations of wifehood, as she perceives no reason that men should have greater "liberty" (2.1.10) than women. Although she recognizes that her husband is to blame if she loses relevance in his eyes, she still realizes that he has full power over her "state" (2.1.96), which refers to her social position that is defined only by her marital status and sexual purity.[37] As a betrothed woman, Adriana is "consecrate[d]" (2.2.125) to her husband in the eyes of society, and will thus be "contaminate[d]" (2.2.126) by any act of divorce or adultery that he willingly commits against her, including those enacted as punishment for perceived failure to pay her marital debt.[38] At the time, a husband's break of faith with his wife and the rape of a woman were regarded as nearly equal to a woman's intentional sexual act outside of marriage. Antipholus of Ephesus's power as a

marital debtee can be compared to Angelo's mercantile power to indict the Ephesian himself for failure to pay.[39] Adriana, in a renunciation of the construct of wifely deference, asserts that it is "not [her] fault" (2.1.96) if Antipholus is attracted to other women, and simultaneously laments that Antipholus's position of male "master[y]" (2.1.96) unjustly places the guilt for his unfaithfulness on her. Despite Adriana's wishes for a mutual relationship of love and an equal relationship of marital-economic status, her husband is not required to repay Adriana's fidelity with his affection.

Through this unequally yoking relationship of Antipholus and Adriana, the playwright criticizes the misconstrued idea of "one flesh" that grants complete sexual freedom to the husband while fully absorbing the wife's agency. Antipholus is not obligated to maintain sexual relations exclusively with Adriana, even though Adriana must only perform the sexual act with him. Instead, he can use her as yet another "stale" (2.1.102), or means to obtain pleasure, without legal penalty.[40] This objectifying construct establishes that the married woman is not her own person, but an offshoot of her husband's body, as greatly subject to his will as the rest of his parts were. In an echoing of Ephesians 5's misinterpreted language, the wife may be of the same "flesh" (2.2.136), or body, as her husband, but "flesh," or sexual desire and control, is permitted to him alone.[41] Consequently, Adriana must keep her husband from lust to the best of her ability, but simultaneously must watch that she does not overstep the confines of society in doing so.

Within this credit-worthiness analogy, Antipholus of Ephesus cannot lose his credit if he violates his wife's trust, but has legal mastery of Adriana's account of reputation. Despite Adriana's protest, he can freely offer the chain, representative of marriage and the sexual act, to a courtesan, even though the commitment was meant for Adriana.[42] As a result, he can easily defile Adriana's previously blameless credit of social standing. Meanwhile, Antipholus's own credit

as a husband is protected by society. As Adriana observes, he is like a "drop of water" (2.2.119) who will lose no part of his own reputation even after mixing with a sea of women.[43] Thus, Antipholus of Ephesus is able to commit a sanctioned act of identity theft at Adriana's expense, since society has established that he has full power over her.

Error causes the chain to find its way to Antipholus of Syracuse, and thus prevents it from reaching the courtesan, but convention dictates that the chains of marriage permit the husband to be free while the wife remains bound. Richard Henze claims that the chain of "status quo" binds both Antipholus of Ephesus and Adriana, but he does not recognize the liberty afforded to Antipholus within the play's marital construct.[44] Yes, Shakespeare's chain is meant to pass from husband to wife, despite the Ephesian's decision to award the chain to the courtesan. When Adriana reminds her sister that Antipholus "promised [her] a chain" (2.1.107), it becomes a symbol of marital bonds, as she wishes that it would bind him to "keep fair quarters with his bed" (2.1.109). Henze claims that social conventions indeed restrain the married Antipholus in this way, since the literal chain "never gets into the prostitute's hands, and finally helps to rejuvenate [his] and Adriana's marriage."[45] However, Henze does not consider that the chain illustrates the husband's sexual authority, echoing the husband's exchange of the "wife's mantle" with the prostitute in the Plautine source. Thus, what matters is that the husband has the power to give the chain to the prostitute, and not whether it reaches her.[46] In addition, at the play's conclusion, Antipholus of Ephesus never enacts marital reconciliation by awarding the chain to, or by engaging in any sort of dialogue with, Adriana. Instead, he converses with the courtesan and returns her ring.[47] This action appears to signal that he will cease his affairs with the courtesan, as it cuts off the courtesan from receiving the chain. Even so, he could begin another sexual relationship outside of marriage with no penalty, as he has already visited the courtesan several times

without consequence.[48] A renewal of marriage, then, does not necessarily equal full reconciliation between Antipholus and Adriana, since Adriana is aware that her binding marriage still threatens her reputation. Through his ability to award the chain to anyone he chooses, Antipholus of Ephesus shows the true significance of marriage for a husband, as opposed to marriage for a wife.

Although the Antipholi and Dromios experience their own legal loss of identity and entrance into debt, Adriana's loss of self in debt is enacted by custom in another key difference from the debt of the males around her. While Antipholus of Ephesus experiences a loss of identity in the commercial world, his loss and debt are the result of error. After all, the Ephesian's refusal to pay for the chain he did not receive, and consequential entrance into debt, occurs because the chain was accidentally granted to his twin.[49] The Dromios also experience identity loss through error. As servants, their obedience to their masters is required, placing them in ongoing debt to their respective Antipholi. However, they are able to pay their debt temporarily with each act of obedience. In spite of their faithful intentions, though, they end up failing to obey their masters because they confuse their masters' identities, and because their own identities are also mistaken. As a result, they are beaten through no fault of their own. Their experience can be compared to Adriana's suffering of neglect at Antipholus's hands, despite her love for him.[50] This equates the chained woman with chained servants, a dynamic that is especially evident when female actors play these male roles.[51] In addition, the Antipholi and Dromios are restored as holding separate identities at the play's resolution.[52] Adriana, however, remains in debt and continues to experience identity loss. She is bound to her husband by marital regulations and cannot recover an independent identity. In both of the twin instances, two males become one through the error of mistaken identity, but then regain their selves. Adriana, though, is denied the

chance to reestablish her own person. While the Antipholi, the Dromios, and Adriana are all chained by debt and a context of identity theft, only Adriana cannot escape.

Even worse, the Ephesian society glorifies the economy of female obligation and the commodification of women at extreme expense to a woman's agency. The pervasive mentality of womanly deference is particularly evident through Adriana's female counterparts, who have internalized the mindset that the wifely debt to the husband is divinely ordained. In Adriana's society, as well as that of early modern England, the patriarchy was viewed as the epitome of order for a marriage, because it mirrored monarchy. As monarchy was thought to model divinity, patriarchy was also seen as synonymous with the order of God.[53] In her promotion of patriarchal regulations, Adriana's sister Luciana provides an example of the time's ideal woman. Luciana sees constant deference to a husband as God's will for all married women, established when God granted "man" power over all other creatures due to "man's" superior knowledge.[54] In fact, Luciana echoes the early modern English interpretation of the biblical directive given through St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians. While St. Paul equates "husbands" with "Christ," Luciana names men as the "divine . . . master" over creation (2.1.20); both draw parallels between God's subordinate creation and the ideal wife.[55] In fact, within the same translation of Ephesians, "Christ" is referred to as the "head of the church" in relation to the "body" of Christians. This evokes the model of monarchy in which the ruler served as the head, or intellectual controller, of his body of subjects, who needed their king's orders in order to conduct themselves with reason. The patriarchal analogies which equate divine creation and king's subject with a married woman intensify further in light of Ephesians 5, which states that the members of a married couple become "one flesh."[56] Within this analogy, the husband was clearly the rational, kingly head, while the wife was the subordinate body.

Adriana is equated with her husband's doors, an object and mere part of the household that he owns economically and socially. Again, society frames her as only a portion of the male whole, the subordinate body to the head. Eric Heinze points out that contrasting dominant and oppressed roles, even when coupled with error, almost always results in a reinforcement of the play's societal norms. Once the twin-based errors are recognized, custom allows the Ephesian Antipholus to escape the debt incurred through his brother's erratic acceptance of a chain not intended for him, and his own refusal to pay for a good that he did not receive.[57] After all, Antipholus of Ephesus is dominant in every sense of the word. He is a married man native to Ephesus with great riches and economic influence. Thus, he possesses "very reverend reputation" and "credit infinite" (5.1.5-8) within an economy where credit equals currency. In contrast, Adriana's *exclusus amator* [shut-out lover] error, or inadvertent denial of her husband's entry into their home, leads to disastrous consequences for her under custom.[58] Adriana knows well that the wife's serving of dinner to the husband is a crucial component of her duty, and that her refusal to do so may undermine her quest for a reciprocal relationship of love.[59] Her error of admitting the wrong Antipholus leads her to witness what appears to be her husband's denial of their marriage in favor of courting her sister.[60] This mistake also results in the Ephesian Antipholus's visit to the courtesan "out of spite" towards Adriana, as he believes that Adriana purposely shut him out. According to Candido, Antipholus's view that "[his] own doors refuse to entertain [him]" (3.1.121) carries the connotation that Adriana has denied her husband sexual pleasure, in violation of marital norms.[61] Antipholus of Ephesus likely believes that Adriana took this action as a froward form of punishment. After all, Adriana is incensed that her husband has been visiting the courtesan.[62] The entrance denied to the Ephesian Antipholus is not as important as the husband's belief in his wife's intentional

denial. Even if Antipholus did not seek intercourse from Adriana at the time of the shutting-out, he is irate that his wife has asserted a control over him in violation of marital customs.

The Comedy of Errors contains several allusions to Antipholus of Ephesus's damaged reputation as a consequence of his marital unfaithfulness, which ironically evokes the more equal early modern English economy of marital obligation. The play's gender stratification of obligation, though, does not allow for a man's reputation to be sullied in the marital sphere. When Antipholus of Ephesus prepares to visit the courtesan, his friend Balthazar warns him that he "war[s] against [his own] reputation" (3.1.87) as well as his wife's, as word of his affair might spread and taint his credit even after his death.[63] This potential threat is never realized, though, as Aemilia affixes all of the blame for his unfaithfulness on Adriana.[64] More strikingly, Adriana's assertions that Antipholus will be corrupted because of his affair suggest potential contempt for Antipholus in the eyes of his society. Adriana advises Antipholus that his extramarital affair will both suffocate her and "infect" (2.2.173) him.[65] In fact, her assertion that she would be "contaminate[d]" (2.2.126) by his affair carries the sense that he would already have lasting "poison" in his "flesh" (2.2.136) upon his transgression, and will not escape "undishonoured" (2.2.139). This stands in direct opposition to her "drop of water" (2.2.119) metaphor mentioned immediately prior, which carries the idea that Antipholus can corrupt Adriana's purity with no consequence to himself.[66] This "contagion" (2.2.137) of unfaithfulness carries implications for Antipholus's marital credit beyond any private agreement between husband and wife, and beyond internal moral guilt, yet is reduced to a private matter of no weight due to the uneven social enforcements of marital obligation based on gender.

The notoriously difficult jewel passage further illustrates the paradoxical nature of the play's marital economy.

Especially within a construct in which one debt or other transgression can tarnish an individual severely, the "jewel best enameled" (2.1.110), or Antipholus of Ephesus with his spotless credit, should still "lose his beauty" (2.1.111), or reputation, if he is unfaithful to Adriana. His act should at least raise internal concerns about his wife's response. However, "[his] gold" (2.1.111) remains untarnished despite "often touching" (2.1.112), or having repeated affairs outside of his marriage; hence his lack of concern about his reputation. When coupled with the lines directly preceding this passage, along with the interpretation of Larry Weiss, the "jewel" metaphor appears to illuminate Adriana's worry that her husband will not return the love she offers, as well as her concern for both of their reputations. After all, she loves him enough to consider him a "jewel" and "gold," and is distraught that Antipholus no longer views her as having similar beauty.[67]

Adriana is also aware of the differences in obligation for females and males within the sphere of marriage and the sharp consequences of such a stratified economy. She asserts that both husband and wife must be concerned about their marital credit in order to build lasting public and private trust in their relationship and to cultivate sustained mutual love. Meanwhile, however, she realizes that her worry about a male's reputation, which itself will surely not be sullied, will likely damage her own credit if she takes action. Adriana's warnings to her believed spouse are ironic in that they carry an awareness that equal marital obligation between husband and wife is necessary for mutual love and forgiveness, but end up being reduced to an admonition that she alone will suffer from a breach of marital contract.

Instead of an equally binding relationship between wife and husband, the institution of marriage in the play creates a dichotomy similar to that of subhuman beings and humans. After all, Luciana equates women with "beasts . . . fishes, and winged fowls" (2.1.18) in her argument for God-given male

superiority.[68] In addition, when Adriana compares herself to a "vine," her husband is equated with an "elm" (2.2.167), as she depends on him for the small amount of status that she holds. She must be attached to him to flourish socially and retain her growth. This language evokes the Psalm used during the period's sanctioned marriage homilies, which likens the wife to a fruitful vine nurtured by a well-ruling husband.[69] "[Her] weakness, married to [his] stronger state" (2.2.168), an explicit reference to the marriage vows, binds the wife to have no power or voice except through him. Meanwhile, any sexual relations between Antipholus and another woman would violate Adriana's space to thrive as a wife, as well as suffocate Adriana's social credit instantly and permanently, like a fast-growing parasite. Of course, the husband, as the master of the marriage, must first sanction this disempowerment. He may also be "infect[ed]" (2.2.173) by this wrong, as mentioned above, but in the play's sphere, this contamination is reduced to a private moral matter.[70] Most strikingly, the Dromios and Adriana are all compared to "asses" who suffer abuse as they are forced to perform their masters' wills.[71] Through Adriana's assertion that "none but asses will be bridled" (2.1.14) in absolute submission to a husband, the "ass" metaphor is coupled with a pun on the "bridle" of animals and the figurative "bridal . . . bridle" with which the husband leads the wife. This construct of the "bridle" is comparable to the literal and figurative restraint of the chain, as both operate on the mechanics of debtee and debtor.[72] To Luciana, and to the society in which she lives, the woman who does not submit to a man is little more than a wild animal, as she does not have sufficient reason to rule herself.

In conjunction with this patriarchal construct, and despite regulations that granted women some permission to participate in economics, the social continuum of maid, wife, and widow defined a woman in terms of her relationship to men, without consideration of her financial standing.

A woman held the status of a maid and was subject to the will of her father until marriage when she became the wife, bound to her husband until her death or her widowhood.[73] Camilla R. Barker extends this idea further, as she reminds readers that economic status determined no part of a woman's social standing, even for a wealthy woman such as Adriana. While Adriana had to bind herself in the chains of marriage to progress socially, from the role of maid to that of wife, Antipholus of Ephesus increased both his freedom and social standing through the same marriage, due to Adriana's riches.[74] Even worse, Adriana's affluence cannot protect her reputation if Antipholus chooses to end the marriage. After all, according to Barker, "[Any] unmarried woman" was considered "a social pariah."[75] Just as even the richest man could become a debtor, a woman's wealth could not free her from the economy of obligation. Instead, a woman's affluence made her more likely to be viewed as a tool for the betterment of male livelihood.

Through the character of Aemilia, a woman's overstepping of boundaries is framed as a cause of societal chaos, while an acceptance of female submission is required for a return to order. As a result, the patriarchal view of Luciana is shown to win out over Adriana's will. Aemilia, the city's abbess and the seemingly widowed wife of Egeon, does not blame Adriana's husband for his alleged madness and break of faith with his wife. Instead, she chastises Adriana for acting in an animalistic way that does not harmonize with female deference, and vows that womanly "jealous[y]" (5.1.69) must have caused Adriana's husband to have lost his reason. This further perpetuates the notion that women who fail to submit to men demonstrate irrationality.[76] Adriana is now the one who "poisons" (5.1.70) her husband by failing to submit to him, instead of the one affected by the "venom" of her husband (5.1.69). Only when Adriana is willing to rededicate herself to following her husband's will does the play reach its resolution and untangle the confusion of the

twins' mistaken identities.[77] However, in this submission, Adriana cannot establish herself as her own person. Instead, she must willingly adopt the identity of her husband and lock herself into a loss of agency. In other words, she must become "compact of credit" (3.2.22), or place herself within a state of full trust in her husband, despite her husband's unfaithfulness.[78] After all, her violation of society's economy of marital obligation has made her an outsider and has supposedly caused disorder.

Adriana's status as a woman in the overall economy of obligation must be examined in light of the golden chain's symbolism, coupled with the lenses of "consideration" and "*assumpsit*," two structures enacted with the intention of making debt accusations more objective. Andrew Zurcher defines "consideration" and "*assumpsit*" as near opposites within legal evaluations. "Consideration" can be defined as the "witnessable expression of [a given] promise," or the binding proof of said promise. Within the economy of obligation, "consideration" was presented to court as the motivation for legally punishing a debtor. Without "consideration," an accusation of one's failure to pay a debt had no weight.[79] Meanwhile, "*assumpsit*" refers to an implied promise with no proof, as well as the legal "action" taken against a breach of this implied promise. This concept, which required no concrete contract, was introduced as an efficient alternative to "consideration" and overtook "consideration" in its frequency of use in sixteenth-century England.[80] Marriage itself provides a key example of "consideration," as the oath taken on the female end is proof of the vow of wifely obedience. However, a husband's promise of faithfulness in marriage is far more similar to "*assumpsit*," as the marital contract does not bind him to fidelity. Thus, his promise is only implied. Unfortunately for a wife, this promise is not truly actionable under "*assumpsit*," as proof of her husband's infidelity would cause a breach of her own faith under "consideration." As a married man, Antipholus

of Ephesus oversteps theoretical boundaries of faith through his relationship with the courtesan.[81] However, there are no true sexual boundaries for Antipholus, as any sexual act he participates in with another woman indicts Adriana and does not penalize him, thanks to societal regulations. As a symbol of marriage, the chain functions as a "consideration" that binds Adriana to deference and that can be invoked in an accusation against her reputation. Despite also serving as the object of Antipholus's promise on a literal level, though, it does not even require his faithfulness through the force of "*assumpsit*."

In addition to Antipholus of Ephesus's established power to give the chain to the courtesan without the binding of "consideration" or "*assumpsit*," one must also examine the courtesan's own power to bind Antipholus to his promise under the "consideration" structure. Her ability to enforce conventions of the law sharply contrasts with Adriana's lack of power as a wife. The courtesan holds that Antipholus of Ephesus is bound to give her the chain through her own exchange of a ring.[82] The use of the ring, itself a symbol of marital and sexual commitment, implies that she possesses knowledge of the "consideration" structures, as the token of exchange functions as proof of a promise: "for the same [ring] he promised [her] the chain" (4.3.76). One must note that an exchange itself is not sufficient for a promise to be designated "consideration" rather than "*assumpsit*"; however, these lines imply that the exchange was accompanied by verbal pledge and could thus solidify the oath.[83] Thus, the courtesan's use of oath is indeed actionable based on "consideration."

Ironically, the courtesan stands outside the maid-wife-widow continuum of social status, yet occupies the position with the greatest potential for female agency, especially in comparison with the married Adriana, who holds weak influence as a wife. Although the courtesan lacks named identity in comparison with Plautus's prostitute Erotium, and although her time onstage is limited in comparison to

Adriana's plight, her function is not as "reduced" as Levin claims.[84] After all, the courtesan's situation is meant to contrast with Adriana's in terms of control and social standing, yet harmonize with Adriana's in terms of womanly debt. The labels that Dromio of Syracuse attaches to the courtesan, "devil's dam" (4.3.44) and "wench" (4.3.45), connote that she is a prostitute rather than a submissive maid, wife or widow. Her willingness and ability to have sexual relations with the married Antipholus further demonstrate a lack of care for social standing. This indicates that she is a female debtor, with no status to lose or chance to regain any trace of former status.[85] Therefore, even though this courtesan holds a drastically different societal position to that of Adriana, her debt paradoxically places her in parallel with the Adriana who faces the Abbess, since both are framed as disobedient in light of female conventions.[86] Ironically, though, only the more innocuous female debtor, the courtesan, can ensure that the debt Antipholus owes her is paid. The chain does not fall into the courtesan's hands, but she does receive her ring back from the Ephesian upon her demand at the play's conclusion. As the return of her proof of promise ensures that the courtesan has no monetary loss, this demonstrates that she has bound Antipholus of Ephesus to be faithful to his word with at least some degree of success, and has thus enforced "consideration." Because of this, despite possessing no social standing, she carries the greatest power available to women. A maid, wife or widow, in contrast, would struggle to enforce a similar contract without overstepping boundaries of deference to men.[87] Adriana demonstrates this phenomenon within her own plight, as she has no legal authority to ensure that she receives the promised chain from her husband.

It may appear to some that Adriana could enforce Antipholus's promise to give her the literal chain, but she cannot invoke "consideration" or "*assumpsit*" against her husband in the literal or figurative sense. In Zurcher's conception, Adriana can supposedly claim the literal chain

through verbal contract, even though she cannot require her husband to be faithful to their marriage.[88] After all, in a normal circumstance, Antipholus's explicit promise of the chain would function as "consideration."[89] Unfortunately, though, this promise carries no legal weight when one considers the chain's symbolism as the conventional bonds of marriage. As stated above, marriage itself is a relationship of "consideration," because the vow itself contains clear verbal promises and is ratified by written contract. Since marital conventions require Adriana's obedience to her husband, Adriana's contract with Antipholus is also a contract between herself and society. Meanwhile, Antipholus's own promise, unbound by any marital restraint of obedience, is only between individuals. If Adriana were to demand the literal chain from her husband, he would not be forced to obey her. Instead, he could easily invoke the marriage vow, instrument of the symbolic chain, to nullify his words and the "consideration" they would otherwise hold. Subsequently, if Adriana were to press court-based charges under "consideration," her basic legal right would be denied, and she would place herself in permanent social debt.

Without a recognition of marriage as an equally binding obligation between husband and wife, rather than a debt that chains the wife alone, true reconciliation cannot and does not occur. The play's resolution reveals that actions to require payment of individual debts would mitigate problems with the commercial economy of obligation, but not the marital economy as it appears in the play. More importantly, it suggests that forgiveness of a debt between husband and wife is only a possibility when both recognize an equal obligation and still desire mutual love. In the sphere of commercial economy, individuals' debts are quickly paid off and forgiven when error is realized, which nullifies the chance that the debts will permanently destroy one's credit, as they might have if error was not found.[90] As Zurcher explains, this forgiveness of reputation upon payment of individual debts

"was seen as a more equitable response to real transactional problems."[91] After all, this merciful structure of debt forgiveness did not pose an absolute threat to one's reputation regardless of previous credit or force fatal consequences on an innocent individual who was falsely accused of holding outstanding debts. In other words, an individual such as the Ephesian Antipholus would not be in danger of losing his own reputation through another's false assumption.[92]

While the commercial economy defines each transaction's debtor and debtee according to the individuals who are granted and give credit, the play's marital economy does not allow for fluctuation in positions of credit between husband and wife. As a result, the play allows for multifaceted forgiveness within economics alone, while its reconciliation within marital exchange becomes painfully one-sided. Adriana still loves her husband despite his record of waywardness. She forgives him for this straying through the dinner she prepares, a joyful acceptance of which would serve as Antipholus of Ephesus's apology.[93] Of course, this ideal is never realized, due to Adriana's accidental shutting-out of her husband, Antipholus of Ephesus's visit to the courtesan out of "spite" (3.1.119), and Adriana's resulting claim that her husband is insane.[94]

Rather than allowing for mutual reconciliation between husband and wife, though, Aemilia and the Duke, representing their patriarchal society, force Adriana's one-sided apology and submission; they do not allow for even a remote possibility that Antipholus shares Adriana's blame. In order to regain her husband, Adriana must profess that he is "lord of all [she] had" and "master of [her] bed" (5.1.136-37). Otherwise, she acknowledges, she has no chance to restore reputation or mutual love. However, this action subjects Adriana to a position as sole debtor, and the "action" taken to mitigate her individual, accidental debt of shutting-out forces her back into a state of perpetual debt.[95] Adriana does not want to submit herself to her husband and society; she only does so as a last resort. After all, she has previously

likened the state of submissive women to that of "asses" (2.1.14) and has questioned why men should be allowed greater "liberty" (2.1.10) than women in marriage. Also, she wants Antipholus of Ephesus to be held accountable for his guilt, to the extent that she has upbraided him constantly but modestly, in appeals to his conscience.[96] Unfortunately, with equal obligation denied, her reputation may remain relatively intact, but her chance to receive equal love disappears. As mentioned previously, no reconciliation between husband and wife, including the exchange of the chain, explicitly occurs. Instead, Adriana's witnessing of the transaction between her husband and the courtesan serves as an indication that he has behaved and will behave as society allows him to, without recognition of even a private obligation to his marriage.[97] In his own eyes as well as the eyes of his society, Antipholus is still the head of his female property, rather than an individual who possesses a duty equal to his wife in the cultivation of marital love.

Shared reconciliation between Antipholus and Adriana remains impossible without a structure of mutual obligation within marriage, even though marital forgiveness may seem to be implied within the resolution through the play's status as a comedy. In a traditional sense, the term "comedy" connotes a play in which all social tensions, including marriage difficulties, are resolved by the play's conclusion. However, since marital forgiveness ironically does not occur for Antipholus and Adriana amidst characteristic resolutions of economic forgiveness and family reunion, the label of comedy on its own is a misleading categorization for *The Comedy of Errors*. After all, according to the observations of Samuel Johnson, the play marks the start of a consistent Shakespearean pattern in which the commonly accepted labels of dramatic genre are refuted through genuine human relationships: "Shakespeare's plays are not in the rigorous and critical sense either tragedies or comedies, but compositions of a distinct kind; exhibiting the real state of sublunary

nature . . . and expressing the course of the world, in which the loss of one is the gain of another."[98] A more accurate genre for the drama, then, is "problem comedy," the purpose of which is to illuminate social complications as they exist outside the dramatic sphere. Lack of resolution or ambiguous resolution is crucial within this genre, to reflect the gravity of societal problems in a more realistic manner.[99] Thus, the lack of dialogue between Antipholus and Adriana in act 5, coupled with the absent exchange of the chain between the married parties, indeed connotes a lack of shared reconciliation—such forgiveness is never implied, not even through the eponymous label of *Comedy*. In characteristic problem comedy fashion, *The Comedy of Errors* illustrates the consequences that result from a lack of mutual marital obligation by refusing to grant Adriana the forgiveness and love that she so desires, thereby denying a completely comedic outcome in the traditional sense.

Although inconsistencies in patterns of forgiveness may appear to illustrate that the economies of commercial and marital obligation are not interrelated, one must consider the alternative to the above, an application of forgiveness of these marital debts under a principle of shared obligation. If both parties had had the chance to recognize that their debts in the marital economy were caused by a mutual error, forgiveness would have been the likely conclusion, as shown through the economic reconciliation that the play allows for. Yes, if only one party was actually at fault, payment of debt in even a mutually binding marital economy may not equal a full reconciliation as it does in the commercial economy. After all, marital transactions govern human relationships rather than goods, and thus the two economies are not equal in substance. Mutual marital forgiveness must always be denied without an affirmation of marriage as an equally binding obligation between husband and wife.

Within *The Comedy of Errors*, Muldrew's structure of the economy of obligation circulates not only in its original form

relating to financial exchange, but also in the parallel structure of marital relations. Each respective economy is associated with the duty of a single gender role; mercantile obligation is the sphere of men alone, while behavioral-marital obligation solely regulates women. In the play's marital economy of obligation, a married woman such as Adriana is chained by the perpetual debt of deference owed to her husband and restricted in opportunities to exercise her free will. After all, Adriana's society frames her as no better than an animal when she is accused of any unfaithfulness to the bond of marriage, including mere failure to defer to Antipholus. Even concerns about one's husband's possible extramarital affairs on a private obligatory and moral basis are classified as female disobedience. Just as a male debtor was sent to prison and stripped of reputation by the society that accused him of debt, the female debtor lost her credit-worthiness if society judged that she had violated the norms of womanly conduct in a way that did not permit her to be a maid, wife, or widow. Even if a man was allowed to usurp a woman's identity and ruin her credit, as Antipholus of Ephesus does at Adriana's expense, Adriana's society threatens the female debtor with a permanent loss of reputation, while her husband's account remains unstained. After all, Antipholus could bring the force of "consideration" against Adriana and claim that it holds greater weight, based on the one-sided maxims on female obedience explicitly included in the marriage-vow. Thus, the institution of reputation-based accounting and the woman's maintenance of her credit-worthiness are identical. While forgiveness of individual debts is presented as a sufficient solution to the problematic capacities of these economies to damage one's reputation permanently, Adriana realizes that a mutual relationship of love is necessary for any possibility of a reconciliation of marital debt. This reciprocal relationship, however, cannot exist without a shared sense of obligation in marriage, cultivated by society. If wives are continually valued as property and are denied equal economic rights in favor of a

behaviorally defined social status, while husbands apparently do not deprive themselves of their own credit-worthiness through extramarital affairs, any attempt at forgiveness of a single marriage-debt would instead result in a reminder that the woman is chained as the perpetual debtor.

Although Shakespeare contends that patriarchal constructs must either be fought against or abolished in favor of marital mutuality, he does not articulate a solution for wives to achieve a mutual marital relationship within patriarchy as it is illustrated in *The Comedy of Errors.* However, his failure to establish such grounds does not indicate a belief that early modern English women must abandon all hope. After all, *The Comedy of Errors* is only Shakespeare's first play. He might not have found an ideal method for a woman to achieve agency and shared obligation in marriage at the time of *The Comedy of Errors,* but he poses frameworks for the potential establishment of such mutuality in later plays, including *The Taming of the Shrew* and *Much Ado About Nothing*.[100] Thus, the lack of solutions in *The Comedy of Errors* is by no means equal to a lack of available solutions for combating an unequal economy of marital obligation.

Notes

1. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Literary Remains,* ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge, 4 vols. (London: William Pickering, 1836-39), 2:114-15.

2. Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Relations in Early Modern England* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), 3.

3. Ibid., 3, 98-102, 108-109, 274-277.

4. All Shakespeare citations are from *The Bedford Shakespeare edition of The Comedy of Errors* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2015). Quoted lines are cited parenthetically in the text; lines illustrating my thesis are cited among the notes.

5. Sarah Scott, "Maid, Wife, Widow" (lecture, Mount St. Mary's University, Emmitsburg, MD, January 2016.)

6. See *The Comedy of Errors* (*CoE*) 2.1.7, 10-13, 30-31; Andrew Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract, and the End of *The Comedy of Errors*," *Law and Humanities* 1, no. 2, (2007): 154-59.

7. Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation,* 3, 98-102, 108-9.

8. Ibid., 3, 129-30.

9. Ibid., 3.

10. Ibid., 3, 98-102, 108-9, 129-30, 274-77.

11. *The Papers of Sir William Chaytor of Croft*, quoted in Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation,* 276-277.

12. Ibid., 277.

13. Ibid.,183.

14. Colette Gordon, "Crediting Errors: Credit, Liquidity, Performance and *The Comedy of Errors,*" *Shakespeare* 6, no. 2 (2010): 169-70.

15. Ibid., 169.

16. See *CoE* 3.2.155-75; 4.1.1-13, 67-84; 4.3.1-11; 5.1.5-8.

17. See *CoE* 4.1.1-84.

18. Laurie Maguire, "The Girls from Ephesus," in *The Comedy of Errors: Critical Essays,* ed. Robert Miola (New York: Routledge, 2012), 365, 378-379.

19. *New Jerusalem Bible,* Eph. 5:21-24.

20. Michael G. Lawler, "Marriage in the Bible," in P*erspectives on Marriage: A Reader,* ed. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13-14.

21. *New Jerusalem Bible,* Eph. 5:3, 5; Lawler, "Marriage in the Bible," 13-14. Maguire, therefore, is mistaken in her assertion that St. Paul desires "to establish domestic harmony through [the] domestic hierarchy" of male superiority (379). St. Paul's concern that Ephesian women would emulate the Amazons' failure to submit, which Maguire correctly identifies, is not synonymous with advocacy for patriarchy, since he equally disapproves of males' domineering.

22. Ibid., Eph. 5:28.

23. Russ McDonald and Lena Cowen Orlin, "Families," in *The Bedford Shakespeare* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2015), 400; Robert Cleaver, *A Godly Form of Householde Gouernement* (London: Felix Kingston, 1598), accessed via *Early English Books Online,* 80-81; "Homily on the State of Matrimony" (n.d.), ed. Ian Lancashire, *Renaissance Electronic Texts,* University of Toronto, 1997.

24. Cleaver, *A Godly Form of Householde Gouernement,* 166-67.

25. "The Forme of Solempnization of Matrimonye," in *The Book of Common Prayer* (1559), accessed via Society of Archbishop Justus; "Homily on the State of Matrimony"; McDonald and Orlin, "Families," 402.

26. "Homily on the State of Matrimony."

27. Cleaver, *A Godly Form of Householde Gouernement,* 112-15.

28. Ibid.; "Homily on the State of Matrimony"; "The Forme of Solempnization of Matrimonye."

29 Kenneth Stevenson, *Nuptial Blessing: A Study of Christian Marriage Rites* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 36-37, 245-46.

30. Ibid., 246-47.

31. See *CoE* 2.1.1-13, 5.1.5-8.

32. See *CoE* 3.2.155-75; 4.1.

33. See *CoE* 2.1.7, 10-13, 30-31; 3.2.155-75; 4.1.1-14, 67-84; 4.3.1-11; 5.1.5-8.

34. See *CoE* 2.1.7, 10-13, 30-31.

35. See *CoE* 2.1.7, 10-13, 30-31.

36. Harry Levin, "Two Comedies of Errors," in *The Comedy of Errors: Critical Essays,* ed. Robert Miola (New York: Routledge, 2012), 123. According to Levin, the *Uxor's* father "judges her from a one-sidedly masculine point of view," while her husband has several extended affairs with a named "prostitute" and even "auction[s] . . . his wife" as yet another one of his many possessions.

37. See *CoE* 2.1.83-96.

38. See *CoE* 2.2.123-26, 135-36.

39. See *CoE* 4.1.1-14, 67-84; 4.3.1-11; 5.1.5-8.

40. See CoE 2.1.95-109.

41. See CoE 2.2.112-16, 135-39; *New Jerusalem Bible*, Eph. 5:28, 31; McDonald and Orlin, "Families," 400.

42. See *CoE* 3.1.118-20, 4.3.73-77.

43. In the above situation's traditional economic parallel, the Syracusian Antipholus incurs debt on behalf of the Ephesian Antipholus when he receives the chain from Angelo. Despite later being confronted by Angelo and the Second Merchant for his failure to pay, the Syracusian is never penalized for damaging the Ephesian's account, as the twins are assumed to be the same person (as seen in 3.2.157-75; 4.1.62-69; 5.1.10-32).

44. Richard Henze, "*The Comedy of Errors:* A Freely Binding Chain," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 22, no.1 (1971): 38.

45. Ibid.

46. Henze contrasts the chain with the Plautine source's object of exchange, the wife's mantle, which successfully passes from husband to prostitute. As the mantle already belonged to the wife before becoming the prostitute's property, it cannot symbolize the promises or restraints of marriage with the same force as Shakespeare's chain (Henze 38). More importantly, though, both mantle and chain signal a departure from marital structures and a construct in which the husband possesses sexual freedom, as both can be awarded to the prostitute with no penalty to the husband. Thus, Shakespeare retains the use of the exchange-object as a device that shows the husband's authority.

47. See *CoE* 5.1.390-91.

48. See *CoE* 3.1.118-20.

49. See *CoE* 3.2.155-75; 4.1.

50. See *CoE* 2.1.44-86, 88-116; 2.2.7-62; 4.4.8-39.

51. Cambridge Shakespeare Festival, *The Comedy of Errors,* live performance, August 13 and 18, 2016.

52. See *CoE* 5.1.330-425.

53. See *CoE* 2.1.15-25; McDonald and Orlin, "Families," 400-1.

54. See *CoE* 2.1.13, 15-25.

55. *New Jerusalem Bible,* Eph. 5:22-24; Maguire, "The Girls from Ephesus," 378-79.

56. *New Jerusalem Bible,* Eph. 5:31.

57. See 5.1.330-425; Eric Heinze, "'Were it Not Against Our Laws': Oppression and Resistance in *The Comedy of Errors,*" *Legal Studies* 29, no.2 (2009): 237-38, 260.

58. See *CoE* 2.2.211-12, 3.1.27-85, 108-22; Scott, "Maid, Wife, Widow."

59. See *CoE* 2.2.103-212; Joseph Candido, "Dining Out in Ephesus: Food in *The Comedy of Errors,*" in T*he Comedy of Errors: Critical Essays,* ed. Robert Miola (New York: Routledge, 2012), 211, 213-15.

60. See *CoE* 4.2.1-28; Candido, "Dining Out in Ephesus," 214-15.

61. See *CoE* 3.1.108-22; Candido, "Dining Out in Ephesus," 211-12.

62. See *CoE* 3.1.108-22.

63. See *CoE* 3.1.86-107.

64. See *CoE* 5.1.64-95.

65. See *CoE* 2.2.166-73.

66. See *CoE* 2.2.118-39.

67. See *CoE* 2.1.104-16; Larry Weiss, "A Solution to the Stubborn Crux in *The Comedy of Errors,*" *Shakespeare* 12, no. 2 (2016): 148-50.

68. See *CoE* 2.1.15-25.

69. See *CoE* 2.2.166-73; "Homily on the State of Matrimony."

70. See *CoE* 2.2.166-73.

71. See *CoE* 2.1.13-14, 2.2.193-95, 4.4.27-35; Maguire, "The Girls From Ephesus," 360, 375-76.

72. Maguire, "The Girls From Ephesus," 360.

73. Scott, "Maid, Wife, Widow."

74. Camilla R. Barker, "Shackles in Shakespeare: On the Falsity of Personal Liberty in Renaissance England," *Liverpool Law Review: A Journal of Contemporary Legal and Social Policy Issues,* 35, no.1 (2014): 27.

75. Ibid., 28.

76. See *CoE* 5.1.45-48, 62-86.

77. See *CoE* 5.1.98-101, 114-17, 137, 159-60.

78. See *CoE* 2.1.100-2; 3.2.21-24; 4.3.

79. Andrew Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract, and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" *Law and Humanities* 1, no. 2 (2007): 148.

80. Ibid., 156-57.

81. See *CoE* 3.1.118-20, 4.3.73-77.

82. See *CoE* 4.3.60-62, 75-77.

83. Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of The Comedy of Errors," 154-59.

84. Levin, "Two Comedies of Errors," 123.

85. See *CoE* 3.1.118-20, 4.3.73-77.

86. See *CoE* 5.1.68-79.

87. See *CoE* 5.1.391-92; Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 160.

88. Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 158-59.

89. See *CoE* 2.1.104-9; Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 158-59.

90. See *CoE* 5.1.190-425.

91. Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 164.

92. See *CoE* 3.2.155-75; 4.1; Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 164.

93. See *CoE* 2.1.377-89; Candido, "Dining Out in Ephesus," 211, 213-15.

94. See *CoE* 2.2.211-12; 3.1.27-85, 108-22; 4.4.40-108.

95. Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract, and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 164.

96. See *CoE* 5.1.57-67.

97. Zurcher, "Consideration, Contract, and the End of *The Comedy of Errors,*" 160.

98. Samuel Johnson, "Preface to the Plays of William Shakespeare," in *Selected Poetry and Prose [of] Samuel Johnson,* ed. Frank Brady and W. K. Wimsatt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 304-5.

99. Dorothea Kehler, "*The Comedy of Errors* as Problem Comedy," *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 41, no. 4 (1987): 229-31, 236.

100. Kehler, "*The Comedy of Errors* as Problem Comedy," 229-30, 236.