

**“Patens of bright gold” in “this muddy
vesture of decay”:** Jessica’s Name as
**Shakespeare’s Paradoxical Engagement
with the Other in *The Merchant of Venice***

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In his 1926 “Introduction” to the Cambridge edition of *The Merchant of Venice*, editor Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch excoriates Shylock’s daughter Jessica for being “bad and disloyal, a thief; frivolous, greedy, without any more conscience than a cat and without animal instinct—pilfering to be carnal—she betrays her father to be a light-of-lucre carefully weighted with her sire’s ducats.”¹ His harsh views have been slow in gaining critical amelioration and rehabilitation since then, even though Jessica’s rebellious behavior has powerful echoes in, for instance, Juliet’s forbidden marriage to Romeo and Desdemona’s secret elopement with Othello. Desdemona, in particular, acts as the dramatist’s characterological reprising of Jessica in that both heroines choose ethnic outlanders for romance and marriage.² And yet, while these actions have been committed against and outside of their socially accepted norms and conventions, critics of Juliet and Desdemona seem willing to be more sympathetic and discerning when it comes to

interpreting these heroines and their choices of personal destiny.

Indeed, while sometimes calling the play “a racist text,” our contemporary criticism of *The Merchant of Venice* is disposed to put forward a racial discourse that surrounds Jewish characters which pivots on Shylock as a mark of estrangement.³ Unlike the above-named Quiller-Couch, modern audiences and readers, over time, have become more culturally literate and empathetic to the way in which Shakespeare presents the Jewish figures. Even so, these characters are still seen as theatrical as well as reflecting contemporary cultural and ethnic stereotypes as dramatized in the sacrament-stealing, buffoonish Jews in the East Anglian *Croxton Play of the [Blyssyd] Sacrament* or in Marlowe’s dissembling, avenging Barabas in *The Jew of Malta*. Those images inevitably invoke the principle of “otherness” or of the Other.⁴ “The Other” is a modern concept appearing in discourses of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and ethics, all of which study the way people identify or label themselves and other people in social groups. The idea of the Other is related to ontology, the study of the nature and questions of one’s essential being or one’s true self. It may be helpful therefore to gain a basic understanding of what this concept of “otherness” or the Other specifically entails in actual practice before discussing how Shakespeare’s stance towards the Other can be better understood if it is focused on the paradoxical being of Jessica intimated in her name.⁵

Briefly summarized, the principle of the Other is a discursive process which first defines an individual who is perceived by an in-group (or dominant society of Us, Self) as not belonging (part of an out-group of Them, non-self), since the Other is defined and labelled as different in core factors than the in-group, whether such differences are actual or imagined. The Other is thus the stranger among the in-group, and is permitted to live on the margins of society, not as a citizen, but as a resident “other.” Any stranger becomes

the Other. In *The Merchant of Venice*, Antonio uses this term in the line “the commodity that strangers have,” meaning foreign merchants in Venice, in conversation with Solanio (3.3.30) and Shylock describes society spurning him by calling him “a stranger cur” (1.3.128), or what Portia calls “an alien” (4.1.364).⁶ For the Other does not fit in the in-group which is made to establish and exercise the norms of its own proper values and behaviors. Most importantly, the in-group defines its ontology or its own essential identity. Such an in-group, like the play’s Christian Venice, therefore, judges those who do not meet those norms as the Other. Though the Other exists “in close proximity” to that group, the Other does not belong to or is not integrated into that group or society.⁷ Further, this group or society which defines the Other and otherness may be “an entire society, a social class or a community within a society, a family, or even a high school clique or a neighborhood gang.”⁸ The significant of this definition will become clear since it will apply to the play’s other characters beyond Jessica as the plot moves forward.

Among these characteristics, Drakakis’s mention of the Other’s “close proximity” to the in-group society serendipitously calls my attention to the stranger Other’s inherently paradoxical nature. For “close proximity” means not belonging to the in-group, yet existing closely near it. The in-group does not willingly invite the Other to become its full member or to view the Other as a part of the in-group’s essential makeup while allowing the Other to exist near or even in it. Thus the Other’s status embodies a paradoxically liminal and marginal existence as “both a part of, yet set apart from” the in-group and the ontology with which the group composes itself.⁹ It follows that this paradoxical state—simultaneously being near but not being of the in-group—can signal that the Other possesses fundamentally two discrete realities (the reality of the out-group, and that of the in-group), both physically and mentally. This state of

being renders the Other's existence problematic for the in-group since the Other's dual perspectives call the in-group's geographical integrity, its epistemological certainty, and its ontological stability and confidence into question.

Though Julia Kristeva employs the term "abjection" to mean one manifestation of the Other in society, her thoughts on abjection's causes and effects unerringly point to those of the Other (markedly the effects of Shylock and Jessica) in the play. Abjection "disturbs identity, system, or order" and thus threatens the stable in-group's position.¹⁰ Abjection is "above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject [or Self] from what threatens it. . . . But also because abjection itself is a composite of judgment and affect, of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives."¹¹

For Shakespeare and other like-minded writers, this epistemological power to challenge absolute judgment or established conventions was the core function of the rhetorical figure of paradox.¹² Etymologically deriving from a Greek root figure "paradoxon," meaning "contrary opinion" ("para" meaning "contrary to"; "doxon" or "doxa" meaning "opinion"), the figure of paradox exploits:

the fact of relative, or competing, value systems. The paradox is always somehow involved in dialectic: challenging some orthodoxy, the paradox is an oblique criticism of absolute judgment or absolute convention.¹³

At the same time, paradox's intrinsically artistic possibilities must equally have attracted them. Classically-informed rhetoricians of Shakespeare's time stress paradox's epistemological as well as artistic functions. For instance, Henry Peacham who in his *The Garden of Eloquence* (1593, 2nd edition) sees paradox as:

a forme of speech by which the Orator affirmeth something to be true, by saying he would not have believed it, or that it is so *straunge*, so great, so *wonderfull*,

that it may appear to be incredible. This figure is then to be vused, when the thing *which is to be taught is new*, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the opinion of the hearer.¹⁴ (italics are mine)

George Puttenham follows Peacham, expressing a more developed understanding of the figure in the chapter “Of Figures sententious, otherwise called Rheroticall” of his rhetorical handbook, *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589).¹⁵ Puttenham explains its double functions, the first of which is its mental action to produce views contrary to received teaching or opinion. The second is its artistic function which results in what he defines as “the *Wondrer*” and the “maruelous.” It occurs when:

Many times our Poet is caried by some occasion to report of a thing that is *maruelous*, and then he will seeme not to speake it simply but with some signe of *admination* as in our enterlude called the Woer . . . oftentimes we will seeme to cast perils, and make doubt of things when by a plaine manner of speech wee might affirme or deny him as thus of a cruell mother who mured her owne child.¹⁶ (italics are mine)

Puttenham implies paradox’s simultaneous nature as a-part-of/yet-apart-from-ness in human conditions, events, things, and ideas, and holds that that is the reason why writers are naturally drawn to paradox, particularly in their pursuit of the marvelous and of “Wondrer” (i.e., astonishment), and Peacham’s idea of “wonderfull” (“marvelous thing, astonishment, OED, s.v. “wonderful”), while both writers agree in finding paradoxes in incongruent or unexpected aspects of life. In dramatic constructions of “Wondrer,” the marvelous, and “wonderfull,” Puttenham notes, writers play intricate games with commonly held conventions and expectations by yoking contrary or unexpected ideas together so as to reconfigure a potential for fresh thought and knowledge.

By making this close link between paradox and both epistemology and wonder, Puttenham also touches upon the ethical aspect of a poet's role. For he recommends that "the good Poet or maker ought to *dissemble his arte* [disguise or conceal his art to reveal something else], and in what cases the *artificiall* [what is contrived by human skill] is more commended then the natural, and contrariwise" (italics are mine).¹⁷ At the same time, he counsels that the purpose of a good writer's artificial "wonder" and "marvel" must not remain a mere trick of his style alluring and catering to the hearer's sensation of them; it must have a higher purpose, one that will deepen and even instruct the hearer's mind and heart in moral lessons:

so is there yet requisite to the perfection of this arte, another maner of exornation, which resteth in the fashioning of our makers language and stile, to such purpose as it may delight and allure as well the mynde as the eare of the hearers with a certaine noueltie and strange maner of conueyance, disguising it no little from the ordinary and accustomed.¹⁸

In his ethical stance toward the use of paradox, Peacham echoes Puttenham when he recommends that "[t]his figure is then to be vsed, when the thing which is to be taught is new, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the opinion of the hearer." Shakespeare seems to have heeded their advice as he does carefully "dissemble his arte" in that he reveals new thought, knowledge, and understanding in devising his own "wonder," "marvelous," and "wonderful" while he paradoxically conceals them. In *The Merchant of Venice*, what he conceals is Jessica's so-called rebellion as the artistic "wondrer," "marvelous," and "wonderful," but in so dissembling, he reveals his art's ability to transform thoughts about the Other through Jessica's name.

Admittedly, at the first sight of Jessica, Shakespeare appears to conceive her character on the standard assumptions of his time, portraying her as Jewish and therefore as the

Other in an alien/non-citizen/stranger triad. In contrast with Juliet and Desdemona who are presumably an integral part of their societies (Verona and Venice respectively), Shakespeare highlights Jessica’s otherness which she takes on in many forms of difference: a different race or ethnicity (European vs. Jewish); a different nationality (Venetian Republic vs. Israelite or the Jewish nation or “sacred nation” as Shylock says [1.3.47, 3.1.55]); a different religion or origin (Christianity vs. Judaism); a different place of living (the city vs. the segregated area within the city/the ghetto),¹⁹ a different social class (Venetian citizen vs. resident alien—the particular point Portia brings up in her courtroom peroration); a different nature of being (fully human vs. a subhuman/lesser OR inferior being; OR, male vs. female—master vs. subordinate, son vs. daughter—all universally and traditionally accepted ontological traits of women in patriarchy).²⁰

But, masked in these outward signs is the shaping origin of Jessica’s thrice paradoxical nature. First, as Shylock’s daughter, Jessica is a part of the same ethnic Other, yet she is set apart from his prescriptive, patriarchal codes of daughterly conduct. What she is becoming is also a part of, yet set apart from, Venetian society at large as she wants to become Lorenzo’s Christian wife and elopes with him. That she is aware of her twice paradoxical existence in Venetian society can be heard in her only soliloquy in act 2, scene 3, though Shakespeare causes her to say it in the form of pain and conflict between the loyalty she owes her father and the moral disapproval she feels for his manners:

Alack, what heinous sin is it in me
To be ashamed to be my father’s child?
But though I am a daughter to his blood,
I am not to his manners, O Lorenzo,
If thou keep promise, I shall end this strife,
Become a Christian and thy loving wife. (2.3.16-21)

But, to come to the very heart of her paradoxical being, Shakespeare increases his sense of Jessica's "wondrer" and "maruelous" by slowly revealing her rebellious conduct as one of many manifestations of "hazard" the characters take on in the play. In Jessica's case, her hazard takes the form of a basic human desire to have outward-bound movement from the constraints and conventions of her family and society, going against Shylock's decree to "Shut doors after you. / Fast bind, fast find" (2.5.51-2). Shakespeare makes this point more intelligible, affective and, most of all, purposeful by harkening back to the literary tradition of morality plays as well as of medieval allegorical and Christian themes and imagery in which characters' names are attributively chosen. Shakespeare uses this technique not only to distinguish "one character from another," but also to emphasize "figurative overtones" contained in characters' personality traits or occupations.²¹

Viewed under figurative and allegorical lights, then, Shakespeare seems to have chosen Jessica's name for its rich instructive power, or as Peacham suggests, "[t]his figure is then to be vused, when the thing *which is to be taught is new*, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the opinion of the hearer." Some onomasticians speculate that the spelling of Jessica is Shakespeare's own invention.²² Shakespeare probably based the name on the Hebrew name Yiskah or Iskah (daughter of Haran), which was then anglicized as Jeska in the Geneva Bible (translated in 1560), Jescha in the Wycliffe version, or Iesca in the Matthew Bible (translated in 1537), all of which were available to Shakespeare.²³

The etymological meanings inhering in Jessica's name were readily available to Shakespeare's bible-reading culture, and he enroots these meanings to organize her so-called rebellious behaviors as the wonder and the marvelous that conceal her core being or true self. For Jessica is a proper name that means "foresight or being able to see the potential in the future;" it also means "one who looketh out / forth," as

Elizabethan commentators glossed it.²⁴ In Hebrew, the name Jessica also means “rich, or God beholds.” Thus, Shakespeare plays on the name’s deeper lesson and creates etymologically allusive scenes to establish Jessica’s most fundamental character which she acts on: against Shylock’s injunction, “Clamber not you up to the casements then/ Nor thrust your head into the public street” (2.5.31-2), she instead listens to Lancelot who prompts her to “look out at window for all this” (2.5.39). She is indeed literally looking out of window for the coming of Lorenzo who is now her existential “potential in the future” ([Enter] Jessica above, dressed as a boy. [2.6.26]). Her “unfilial” outbound behavior—her voluntary breaking out of Shylock’s prescriptive codes of daughterly conduct, thus defying the time’s view of proper female behavior—then can be seen as her simply looking out for and taking watchful care of the spirit embedded in her name. Her subsequent actions throughout the play then become the outward-bound movements of her name’s prompting spirit, though Shylock feels justified in condemning her as “a rebel” daughter and “damned for it” (3.1.28, 30). She disguises herself as a boy to escape, moving out of a patriarchal view of gender fixity to the freedom of gender flexibility (2.6.39); she then elopes with Lorenzo, moving out of the ghetto to the city and beyond; she becomes Lorenzo’s wife, moving out from the sanction of the Old Mosaic Law to that of the New Law of Christianity, thus creating a new social identity (“I shall be saved by my husband. He hath made me a Christian” [3.5.18-9]); she steals Shylock’s money and jewels, moving out of Shylock’s own prodigal love of gold (2.6.33, 3.1.94) to giving and using it for the “hazard” of her love; and when she indulges in profligate spending in Genoa, she moves from hoarding gold for its own sake like Shylock (“Fourscore ducats at a sitting, / fourscore ducats!” [3.1.85-99]) to fulfilling Lorenzo’s image of her soul as, like the stars, being made of “bright gold” in “patens” (5.1.69).

Fast forward in dramatic action to act 5, scene 1 and the etymological dimensions in Jessica's name coalesce into her most paradoxical role. For with his final dissembling act, Shakespeare proves that she has turned her biblical namesake into the entirely new Jessica: she has turned her outward movement into her act of "looking out" for "the potential in the future" of mutual love with Lorenzo and the final reward she receives at Portia's home, Belmont. Providing moonlight and music, which functions metaphorically as universal harmony, Shakespeare causes Venice's young in-group and out-group (the Other) members to engage in a kind of dialogue of social bonding, with the salutary result that they acquire a heightened creative understanding of social others and themselves. Jessica-Lorenzo's classical allusions in their love duet first foreground their cognitive ascent to reach more richly understood and articulated selves (5.1.1-22). Placing her own love story among the famous tales of love and faith between stranger and insider, Jessica pretends to be Cressida (wife of Menelaus of Sparta, a stranger) who betrays Troilus (a Trojan, an insider) after Cressida is moved to the Greek camp. Jessica also likens herself to Thisbe (a stranger) who, together with Pyramus (another stranger) in defiance of their insider parents ends her life tragically. Jessica alludes to Dido (queen of Cartage, an insider), who falls in love with Aeneas (a Trojan, a stranger) who in turn abandons her. Lastly, Jessica compares herself to Medea (of Colchis, an insider) and her love Jason (from Iolcus, a stranger) who betrays her and the way Medea avenges his treachery by murdering her own two sons by Jason. By elevating her love for Lorenzo to a universal, mythic level, Jessica demonstrates her new knowledge that unlike classical examples of insane or tragic love, her otherness in love has neither turned tragic nor miscarried despite surface resemblances. No longer existing as a binary self in society's eyes, her otherness has instead brought her and her now-husband Lorenzo to Belmont as a dual self in a place where free human association, friendship, and true romance culminate.

Shakespeare’s last paradoxical touch is Jessica’s newly achieved special epistemology which allows her to “see” what the in-group cannot. Her outbound movements have been in fact her mind moving transformatively toward what may be termed a humanized ethical epistemology beyond the insiders’ simplistic and reductive duality of insider/citizen and stranger/Other. The act of the mind is infinite, irreducible, complex, and full of possibilities. Thus, the final paradox of Jessica is that it is Jessica the Other who defines others, because her Otherness helps to hold the truth of the identity of herself and others. Most illuminating is the role of Jessica as Portia’s moral foil. Like Jessica, Portia—the gendered Other and subordinate to men—gains knowledge by learning the difference between doing good and knowing good. Like Jessica, Portia first wins Bassanio with her own device when she helps him choose the correct casket by providing background music that contains a hint on how to choose the right casket. But ultimately she refines her knowledge in the courtroom and secures Bassanio, not as a matter of self-abnegation or as a sacrificial victim like these classical women, but as a willing choice and defiance against the deceased father’s injunction, mirroring Jessica’s “rebellion” in a man’s disguise. Like Jessica still, Portia also has “looked out for” a marriage of love as a union fundamental to her own civic freedom while learning also how to envision a redistribution of social authority in her civic society. In the final view, both Jessica and Portia transcend the accepted codes of the Other defined by class, culture, ethnicity, and gender. Jessica has taken watchful care, using the spirit innate in her name to reach her potential (“patens of bright gold” 5.1.69), achieving her fundamental right to individual salvation and happiness, this despite her thrice paradoxical social status as the Other (“this muddy vesture of decay” 5.1.72).

As Shakespeare concludes the play at Portia’s Belmont (suitably meaning “a beautiful hill,” deriving from the Old

French “beu” [fair, lovely] and “mont” [hill, mountain]), one wonders if Shakespeare’s interest in proper names is only professionally inspired. Using his accepted biographical information, one can speculate that the shaping origins of his sense of the Other derived from the foundational paradox in several aspects of his own life. What made him “a stranger” and “an outsider” might have been his provincial heritage and education.²⁵ Another paradox is evident in the life he lived amid the bustle of mercantile London while, Tucker Brooke suggests, “his soul through all this time remained a stranger to them.”²⁶ His writing career amidst the brilliant inner circle of the university wits and “the gentleman poets” might also have made him a part of, yet set apart, from his perhaps better-circumstanced social and literary associates.²⁷ The “stranger-outsider” in him must have been further honed by his astute schooling at the marginalized theatre which, paradoxically, was “both a part of, yet set apart from” the liberties of London.²⁸ In Steven Mullaney’s phrasing, the stage taught him “[the] power to produce, in dramatic form, an anamorphic scene that always seems to call for yet one more perspective, for what are oftentimes mutually exclusive points-of-view, if it is to be adequately comprehended.”²⁹ He is comparing the effects of Shakespeare’s theatrical education to the similarly subversive and paradoxical effects of the anamorphic image of a skull in the foreground of Hans Holbein the Younger’s painting, *The Ambassadors*. Even in his private self, his outbound artistic movement also points to his keen sense of paradox about his family name as evidenced in the granting of a coat-of-arms to his father, John Shakespeare in 1596—coincidentally the year he composed *The Merchant of Venice*. On his father’s death in 1601, Shakespeare continued to use the coat of arms and had the right to style himself a gentleman—a new synthetic self built upon a faith that he could transcend the external given of his birth and enter a new field of belonging through his professional and personal respectability. Drawing on his

“maruelous” and “wonderfull” life, he would felicitously cultivate his universalist sensibility—what Mikhail Bakhtin calls “*supra-I* . . . the witness and the judge of *the whole* human being, of the whole I, and consequently someone who is no longer the person, no longer the I, but the *other* . . . a person irrespective of *I* and other,” maintained in a dialogic equilibrium.³⁰ And thus enriched with paradox’s epistemological and artistic privilege, Shakespeare dramatizes his kinship with Jessica and foreshadows our modern thinking that we as individuals are a microcosm of multiple Others within ourselves, distinct and different at given moments but also made a whole in the mysterious workings of multivalent love’s power which can transcend both external and inner givens and boundaries.

Notes

1. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, introduction to *The Merchant of Venice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), xx.

2. Generally agreed dates for their composition are as follows: *The Merchant of Venice* was composed in 1596-7, *Othello* in 1603-4.

3. John Drakakis, introduction to *The Merchant of Venice* (London: Arden Shakespeare, A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 2010), 30.

4. Otherness and Other are used interchangeably as signifiers.

5. The following concise and useful sources have been consulted: Lilia Melani, “The Other,” Brooklyn College, City University of New York, last modified February 4, 2009, <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/english/melani/cs6/other.html>. She usefully summarizes modern thoughts on the Other by such writers as Edmund Husserl, Emanuel Levinas, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Julia Kristeva. John Drakakis’s introduction in his edition of the play has also been consulted.

6. Lines quoted in this article are drawn from William Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, ed. Barbara A Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992).

7. Drakakis, introduction to *The Merchant of Venice*, 30.

8. Melani, “The Other.”

9. This is Steven Mullaney’s phraseology describing the status of Shakespeare’s theatre in relation to the City of London in his *The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 54. I have adopted this expression to emphasize the gap between in-group and Other throughout this paper.

10. Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roundiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4.

11. *Ibid.*, 9-10.

12. The term “writers” in the English Renaissance is meant to refer to “authors” (translators, prose writers), “playwrights,” and “poets or makers,” though some writers belong to more than one category. George Puttenham uses “poet” throughout his work.

13. Rosalie L. Colie, *Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 10.

14. Perseus Digital Library, “Henry Peachum., The Garden of Eloquence (1593): Schemas,” Tufts University, accessed February 28, 2019, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.03.0096%3Apart%3DSchemas+Rhetorical%3Asubpart%3DThe+second+order%3Asection%3DFigures+of+Permission%3Asubsection%3DParadoxon>.

15. Quotations from Puttenham derive from George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (London: A. Murray and Sons, 1869), Internet Archive, <https://archive.org/details/georgeputtenham00puttgoog/page/n144>). I have also consulted with a critical edition of Puttenham’s handbook edited by F. Whigham and W. A. Rebhorn who modernized Puttenham’s Elizabethan English.

16. *Ibid.*, *The Arte of English Poesie*, 233.

17. *Ibid.*, 304.

18. *Ibid.*, 149.

19. In 1516, the Republic of Venice established the world’s oldest Jewish ghetto.

20. I have adapted Melani’s list of otherness to characterize Jessica’s otherness. Many of these characteristics are shared by Jessica and Portia as gendered Others.

21. See Israel Gollancz, *Allegory and Mysticism in Shakespeare: A Medievalist on The Merchant of Venice, Reports on Three Lectures*, ed. A. W. Pollard (London: Haskell House, 1931), 13-68; Barbara K. Lewalski, “Biblical Allusion and Allegory in *The Merchant of Venice*,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 13.3 (Summer 1962): 327-343; William Green, “Humours Characters and Attributive Names in Shakespeare’s Plays,” *A Journal of Onomastics* 20.3 (September 1972): 157-165.

22. Patrick Hanks, Kate Hardcastle, and Flavia Hodges, *A Dictionary of First Names*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142-3.

23. Genesis 11.29. The Bishop’s Bible (translated in 1568) may have also been available to him. Though the King James version is often cited as part of Shakespeare’s indirect sources, it was not published until 1611, near his retirement from the theatre. On the popularity of the Geneva Bible among the Puritans, see Adam Nicolson, *God’s Secretaries: The Making of*

the King James Bible (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003), 58-60, 180, 228-230, and 249-50.

24. Gollancz, *Allegory and Mysticism in Shakespeare*, 42.

25. The Other and the outsider often overlap, but they are not identical. “The outsider has the possibility of being accepted by and incorporated into the group; offspring are very likely to be accepted into the group.” Melani, “The Other.”

26. Tucker Brooke, *Essays on Shakespeare and Other Elizabethans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 27.

27. Stephen Greenblatt, *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare* (New York: Norton, 2004), 206-10.

28. Mullaney, *The Place of the Stage*, 54.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Mikhail Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*, trans. and notes by Vadim Liapunov, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 39; “From Notes Made in 1970-71,” *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 137-8.