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In Memory of Michael Flachmann
(1942 – 2013)

Distinguished professor of English and Director of the Honors Program at California State University-Bakersfield, Dr. Michael Flachmann served as dramaturge for the Tony-award winning Utah Shakespeare Festival and was a founding board member of the Wooden O Symposium and its sister publication the *Journal of the Wooden O*. Dr. Flachmann was an accomplished Shakespeare teacher and scholar authoring more than twenty book and 100 articles. His expertise and professionalism were vital to the ongoing success of both the symposium and the journal. His annual Actors' Roundtable with members of the Festival Company was a highlight of the symposium and a welcome addition to the literature. His insightful comments, ready smile, and keen wit will be missed.

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The Wooden O Symposium is a cross-disciplinary conference that explores Medieval and Renaissance studies through the text and performance of Shakespeare's plays. The symposium is held annually in August in Cedar City, Utah, and coincides with the Utah Shakespeare Festival's summer season. Three plays from Shakespeare's canon are performed each summer in the Adams Memorial Shakespeare Theatre, a unique performance space modeled after the Globe Theatre, Shakespeare's own "Wooden O."

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The Kingly Bastard & the Bastardly King: Nation, Imagination, and Agency in Shakespeare's *King John*

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In *The Life and Death of King John*, Shakespeare delivers a controversial character who demonstrates remarkable imagination, individuality, and agency, a fictional Bastard whom the playwright uses to interrogate notions of "truth," "rightness," and legitimacy. The Bastard character's capacities are important, because as the pivot between Shakespeare's two tetralogies, *King John* was first staged as England moved from empire to nation. It is argued here that Shakespeare's history, about the reign of perhaps England's worst king, encouraged playgoers to think of themselves as individuals with the agency necessary to *choose* nation rather than merely exist as subjects whose nation chose them.[1] While complexly persuasive, the play is not polemical or propagandistic in the traditional sense. *King John* thematically echoes and supports much of the propagandistic print media of the day, but because it is not a polemic, the play invites audiences to reason with and against its characters, in particular with the Bastard character, as they attempt to navigate the "thorns and dangers" of their world (4.3.147).[2]

This article proposes Shakespeare's richly imagined Bastard, Philip Falconbridge, son of Richard the Lionhearted, as a very different sort of hero and protagonist, and it uses him as a prism through which to see Shakespeare's participation in the project to imagine or invent an England. In applying Benedict Anderson's ideas of "imagined" nations and national community, and in building on Claire McEachern's proposition that Shakespeare, along with Edmund Spenser and Michael Drayton, wrote or inscribed a nation through texts, this article interrogates *King John* as part of a larger study that reads Shakespeare's histories as contributors to and not merely portrayals of national identity, a project that similarly reads *Richard III* and *Henry V*.[3] This

particular reading argues that the play is not contradictory or confused in its presentation of the Bastard, as some critics have found it, but rather that the character's transformation in his pursuit of an "ordering of the time" is a key to understanding the kind of nationalism that Shakespeare is seemingly advocating or, regardless of intent, persuasively depicts in this complex play. It is a reading that sees language not as a neutral medium, passing freely and easily into the private property of any speaker's or interpreter's intentions, but one that interprets Shakespeare's histories as a coherent, cohesive attempt to implement a nation, or, to use a less anachronistic term, nation-ness.[4]

To propose some possibilities about what Shakespeare communicated to audiences in the late 1590s when *King John* was probably written and first performed, this article considers a few organizing questions: What does the Bastard character, as he who possibly "embodies England and the English soul," suggest from the perspective of a noble about "Englishness" and England as nation?[5] To use Anderson's terms, how does the Bastard contribute to the idea of England as "an imagined political community . . . both inherently limited and sovereign," rather than defaulting to the early Tudor notion of nation as merely race, kind, or kin?[6] If nationhood is, to use Stephen Kemper's phrase, "a conversation that the present holds with the past," Shakespeare can be seen as informing this conversation by blending the historical and the fictional, and in this naturalized blend drawing from and contributing to the collective memory (or *post-memory*, as Anderson refers to it) and shared culture that are necessary ingredients of nation-ness as a cultural expression.[7] This view of nation-ness is in contrast to England as empire, as Henry VIII declared it to be more than sixty years prior to Shakespeare's writing of King John.[8]

In interrogating Shakespeare's conscious or unconscious project to create or imagine a nation, *King John* is a text worth close examination. The play's politics "seem beyond dispute," as David Womersley put it, ending with "a note of refreshed, exhilarated patriotism and newly forged national integrity."[9] The utterly national Bastard is the last man standing, ending the play with an attempt to inspire future England to be to "true" to itself. In this attempt, Shakespeare, through his character, therefore imagines a unified and unifying national "truth." But the Bastard's patriotism is not simply reflexive; it is considered and questioning, crystallizing as the character becomes a noble, even kingly citizen. This article, therefore, disagrees with

Alexander Leggatt's view of the Bastard as merely "drifting" into his allegiance.[10] Falconbridge stirringly declares at the play's close, in some of the play's most memorable lines:

> This England never did, nor never shall,
> Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
> But when it first did help to wound itself.
> Now these her princes are come home again,
> Come the three corners of the world in arms,
> And we shall shock them. Nought shall make us rue,
> If England to itself do rest but true. (5.7.116-22)

Background

Lacking a conventionally satisfying protagonist and absent a miraculously heroic ending, the "notoriously episodic" *King John* is very rarely staged.[11] First performed since the time of Shakespeare in February 1737 at Covent Garden in London, a staging that was revived in 1823, the play eschews a traditional narrative and a prototypical hero.[12] In attempting to explain this, Sigurd Burkhardt surmised that Shakespeare was "bored with a theatrical chore," more interested in finishing quickly, with "no way to put Humpty Dumpty back together again."[13] This criticism is misguided.

While not wholly neglected in the literature, *King John* has not generated anything of the same scholarly interest or output as Shakespeare's other plays, including all of his histories. Emrys Jones suggests that of all of the playwright's early plays, it is *King John* that has "receded furthest from us, so that a special effort is needed to recover it."[14] Scholars have been particularly quiet on the subject in the last twenty-five years, after a flurry of interest in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Perhaps disillusionment after the Vietnam War and Watergate fueled an interest in the play's themes of sedition and political commodity, at least among scholars in the United States.

Though the play's relatively low profile and even languishing could be explained by the infrequency of its staging, Virginia Mason Vaughan has suggested that the play is ignored more because it does not fall within the broad scope of series like the two tetralogies between which it somewhat awkwardly sits.[15] No book-length scholarship of *King John* has yet been published, and it does not help the play's popularity, as Carole Levin points out, that John, the historical figure, has been despised with near unanimity for centuries.[16] His military defeats, stamping rages, and appalling cruelties, his sloth, lechery, and gluttony, and his

capitulation both to the Pope and to his own rebellious barons establish him as perhaps the "worst monarch to rule England."[17]

Following Shakespeare's visually daring *Richard III*, *King John* should be seen as a further dramatic development away from or beyond the moralist tradition in theater and a recognition by Shakespeare that the God-ordained Tudor progression assumed by so many of the period's plays ultimately was an imaginative dead end. *King John* can and perhaps should be read, therefore, as a series of debates and point-counterpoints, which provides for an interesting look at the playwright's development in his writing of history. Shakespeare in the play moves beyond local political interests and elevates his view of national identity and of citizenship, and he does this ingeniously through the experience of one of the period's ultimate "others," a bastard son. Unfortunately, a series of debates does not lend itself to dynamic staging, as several scholars have noted, which likely explains its rarity on the world's stages.[18]

Elizabethan era history plays were expected to shed light on contemporary events by holding up a mirror on the times and by providing examples that could be studied for their immediate practical importance.[19] Playwrights drew from the past for didactic purposes, liberally re-mixing historical events for these purposes.[20] Actors during this period were among the "chroniclers of man's great deeds," and it was in the theater that the "actions of the world are preserved for the instruction of future generations," as Anne Righter put it.[21] *King John* does not disappoint in this regard, but in this reading, the play also is regarded as part of a much larger project to imagine an England, a project that, as Anderson argued, depended upon a unifying print culture, and a project that, as McEachern conceives of it, joins Shakespeare with Spenser ("The Faerie Queen") and Drayton ("Poly-Olbion") as writers of "political discourse [that] inscribe and imagine a nation."[22] Elizabethan history plays can be considered as part of a print culture that welded the nation together in, as Michael Neill put it, "helping to reform the inchoate babble of a bastard tongue into a true national language."[23]

In communicating and, as works of fiction, even creating this collective memory, or what Stephen Greenblatt calls "the collective consciousness of the kingdom," Shakespeare's history plays furnish the project to inscribe and imagine a nation with what Roland Barthes described as a mythic truth and a naturalized history.[24] As a contributor to this cultural consciousness and

corporate identity, Elizabethan theater created imaginary worlds of increasing naturalism and depth, fostering a belief in playgoers that illusion could exercise power over reality.[25] The play metaphor is quite powerful, making the theater an important source of what was a "newfound sense of national unity and purpose which was the mainspring of Elizabethan activity in every field," according to John Dover Wilson, writing in his introduction to *King John*.[26] The degree to which this "sense" of national unity and identity was true or accurate or real is beside the point: as Anderson argues, "nationhood" here is an ideal and imagining of something forever just beyond reach. Thus, Shakespeare's histories are involved in something much larger than propaganda or patriotism, or what Gerald Newman defines as "a mere primitive feeling of loyalty."[27]

The mostly propagandistic plays that were contemporary during the reign of Elizabeth promoted a larger narrative of God divinely appointing Elizabeth and the Tudor reign after and perhaps because of the sins of the Plantagenets, Yorks, and Lancasters. In his imaginative capacity and "loyal but searching study of England's past," Shakespeare did much more than support the orthodox casting of contemporary politics, however, and it is his unorthodoxy that is highlighted in *King John*, Shakespeare's only play dramatizing English medieval history prior to the fall of Richard II.[28] It is important in the larger project that the play looks back to one of the first kings of the Plantagenet dynasty in order to condemn that reign, but in that condemnation to hold up, examine, and celebrate the Bastard's self-determination and the transformation of what could be called civic duty into the much more powerful and persuasive desire.

Myth and history

Emrys Jones described the Bastard character as standing "with one foot in history, the other in myth"; he can thus appeal to a "deep layer of audience-memory."[29] As a mythic character in the Barthesian sense, a social type, and epithet, the Bastard conflates "past significance and performed meaning."[30] Like the hero of a medieval romance, he is larger than life, while at the same time believable, life-size, heroic, yet also human. Playgoers read and experience this myth as a story that is at once unreal and yet true, or the bearer of larger truths; this is the principle of myth: history transformed into nature as its myths are experienced as "innocent speech."[31] The Bastard's speech is all the more innocent because he is so human, just a "good, blunt

fellow," in the playwright's description (1.1.72). He establishes a connection with audiences immediately, just as they are getting acquainted with him in act 1. He does this with a sense of humor and ready wit, because of his satirizing view of nobility and court life, and due to his comic familiarity with his own illegitimacy. Jones credits the character with "warmth and energy of mind," and with a good-humored laughter that is a "most powerful and rapid of creative solvents."[32] Yet he maintains enough distance from the action of the play, what little there is, to comment on and make meaning of it, even to earn the audience's trust as a guide to the "truth" of the play. In Barthes's terms, the Bastard invites, if not obliges, playgoers to acknowledge the intentions that have motivated him as myth and *King John* as history because myth does not hide, but privileges or signals a particular, even individual history, as "a confidence and as a complicity."[33]

This complicity is all the more intriguing because, as a bastard, the character draws attention to the nature of order, authority, legitimacy, and, for this play, all-important "right" and "right-ness," especially for a society organized on paternal authority. Plays with a prominent bastard character "advertise an awareness of the false consciousness which creates legitimacy and upholds . . . the State," as Alison Findlay argues in her exhaustive history of bastardy in Renaissance England.[34] Because through the father a son claims his inheritance and is eligible for, among other "rights," civil office, the character's bastardy is a commentary on John's own claim to the crown, which, depending on how the play is interpreted, is also either an affirmation or a critique of Elizabeth's own claim to the throne. (Her own "secret" bastardy had been declared in the 1536 Succession Act.[35]) *King John*'s Bastard is, after all, a contravention of the law, as John himself notes in the first act, just as the King, though affirmed by the law in a *de facto* sense, is a bastard to the throne. He possesses it, but, at least in Shakespeare's telling, has not the same right to it that Arthur does. This makes the king's knighting of the Bastard in act 1 a wicked joke on the king himself: the bastard king making legitimate the Bastard son of Richard, in contravention of English common law, and giving the Bastard possession of a place in the court to which the Bastard has no "right" (1.1.117-30). The Bastard's physical presence and his ascension to knighthood in turn illegitimates the law, which is typically personified as male, as "father," in counterposition to the feminine or motherly love of country. To anticipate the play's climax, this bastardy also precludes Philip/Richard Falconbridge

from laying any sort of claim to the crown himself, lacking as he does his father's name, even though he is by play's end its most kingly character.

In rendering a very individual history of an invented bastard character, portraying him as the key agent in what otherwise is a reading of a national history, Shakespeare was making a most unorthodox move in that most orthodox of nationalistic enterprises—that of fostering patriotism. Following the character's cues in the source text, *The Troublesome Raigne of King John*, Shakespeare has the Bastard sever his familial ties in order to dedicate him to service to nation. His domestic origins become national, and his nationalism and patriotism become more important in the play than honor, "right," and objective meaning or truth, which are trampled by several characters in the play. "But truth is truth," Robert Falconbridge says, to point to just one example, when clearly "truth" is not truth (1.1.106). This continual trampling for Eamon Grennan is "one of the most striking linguistic features of the play."[36] The Bastard's origins and "rights" are contested even within his own family, for whom he is an inconvenient "truth" or presence. It is relatively easy for the character, then, to disintegrate in favor of service to nation, and he is immediately welcomed into John's court and adopted as a Plantagenet, dedicated to a career as caretaker of England rather than as caretaker of the Falconbridge estate.[37]

It is important that Shakespeare, like the author of *The Troublesome Raigne*, gives the last and most patriotic lines to the Bastard, lines spoken after the character has proven his mettle and merit on the battlefield. In Shakespeare's imagining of national community, "nation is . . . conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship," as Anderson described it, even despite the inequality and exploitation of its members, including and especially the "illegitimate," the lowly, the bastards.[38] It is this fraternity that makes it possible for the Bastard to so willingly risk death. And this has not changed. So many are willing to die for such limited national imaginings as the flag or the uniform, which are, in their simplest terms, mere symbols. The Bastard character can be read as contributing to this fraternity in profound ways, and to a particular imagining for which he would quite readily die. Shakespeare has the Bastard prove this willingness valiantly on the battlefield to mark even greater the contrast between the bastard "hero" and the incompetent king, the play's true illegitimate.

Whether the Bastard character can be rightly called a hero is a question on which scholars are fairly evenly split.[39] On one hand, E. A. J. Honigmann offers evidence of the Bastard's hero status in noting that the personal pronoun "I" is used fifty-eight times in the play's first act, fifty-one of those by the Bastard character, who is almost alone in enjoying the privilege of the soliloquy.[40] He is a protagonist of sorts, and in his agency and volition this "hero" can be read as moving from "subject" to "citizen," or to a rather innovative idea or model of citizenship for the period, even a controversial one.[41] Thus, he provides the project to imagine a nation with an important cognitive or imaginative bridge over which to cross to nation from empire, to citizenship from subjection, and to agency and choice (and, therefore, true fraternity) from blind loyalty and obedience. The Bastard therefore chooses the true and right path to loyalty and patriotism, as only a bastard son excluded from the patriarchal State could. His choice is sealed in the play's final words. This agency and autonomy, smartly mobilized by an "unnatural," illegitimate character, demonstrate Shakespeare's imaginative capacity. Ernest Gellner uses "nationalism" to describe "not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness," but the *invention* of nations where they do not exist.[42] The Bastard provides, then, a bedrock principle or seed of true nationalism in this Gellner sense, as opposed to unthinking, lockstep loyalty.

On the other hand, E. M. W. Tillyard, John Dover Wilson, J. L. Simmons, and R. Ornstein argue that the play is patriotic, but not propagandistic. Tillyard, et al., argue that Shakespeare's histories uncritically present the Tudor worldview in expressions of blind, royalist patriotism.[43] "That the plays assert the evils of rebellion and are generally orthodox in their support of the Tudor monarchy is obvious," as Ribner put it. "They could scarcely have been staged had they done otherwise."[44] This description fails to appreciate Shakespeare's innovation in his use of the Bastard's subversive power to critique law, authority, and succession, even as he ultimately affirms them. David Womersley correctly identifies the playwright's "unorthodox orthodoxy," both in mode and means, because in articulating and effecting personal agency, self-determination, and choice, Shakespeare proves remarkably heterodox.[45]

The invention of agency

To appreciate Shakespeare's use of the Bastard character in *King John*, it is useful to compare the playwright's Bastard with

that of his likely primary source, the anonymously penned *The Troublesome Raigne of John, King of England*, as several scholars have done.[46] For both plays, the character has no clear historical referent, giving each playwright license to use the character to provoke and proscribe, decry and comment, criticize and instigate.[47] *The Troublesome Raigne* deploys the anti-papal character for an explicitly orthodox set piece of Tudor propaganda that promotes reflexive obedience to the crown, the unquestioned sovereignty of the king, and the dangers of seditious acts. Shakespeare, however, in a far more nuanced and complex construction, de-emphasizes religious themes and blind patriotism. As a whole, *King John* is only "mildly Protestant," and it is relatively gentle with England's chief "other," the French.[48] Shakespeare emphasizes the Bastard's moral and national development as a metaphor for legitimacy; the Bastard is Shakespeare's moral and political center of gravity or fulcrum for what otherwise is a see-saw series of arguments. The real creativity in Shakespeare's play, then, is the question he chooses to ask as the basis for the narrative and for the motivations of his characters. This determination controls all others.

In the beginning of both plays, the Bastard is presented with a question and choice by Queen Elinor. From Shakespeare's version, the Bastard must decide

> Whether hadst thou rather be: a Falconbridge,
> And like thy brother to enjoy thy land,
> Or the reputed son of Coeur-de-lion,
> Lord of thy presence, and no land beside? (1.1.135-38)

In other words, Bastard must choose either to be the safe caretaker of the family estate or, risking safety and all else, dare a path to caretaking England and her king. In the propagandistic *Troublesome Raigne*, the typical stage ruffian lacks the capacity, morally or spiritually, to deny his heritage and lineal history as part of "a worshipful society" (1.1.206). Thus, he "chooses," or defaults to, his Falconbridge identity and the estate that comes with it. In Shakespeare's version, however, one in which the Bastard has an even stronger legal claim on his family inheritance, the character immediately chooses instead a place in King John's court and the "right" to die for country on the battlefield. As a bastard, Falconbridge understands full well the limitations of legitimacy and "right," perhaps better than anyone but the usurping king, and in his choice he transcends or at least re-defines both legitimacy and right in a way the king cannot.

In his free agency, the Bastard can be read as representing all Englishmen, or "subjects," facing questions of loyalty amidst competing claims to the crown. Few playgoers could have missed the parallel between John and Arthur on the one hand and Elizabeth and Mary on the other. The Bastard marks John as the true bastard, just as Elizabeth's bastardy, while unspoken, served to underline doubts of her legitimacy as queen. The Bastard answers Elinor's question: "Brother, take you my land, I'll take my chance" (1.1.152), and thus he rejects a history that would grant and guarantee name and title for the freedom to create both. He chooses the freedom to create or re-create himself, to become "lord of his presence" while still a "bastard to the time" (1.1.208). Yes, he is fictional, but in the theater, all characters ultimately are fictional, as John himself acknowledges in act 5: "I am a scribbled form, drawn with a pen" (5.7.33).

The Bastard's fictionality, then, is precisely how he can serve as metaphor for England, especially a future-facing England trying to resolve its past (to once again evoke Stephen Kemper's notion of nation-ness). As someone without historical referent, the Bastard is free to invent himself in ways that the play's historical characters cannot. By foregrounding this invention, Shakespeare moves to the background the heretofore seemingly immutable defaults of blood, paternity, and genealogy, which are shown in Shakespeare's play, suddenly and startlingly, to be subject to the Bastard's personal agency.[49] He is not unlike the citizens of Angiers in act 2, who, in the Bastard's own words, must choose to whom to prove loyal (and, therefore, to whom to become disloyal). "By heaven, these scroyles of Angiers flout you, kings, / And stand securely on their battlements / As in a theatre, whence they gape and point / At your industrious scenes and acts of death" (2.1.380-83). As he so often does, Shakespeare uses the artifices of the theater to limn the limits of politics.

In contrast to the timid, commodious citizens of Angiers, the Bastard establishes his independence in the play's opening scene through the zodiac of his intelligence and wit. At first irreverent and satiric, he resurfaces throughout the play, maturing along the way into an eloquent, stirring voice for England as sovereign, independent nation; he becomes "the mouthpiece of official patriotism," as Grennan describes him.[50] But he becomes much more as he goes beyond politics and history to more universal themes and questions. The character's sarcasm and wit supply him the distance Shakespeare needs to make the character a sort of spectator-surrogate; he is involved in the action, but sufficiently

disengaged to comment on it, just as he does in Angiers on the battlements.[51] His speeches get special force from the fact that their voice is that of a cynical observer. This critical distance makes his considered choice of country over self-interested gain worth studying.

Shakespeare's move away from reflexive obedience is important because before the Bastard can represent the body politic as a horizontal fraternity of loyal citizens, the "hero" must first become worthy by showing the way. For the Bastard, as for the king, the limits of legitimacy and "right" are the principal problems. The character of the Bastard is a questioning of the legitimacy—its genesis and nature. The Bastard sees, as John surely does, the distinction between being "true begot" and "well begot" (1.1.76-78). While he cannot fully control the former, regardless of his choice, he can achieve the latter, just as John "by chance but, not by truth" obtained the throne (1.1.170). The Bastard passes this first test in much the same way that the king fails his, thus presenting in microcosm England's national crisis. The Bastard successfully claims a right to his father's estate, even over his elder brother's claim, then determines his identity by leaving that estate. The king, meanwhile, will be defeated by France and then by the papal legate, before being poisoned by a monk. The Bastard's world is forming just as John's is disintegrating.

In the transition or, more accurately, transformation that the opening scene begins, the Bastard shakes off the fetters of the Vice character type of the morality plays on which he is clearly based, especially in the earlier *The Troublesome Raigne*; rather, he is an evolutionary link from the Vice character to a wonderfully and newly creative, individuated character, one who in his individuality ennobles his ultimate choice of a unified if imperfect England over no England at all. When faced with the existential problem of finding meaning and orientation in a topsy-turvy world of moral confusion, ambiguity, and win-at-all-costs politics, "the man of action becomes for an intense moment the man of thought."[52] He is, in other words, a portrait of emergent patriotism that contrasts sharply with the Tudor propaganda of the day, which, in addition to *The Troublesome Raigne*, included John Bale's earlier chronicle, *Kynge Johan*, John Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, and various broadsides and pamphlets.[53] This mostly anti-Catholic, war-mongering propaganda promoted the principles of order and allegiance to the throne, not as a matter of rational choice, but unthinkingly as absolutes. Rational

choice, after all, implies the possibility that a person might at different times and in different circumstances choose differently. Shakespeare's genius is in dramatizing the fatherless Bastard as ratifier of paternal order and orthodoxy, at a time when Elizabeth most needed it.

With the Bastard's autonomy established and his future a mostly blank slate, to what does the Bastard commit? If he is the play's kingly or "true" character, and his juxtaposition with John helps to establish this, why does Shakespeare have the Bastard deliver a speech in act 2 declaring as his gods "that smooth-faced gentleman" commodity and self-interested gain? Is his cosmopolitan perspective no different from anyone else's?

> Mad world, mad kings, mad composition!
> John, to stop Arthur's title in the whole,
> Hath willingly departed with a part,
> And France, whose armour conscience buckled on,
> Whom zeal and charity brought to the field
> As God's own soldier, rounded in the ear
> With that same purpose-changer, that sly devil,
> That broker that still breaks the pate of faith,
> That daily break-vow, he that wins of all,
> Of kings, of beggars, old men, young men, maids,
> Who, having no external thing to lose
> But the word 'maid,' cheats the poor maid of that:
> That smooth-faced gentleman, tickling commodity,
> Commodity, the bias of the world,
> The world, who of itself is peisèd well,
> Made to run even upon even ground,
> Till this advantage, this vile-drawing bias,
> This sway of motion, this commodity,
> Makes it take head from all indifferency,
> From all direction, purpose, course, intent:
> And this same bias, this commodity,
> This bawd, this broker, this all-changing word,
> Clapped on the outward eye of fickle France,
> Hath drawn him from his own determined aid,
> From a resolved and honourable war,
> To a most base and vile-concluded peace.
> And why rail I on this commodity?
> But for because he hath not wooed me yet:
> Not that I have the power to clutch my hand,
> When his fair angels would salute my palm:
> But for my hand, as unattempted yet,
> Like a poor beggar, raileth on the rich.
> Well, whiles I am a beggar, I will rail,

> And say there is no sin but to be rich:
> And being rich, my virtue then shall be
> To say there is no vice but beggary:
> Since kings break faith upon commodity,
> Gain be my lord, for I will worship thee. (2.1.571-608)

This speech is the play's bewildering riddle and the fault line along which criticism of the play chiefly divides. As van de Water put it, this soliloquy is "an extremely difficult speech for critics who would have the Bastard the embodiment of kingliness."[54] For her, the Bastard is simply a "thinly disguised vice" who clumsily becomes or is replaced for the last two acts by "the embodiment of active and outraged nationalism."[55] In her interpretation, the character first chooses commodity. In a lop-sided, misshapen play, two bastards bearing absolutely no relation to each other animate the action in a sort of tag-team fashion. For other critics, such as Manheim and Tillyard, the Bastard evolves and grows as he navigates his "mad world." He becomes the moral voice and conscience of England just as John crumbles, to further muddy the already murky moral waters that all of the characters stumblingly, haltingly navigate.

Clues to the riddle are perhaps in the speech itself, in particular the pejorative references to commodity and gain, which as the Bastard's professed goals may or may not be authentic. A "vile-drawing bias" and a "sly devil," commodity is personified by the Bastard as an indifferent and bawdy broker tempting with wealth. Even the coins are deceptive, embossed with "fair angels," corrupting the world and its kings. For an otherwise noble, even regal character, surely such a devilish "god" cannot be his, a god claimed only at the very end as sanctioned by Philip's and John's own demonstrated allegiance to commodity above all else. Tillyard noted Shakespeare's use of "this all-changing word" as a reference to God's creation of the world through the Word, a word that in the devil's hands (and mouth) becomes all-corrupting and rends the fabric of God's order.[56] The result is, naturally, a "mad world, mad kings, mad composition." The Bastard's ultimate choice, which is anything but commodity traditionally understood, strains van de Water's analysis. Audiences can see this; they know the Bastard is different, that he is the play's moral agent who, as he moves through the play, reveals the true character of those around him.

Given the action of the play, seeking personal gain is the logical application of the Bastard's analysis of the world's "composition." His analysis seems troublingly accurate. Where

the Bastard is a true "bastard to the time," the "true sons to the time"—John, Philip, Pandulph, and the nobles Salisbury, Pembroke, and Bigot—prove the Bastard's critique to be accurate.[57] All of these players "break faith upon commodity." John surrenders his French holdings "to stop Arthur's title," despite his threats in act 1 that England's cannon would be heard as a "trumpet of our wrath" (1.1.26-27). He then declares allegiance to the Pope to halt Lewis's invasion of England (5.1.1-5), even after speaking so eloquently that "no Italian priest" would ever "tithe or toll in our dominions" (3.1.81-82). Pandulph coldly and very successfully manipulates France and England, Philip and John, against each other, with little or no regard for principle or conviction; he is utterly pragmatic in geopolitical terms, seeking nothing but gain for the papacy. With their own agency, the nobles choose rebellion over national unity.

These choices disqualify these characters as the play's center of moral vision, even as they strew the moral landscape of the last man standing, that of the Bastard, with "thorns and dangers." In so doing, these commodious choices highlight bastardy as an organizing metaphor, as Stroud pointed out, and they present ironically and with great clarity the distorted values of the society the Bastard chose for himself.[58] While he chooses "rightly" and leads England against France, bravely fighting for the king (and, in another irony, living up to his natural father's lion-hearted reputation for battlefield valor), the "true" sons of the time wish to take flight at even the hint of treachery, before Arthur can be proven dead by the king's command. Thus, Shakespeare creates parallels between the very public action on the stage and the betrayals of the bedchamber—the adultery that leads to illegitimate children. For Tillyard, the theme of rebellion, or infidelity at a national level, gives a play generally lacking in unity at least a measure of it.[59]

Another seed of the Bastard's true character inscribed by Shakespeare in act 1, his willingness to die for country, should be considered in a national context. When Elinor asks him to join her army bound for France, the Bastard does not hesitate: "Madam, I'll follow you into the death" (1.1.155). This same resoluteness is on display later, in act 4 after the death of Arthur, in a scene that is the play's pivot. For Anderson, it is this willingness to die even more than the willingness to kill that attests to the imaginative power of "nation-ness," a conception of "deep, horizontal comradeship" that is capable of justifying such commitment.[60] This idea of ultimate sacrifice can only come with an idea of

purity through fatality. Also, the Bastard's quick commitment to die for queen and country is complemented by a generosity of spirit and patience shown toward his mother later in the first act. Playgoers are likely to affiliate with him, therefore, recognizing that though he is about to embark on his great adventure, he unselfishly turns his attentions to comforting his mother, Lady Falconbridge (1.1.261-78).

For Grennan, too, the play presents two different bastard characters, but the change or switch can be explained if the character is seen as an individual in the first three acts and, in the final two acts, the personification of conventional, official patriotism, though one that is willingly embraced, even desired. "The explosive personality of the earlier part of the play has stiffened into an official posture," Grennan writes, as the character sheds his individuality to become the public, symbolic voice of orthodoxy.[61] Thus, Grennan straddles the critical fault line, rationalizing the split as Shakespeare's shifting of the play's center of gravity and, here conceiving of Shakespeare as a historian, its transfiguring of historical personality into service to conventional patriotism. Such an analysis risks diminishing Shakespeare's argument in and through the Bastard for achieving representativeness, as opposed to being born with a "true" or "right" version of "greatness." This view also fails to see the importance of the Bastard's individualism in the second half of the play, when John disqualifies himself as *de facto* king, and when despite this disqualification the Bastard identifies national unity as even the individual citizen's true intent and highest commodity. The disillusionment of the young, adventurous idealist becomes a measure of his virtue as he proves unshakeably loyal, and it is the nobles' disloyalty that underscores this virtue.

Grennan's reading does, however, importantly highlight Shakespeare's role as historian and the Bastard as a form of *historia*.[62] Shakespeare resembles Walter Benjamin's storyteller as a narrator who knows and incorporates earlier tellings to insure the "truth" or meaning of the whole.[63] Shakespeare appropriates, molds, and condenses historical and dramatic sources like *The Troublesome Raigne* into a more cohesive narrative that suggests a general cultural understanding of the original events and historical figures for circulation beyond the playhouse. These acts of transference transpose the scenes of particular experience into a figuration of collective life and memory, leading Middleton Murry to describe the Bastard as embodying England's national soul.

Regardless of which side of the fault line a reader stands, the Bastard can no more be taken at face value in his act 2 soliloquy than he can viewed later, when he argues his lack of religion ("If ever I remember to be holy" [3.2.26]), for, as Tillyard argues, "in actual deed he has the fidelity and the self-abegnation, or at least the conscientiousness, of the pelican."[64] Because he does transform into a kingly character "true" and "right," several critics have compared the Bastard with Shakespeare's *Henry V*, one leg of McEachern's tripod of nation-ness written or inscribed into the popular imagination. Simmons, among others, believes this comparison to be "a critical mistake," because the Bastard has no identity apart from his connection with the king.[65] He is the embodiment of the ideal subject, and juxtaposed with a dissolving monarch, he shows himself to be the natural ruler that John fails to be. In this assessment, it is the Bastard rather than the king who jumps off the page as the character who is more passionate, more individuated, more human, and most kingly. This is his power. As an illegitimate son registering otherness as an outsider to established authority, standing at play's end in the rubble of all that was supposed to be "right" and legitimate, he chooses love before law and desire beyond the obligations of duty.

Arthur's corpse

The Bastard's kingliness emerges upon the death of Arthur, a scene that is for Tillyard the play's "culminating and best," and a scene that foregrounds the play's unifying theme of the evils of rebellion and sedition.[66] It is also entirely fictional, allowing Shakespeare, who makes Arthur younger as if to make his supposed murder all the more horrible, to juxtapose the nobles—"sons of the time" and legitimate heirs all—with the Bastard, for a rich study in contrasts. The "true and right" nobles determine John to be guilty, seemingly in a hurry and without any proof, and they use John's guilt to justify their hasty rebellion. Of course, they are wrong. The Bastard, however, sees beyond the crime, calling it "the graceless action of a heavy hand" (4.3.58), a potential breach of the will of God, and as a result he reserves judgment until a deed with such grave implications can be proven ("If that it be the work of any hand" [4.3.59]). When the nobles set upon Hubert, it is the Bastard who protects him, restraining Salisbury with the kingly caution, "Your sword is bright, sir: put it up again" (4.3.80). These are words one might more expect from Henry V.

Though the Bastard recognizes Arthur's right to the throne and suspects John of murder, he is resolutely concerned for England. He alone thinks through what "right" and "true" action to take, instructing Hubert, an Abrahamic figure in the near-sacrificing of the innocent Arthur, to

> Go, bear him in thine arms:
> I am amazed, methinks, and lose my way
> Among the thorns and dangers of this world.
> How easy dost thou take all England up!
> From forth this morsel of dead royalty,
> The life, the right and truth of all this realm
> Is fled to heaven: and England now is left
> To tug and scamble, and to part by th'teeth
> The unowed interest of proud-swelling state:
> Now for the bare-picked bone of majesty
> Doth dogged war bristle his angry crest
> And snarleth in the gentle eyes of peace:
> Now powers from home and discontents at home
> Meet in one line: and vast confusion waits,
> As doth a raven on a sick-fall'n beast,
> The imminent decay of wrested pomp.
> Now happy he whose cloak and cincture can
> Hold out this tempest. Bear away that child
> And follow me with speed: I'll to the king:
> A thousand businesses are brief in hand,
> And heaven itself doth frown upon the land. (4.3.145-65)

In crisis the Bastard rises above the nobles, John, and even his own critical distance and satirical irony; it is a dialectic of separation. He imagines an England under God, an England "in grace." Arthur, the "life, right and truth of all this realm" is gone to heaven. England is invaded and her armies divided. What "now"? This fully present tense word, "Now," repeated throughout the speech, draws attention to the fact that that the Bastard has a choice, now; this moment is or could be a turning point. And the crisis is double; it is a crisis for the Bastard but also for the body politic.[67] Describing the death as "a graceless action," the Bastard momentarily loses his way, amazed and shaken amidst and by the vicissitudes of self-interested politics and war. But he recovers, and he resolutely determines, "I'll to the king: A thousand businesses are brief in hand." This quicksilver recovery in which the Bastard chooses loyalty and nation over commodity and gain looks a lot like honor, an honor that has been transformed from feudal to national. Along the progression

Shakespeare has plotted for the character, the Bastard's decision also seems inevitable, or historically "natural."

As Tillyard noted, the Bastard makes his choice "with superb strength and swiftness," and he makes it once and for all.[68] Shakespeare then vindicates the choice with the poisoned death of John and the ascension of Henry III, a most Arthur-like heir. (It is Shakespeare who vindicates, because in most Tudor histories, the *de facto* legitimacy of John's crown is not questioned. Furthermore, the barons' revolt was in fact motivated by disgust over taxation and because of an accumulation of mostly fiscally related grievances, not Arthur's death). Not coincidentally, in the very next scene, after such a kingly display of character and leadership by the Bastard, John very weakly hands his crown over to Pandulph. It is the Bastard who furnishes the play with a glorious moment of considered patriotism, and as such he "dominates" the play; he "represents England against the vagaries and viciousness of a titular king," as Middleton Murry wrote. "His is the native royalty, while the King is a shadow."[69]

Act 4's third scene, therefore, serves as the Bastard's climactic and transformational moment. His wobble and waywardness suddenly and completely are gone, and he plunges back into the "tug and scamble" to defend Hubert and hold England together. He is able to control his outrage in refusing to become a "dog quarreling over a bone" or a man gone astray in a wilderness of thorn bushes. As caretaker of the garden of England, he will remove the scrub and enclose it once more. In short, the Bastard shows, as Matchett described, "the self-denying acceptance of a higher duty which true loyalty demands from men of honour."[70]

This transformation leads John, again very naturally and seemingly inevitably, to ask in act 5 whether the Bastard possesses "the ordering of this present time" (5.1.79). It is almost as if John wishes to pass his crown to the Bastard, at least morally or figuratively or imaginatively, which culminates Shakespeare's metaphorical use of the Bastard as nation in microcosm. Rather than either fleeing or trying to somehow exploit an inept and fading ruler, the Bastard essentially invents a king. Speaking to John and encouraging him in his symbolic and national role, the Bastard sounds like the playwright to his leading player:

> Be great in act as you have been in thought:
> Let not the world see fear and sad distrust
> Govern the motion of a kingly eye:
> Be stirring as the time, be fire with fire,
> Threaten the threat'ner and outface the brow

> Of bragging horror: so shall inferior eyes,
> That borrow their behaviours from the great,
> Grow great by your example, and put on
> The dauntless spirit of resolution.
> Away, and glisten like the god of war
> When he intendeth to become the field:
> Show boldness and aspiring confidence. (5.1.46-57)

Of course, John isn't up to the part, even as political theater, which is why he at least symbolically cedes rule to the Bastard in asking him to order the present time. And the Bastard once again rises to the mostly rhetorical challenge, ordering more through poetry than politics.[71] To fend off England's enemies and bind England and the English together, the Bastard imagines and stirringly creates the image of a resolute, courageous, and honorable king and, therefore, a resolute, courageous, and honorable England for which the king is a symbol:

> Now hear our English king,
> For thus his royalty doth speak in me:
> He is prepared, and reason too he should:
> This apish and unmannerly approach,
> This harnessed masque and unadvisèd revel,
> This unheard sauciness and boyish troops,
> The king doth smile at, and is well prepared
> To whip this dwarfish war, these pigmy arms,
> From out the circle of his territories. (5.2.129-37)

Through the Bastard, Shakespeare creates the image of a unified nation at a time when England "was as variable as . . . representations of it," as Helgerson noted. "Not even its name remained fixed," like Philip/Richard Falconbridge himself.[72] Like the king the Bastard imagined, England, too, is a fiction, but one that in its naturalized "truth" can effect the very loyalty and unity England needs to be a nation. Such a fiction avoids or extinguishes "vast confusion" in its "ordering of the present time" through the peaceful transfer of kingly power. In ordering the present time, the Bastard paints "in the most heroic colors he knows because he has come to realize something about kings. They are all men, and thus they are all weak."[73] For his own part, the Bastard realizes that "true subjection everlastingly" (5.7.109) is a subjection willingly chosen for the sake of nation rather than self. He relates to his nation, and the nation reciprocates; he articulates "nation-ness," and the nation as a unified, coherent whole, or at least imagined to be, in turn articulates the Bastard as loyal citizen.

That the Bastard ultimately chooses loyalty is utterly orthodox, of course, but how he becomes loyal and patriotic, which is to say rationally and with individual agency, is (or was) notably unorthodox. Thus, *King John* celebrates the body politic rather than the king, which is the important contribution to the larger project to imagine a nation that the play can be read as providing. The strength of the Bastard character as Shakespeare's conception, according to Jones, comes from the fact that he is "not only a 'loyal subject' but *vox populi*. When he speaks, he speaks not for one only but for many, the unknown multitude who make up the people of England."[74] The play's closing lines suppose a unified nation, an imagined community in and to which English men and women could remain true: "Nought shall make us rue,/If England to itself do rest but true" (5.7.121-22). In this supposing, Shakespeare invents an England and a history for that England that is, in the Barthesian sense, mythically "true" and "right" and natural. This "true" history is imagined and conveyed by an utterly fictional character who provides form and order where England's history was "shapeless and so rude" (5.7.28). (Shakespeare importantly gives these final words to the Bastard. In *The Troublesome Raigne*, the words belong to the newly crowned Henry III.)

It is useful to compare the Bastard's rousing closing speech with Salisbury's unrealistic vision for England as empire, one of crusading Christians expanding their territories by trampling their "pagan" foes on faraway shores:

> What, here? O nation, that thou couldst remove,
> That Neptune's arms who clippeth thee about,
> Would bear thee from the knowledge of thyself,
> And grapple thee unto a pagan shore.
> Where these two Christian armies might combine
> The blood of malice in a vein of league. (5.2.34-38)

Salisbury's is an untenable, unsustainable imagining, and it comes at a time when, under John, England's continental holdings were being surrendered; England was becoming an island nation again. Shakespeare's imagining is a particular kind of remembering, a mythic history that for Elizabethan audiences made John's reign "now." Elizabethans needed to find themselves on the victorious side in a continuum of past, present, and future; thus, Shakespeare chooses the telling examples, then molds and recasts them, and invents a "legitimate" bastard king to bring a history to bear on the present in manageable doses and as part of a unified, coherent, national story.

The past informs the present in the discovery, or really the creation, of a "natural" truth: what was and what *is* join in the expectation of what *must be*. Anderson argues that all profound changes in consciousness bring with them amnesias, and that out of these oblivions spring narratives, because what cannot be remembered must be narrated. In his analogy, it is as if Shakespeare is holding up to Elizabethan England a sepia-toned photo of herself in infancy, inviting a now pre-adolescent nation to remember its childhood. "How strange it is to need another's help to learn that this naked baby in the yellowed photograph, sprawled happily on rug or cot, is you," Anderson wrote.[75]

The Bastard isn't a source of wisdom so much as he is a timeless element out of a remembered past assumed to be "true" and "right" and "victorious." He is a patriotic past inevitably coursing into a complex, vexed, but ultimately manageable "now." Through him Shakespeare furnishes the agencies of mind and spirit that gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and create an imagined continuity that we call history. Naturalized and, therefore, mythic, this history must be taken on faith, and Shakespeare's voice makes this possible, even probable, especially as the Bastard supplies its humanity and familiarity.

Notes

1. Carole Levin, "A Good Prince: *King John* and Early Tudor Propaganda," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 11, no. 4 (Winter 1980), 23.

2. All references to the play are to *The RSC William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, ed. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen (New York: The Modern Library, 2007).

3. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: New Left Books, 2006, first published in 1983); Claire McEachern, *The Poetics of English Nationhood*, 1590-1612 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. For more on Shakespeare's project to make or invent or imagine an England, see Brian Carroll, "Richard as Waking Nightmare: Barthesian Dream, Myth and Memory in Shakespeare's *Richard III*," in *Visual Communication Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2013); and Brian Carroll, "Appearances and Disappearances: *Henry V*'s Shimmering Irishman in the Project to Make an England," in *Journal of the Wooden O Symposium* 9, (Fall 2010): 11-32.

4. McEachern points out that the term "anachronism" itself dates back only to 1612 (7). For language as more than a neutral medium, see M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 294.

5. John Middleton Murry, *Shakespeare* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936), 127.

6. Anderson, 6.

7. For the Kemper quote, Anderson, 7. For "post-memory," Anderson, 7. Marianne Hirsch's term *postmemory* is "distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history by deep personal connection," in *Family*

Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard, 1997), 22.

8. The Ecclesiastical Appeals Act of 1532 (24 Henry VIII c. 12), in Geoffrey Rudolph Elton, *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1982), vii.

9. David Womersley, "The Politics of Shakespeare's King John," *The Review of English Studies, New Series* 40, no. 160 (November 1989), 497.

10. Alexander Leggatt, "Dramatic Perspectives in *King John*," *English Studies in Canada* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1977), 10.

11. Eugene M. Waith, "*King John* and the Drama of History," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 199.

12. Ibid., 193.

13. Sigurd Burkhardt, *Shakespearean Meanings* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 134

14. Emrys Jones, *Origins of Shakespeare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 235.

15. Virginia Mason Vaughan, "Between Tetralogies: *King John* as Transition," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (Winter 1984), 408.

16. Levin, 22.

17. Ibid., 17. Many of John Lackley's vices are on cinematic display in the 2011 film, *Ironclad*, one of only a handful of movies other than the many versions of the Ivanhoe and Robin Hood stories to include the historical figure.

18. Douglas Wixson, "'Calm Words Folded Up in Smoke': Propaganda and Spectator Response in Shakespeare's *King John*," *Shakespeare Studies* 14 (1981), 111.

19. M. M. Reese, "Origins of the History Play," in Eugene M. Waith, ed., *Shakespeare The Histories: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 46; Irving Ribner, *The English History Play in the Age of Shakespeare* (Princeton, 1957; rev. ed., London, 1965), 10.

20. Ribner charts the purposes of the Renaissance-era history writers, such as Raphael Holinshed in *The English History Play*, a history of the history genre in drama. The chart is also useful in considering the didactic purposes of playwrights such as Shakespeare and Christopher Marlowe: the nationalistic glorification of England; an analysis of contemporary affairs, both national and foreign; a use of past events as a guide to political behavior in the present; a use of history as documentation for political theory; and a study of past political disaster as an aid to Stoical fortitude in the present (26).

21. Anne Righter, *Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play* (New York: Penguin, 1967), 158.

22. McEachern, 2. In addition to the two poems, McEachern reads or analyzes Shakespeare's *Henry V*.

23. Michael Neill, "Broken English and Broken Irish: Nation, Language, and the Optic of Power in Shakespeare's Histories," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 19. In addition, Douglas C. Wixson examines English pamphleteering as a model for the debate structure of *King John* (see note 18) and, as a byproduct, the play's role and place in the print culture of the period.

24. Stephen Greenblatt, *Hamlet in Purgatory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 180; Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 17. Barthes's essays were originally written between 1946 and 1956.

25. Righter, 81.

26. *King John*, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge University Press, 1954), xv.

27. Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History* 1740-1830 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 53.

28. Lily B. Campbell, *Shakespeare's 'Histories': Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy* (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1947), 11.

29. Jones, 249, 252.

30. Robert Weimann, "Mingling Vice and 'Worthiness' in *King John*," *Shakespeare Studies* 27 (1999), 130.

31. Barthes, 131.

32. Jones, 248.

33. Barthes, 121.

34. Alison Findlay, *Illegitimate Power: Bastards in Renaissance Drama* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 19.

35. In *The Statutes at Large, from The First Year of King Richard III to the Thirty-first year of Henry VIII*, published by Jeremy Bentham, 1763, page 419, and available via Google Books. To mention Elizabeth's bastardy was treasonable as a challenge to her authority (Findlay, 2).

36. Eamon Grennan, "Shakespeare's Satirical History: A Reading of *King John,*" *Shakespeare Studies* 11 (1978), 32.

37. Denton Jacques Snider, *The Shakespearian Drama: A Commentary* (Boston: Ticknor & Co., 1889), 281.

38. Anderson, 7.

39. Emrys Jones, E. M. W. Tillyard, and Jacqueline Trace see the Bastard as at least a kind of hero, while Lily B. Campbell, Julia van de Water, and E. A. J. Honigmann are among those who do not, regarding the character as nonessential, as perhaps a "choric" presence and a holdover from the source text, the anonymously written *The Troublesome Reign of King John*. See Jones, *Origins of Shakespeare*, 246; E. M. W. Tillyard, *Shakespeare's History Plays* (New York: Macmillan, 1946); and Jacqueline Trace, "Shakespeare's Bastard Faulconbridge: An Early Tudor Hero," *Shakespeare Studies* 13 (1980): 59-69; Campbell, *Shakespeare's 'Histories'*, 166; E. A. J. Honigmann, ed., *King John* (1954), lxxi; and Julia Van de Water, "The Bastard in *King John*," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 11 (1960), 145.

40. Honigmann, 6.

41. McEachern cites Robert Doleman's 1594 publication, *Conference About the Next Succession to the Crown*, in which the author argues that no one form of government is divinely privileged and defends the people's right to choose their form of government (9). His argument elicited in 1598 an emphatic declaration of royal power by conquest, not consensus, from James I (*The True Law of Free Monarchies*). The Bastard's self-determination and *choosing* loyalty to king can be interpreted as at least sympathetic to Doleman's argument, though not an outright endorsement; the Bastard chooses monarchy.

42. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), 169.

43. For example, see J. F. Danby, *Shakespeare's Doctrine of Nature* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1961), 78; Reese, 277-78; H. A. Kelly, *Divine Providence in the England of Shakespeare's Histories* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970); and Ribner.

44. Ribner, 206.

45. Womersley, 497.

46. Roy Battenhouse, "Shakespeare's Perspective and Others," *Notre Dame English Journal* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 191-215; Eamon Grennan, "Shakespeare's Satirical History: A Reading of King John," *Shakespeare Studies* 11 (1978): 21-38; James P. Saeger, "Illegitimate Subjects: Performing Bastardy in *King John*," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 100, no. 1 (January 2001): 1-21; John Sibly, "The Anomalous Case of *King John*," *ELH 33*, no. 4 (December 1966): 415-21; J. L. Simmons, "Shakespeare's *King John* and Its Source: Coherence, Pattern and Vision," *Tulane Studies in English*, 17 (1969); Ronald Stroud, "The Bastard to the Time in *King John*," *Comparative Drama* 6, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 154; Sidney Thomas, "'Enter a Sheriffe': Shakespeare's King

John and The Troublesome Raigne," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 37, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 98-100; Julia van de Water, "The Bastard in *King John*," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 11 (1960); Robert Weimann, "Mingling Vice and 'Worthiness' in *King John*," *Shakespeare Studies* 27 (1999): 109-34; Douglas Wixson, "'Calm Words Folded Up in Smoke': Propaganda and Spectator Response in Shakespeare's *King John*," *Shakespeare Studies* 14 (1981): 111-28. Most of these scholars believe that Shakespeare used *The Troublesome Raigne* as his primary and perhaps only source text, writing King John probably around 1594 (Battenhouse, 192; van de Water, 137).

47. If in fact there are two playwrights. Tillyard has suggested, but not quite argued, that both plays were authored by Shakespeare (*Shakespeare's History Plays*, 216-17).

48. Tillyard, 215.

49. James P. Saeger, "Illegitimate Subjects: Performing Bastardy in *King John*," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 100, no. 1 (January 2001), 6.

50. Grennan, 31.

51. Vaughan, 414.

52. James L. Calderwood, "Commodity and Honor in *King John*," in Eugene M. Waith, ed., *Shakespeare The Histories: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 97.

53. Ribner argues for Bale's *Kynge Johan*, written before 1536, as England's first history play "because it deliberately uses chronicle material in order to accomplish several legitimate historical purposes . . . a nationalist work dedicated to the greater glory of England" (39).

54. van de Water, 141.

55. Ibid, 143.

56. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made" (John 1:1-3, New International Version).

57. Stroud, 155.

58. Ibid., 162.

59. Tillyard, 221, 232.

60. Anderson, 7.

61. Grennan, 31.

62. Ibid.

63. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 106-109.

64. Tillyard, 228.

65. McEachern, 70.

66. Tillyard, 223.

67. Womersley, 509.

68. Tillyard, 225.

69. Middleton Murry, 98.

70. William H. Matchett, "Richard's Divided Heritage in *King John*," *Essays in Criticism* 12, no. 3 (July 1962), 253.

71. David Scott Kastan, "'To Set a Form upon that Indigest': Shakespeare's Fictions of History," *Comparative Drama* 17, no. 1 (Spring 1983), 14.

72. Richard Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 8.

73. Michael Manheim, *The Weak King Dilemma in the Shakespearean History Play* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973), 156.

74. Jones, 262.

75. Anderson, 204.

Fatal Indulgences: Gertrude and the Perils of Excess in Early Modern England

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Near the end of act 5, scene 2 of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Gertrude raises a toast to celebrate Hamlet's fortuitous hit against Laertes. Declaring, "The Queen carouses to thy fortune, Hamlet" (5.2.232), Gertrude drinks from the fatal stoup intended for her son, falling victim to Claudius's murderous scheming.[1] Gertrude's fatal fall, however, proves as much about excessive consumption as it does about the toxic union Claudius slips into the cup. The poisoned wine Gertrude consumes comes, in fact, to represent a deleterious pattern of excess at the court of Elsinore that, from an early modern humoral perspective, results not only in the murder of a king, but in the all-consuming tragedy that invariably ensues. While, as Hamlet decries, overindulgence appears to be a condition of the Danish court as a whole, such excess proves especially intriguing in the case of Gertrude, whose linked dietary and sexual appetites torture her son's overwrought imagination. In the case of Elsinore's queen, the final drink she imbibes in celebratory abandonment ultimately proves one too many.

Important to an understanding of consumptive excess in early modern England is some knowledge of the role humors were believed to play in overall bodily health. According to the humoral model, first credited to Hippocrates and later advanced by Galen, the body was made up of blood, bile, black bile, and phlegm, which in combination defined an overall complexion or behavioral disposition: Each of the humors possessed two primary attributes—blood being hot and moist; bile, hot and dry; black bile, cold and dry, and phlegm, cold and moist. Humoral complexions were, moreover, believed to differ according to sex:

men, for the most part, considered hotter and drier; women, colder and moister—such complexional distinctions defining perceived sexual and behavioral differences. Moreover, as Gail Kern Paster notes, "the quantity of humors not only depended on such variables as age and gender, but also differed from day to day as the body took in food and air, processed them, and released them."[2] This link to dietary intake proves crucial to an understanding of associated behavioral attributes.

Because, as Paster further observes, "foods were thought of in thermal terms—variously promoting cooling and heating or aiding in the regulation of body temperature," early modern dietaries were concerned with the types as well as quantities of food and drink needed to maintain or achieve optimal balances to guard against disease or undesirable behaviors.[3] Thomas Elyot (1541) describes a process he calls "concoction . . . an alternation in the stomacke of meates and drynkes, accordyng to their qualities, whereby they are made lyke to the substance of the body."[4] Such an alteration could produce, from an early modern perspective, cholera, a hot and dry condition indicative of anger and, because of inherent humoral makeup, usually associated with men. Adding heat to the fire, or in other words, consuming food and drink containing or producing bile, could only exacerbate an already volatile bodily complexion. Thus, as Galen notes, "it is most essential for the physician to know in the first place, that the bile is contained in the food itself from outside, and secondly, that for example, beet contains a great deal of bile, and bread very little, while olive oil contains most, and wine least of all, and all the other articles of diet different quantities. Would it not be absurd for anyone to choose voluntarily those articles which contain more bile, rather than those containing less?"[5] This cautionary is echoed by Andrew Boorde, an early modern physician, who argues, for example, that because "color is hot and dry . . . colorycke men must abstayne from eating hote spyces, and to refrayne from drynkynge of wyne, and eatynge of colorycke meate."[6] From a Galenic perspective, one was, quite literally, what one ate.

Given the body's manufacture of humoral substances, dietary excess constituted an ever present threat to overall health and behavior. The Elizabethan *Homily Against Gluttonie and Dronkennes* (1563), which locates its authority in biblical admonitions against gluttony, advises, "He that eateth and drynketh vnmeasurablye, kyndleth oft tymes suche an vnnaturall heate in his body, that his appetite is preuoked thereby to desire more than it shoulde."[7] This desire, believed to impact the liver, site of the passions and

specifically sexual appetite, resulted from unhealthy imbalances in the overall humoral complexion. Key here is the word "vnmeasurablye," for while food and drink could well prove detrimental to bodily health and behavior, one could not simply stop eating or drinking. As Joan Fitzpatrick notes, it is "the immoderate consumption of food and drink [that] should be avoided, not consumption *per se*."[8]

The dangers of dietary overindulgence are especially evident in admonishments against excessive wine drinking. While alcohol consumption was considered a normal part of the early modern English diet, it nevertheless remained a concern, given the threat of drunkenness with its attendant problems. As the *Homyly Against Gluttonie and Dronkennes* declares, "Dronkennes bytes by the belly, and causeth continually gnawing in the stomacke, brynges men to whoredome and lewdenesse of harte, with daungers vnspeakable."[9] This sentiment is echoed by William Bullein (1595), who argues that although "almightie God did ordaine [wine-drinking] for the great comfort of mankind, to bee taken moderately. . . drunken with excesse, it is a poison most venomous, it relaxeth the sinews, bringeth palsey, falling sicknesse in cold persons, hote feuers, fransies, fighting, lecherie, and a consuming of the liuer, to chollerycke persons and generally there is no credence to be giuen to drunkards, although they be mightie men."[10] Clearly, wine consumption represented a much more imminent threat to the early modern social as well as bodily order than did food excess alone. While, as Boorde observes, "moderately drunken, [wine] doth acuate and doth quicken a mans wyttes, it doth comfort the hert, it doth scoure the lyuer,"[11] excess, which differed according to the individual, could result in sin and violence. Elyot goes as far as to warn that "yong men should drinke little wine, for it shall make them prone to furie, and lechery."[12]

It is perhaps no coincidence that the *Homyly* separates out gluttony and drunkenness, for despite the fact that the consumption of alcoholic beverages was part of the early modern diet, it nevertheless required special care. The early modern practice of watering down wine may be viewed as one means by which those who imbibed attempted to mitigate the potentially intoxicating effects of overindulgence. Shakespeare's Cassio, who, as he says, has "very poor and unhappy / brains for drinking," in fact, "craftily / qualifie[s]," i.e., waters down his first cup in an effort to avoid the cholera wine produces within him (2.3.29-30; 33-34). Such a practice was not, however, without dangers of its own, for as Boorde observes, "water is not holsome . . .

If any man do vse to drynke water with wyne, let it be purely strayned; and then seth it, and after it be cold, let hym put it to his wyne."[13] Gervase Markham offers up his own rather unique recipe for staving off drunkenness. He notes that "if you would not be drunk, take the powder of betony and coleworts mixed together; and eat it every morning fasting, as much as will lie upon a sixpence, and it will preserve a man from drunkenness."[14] It is unclear how betony, a member of the mint family, and coleworts, any kind of cabbage, consumed in combination will prevent drunkenness. Nor is it clear whether Markham's recipe constitutes an attempt to avoid the moral sin of drunkenness or whether it arises from a purely dietary concern. Such a seemingly odd recipe does, however, indicate an attempt to offset negative humors produced by excessive alcohol consumption. What is clear from the examples listed above are often extraordinary measures taken in early modern English society to avoid drunkenness. For while early modern moralists derided the sin of drunkenness, as A. Lynn Martin concludes, "alcohol [continued to form] a fundamental part of most people's diet."[15]

Yet the marked humoral differences between men and women arguably necessitated gender specific solutions to the problem. Given their unique humoral makeup, alcohol consumption was believed to impact women differently than it did men. Excessive wine consumption, as Ken Albala notes, was believed to add "too greatly to the internal vital heat of digestion, totally subverting it, much as throwing too much wood on a fire suffocates it."[16] This increase in bodily heat could introduce a whole host of negative consequences. In terms of the male humoral makeup, excessive heat could lead to an undesirable choleric state, replete with anger and increased sexual appetite. Boorde advises the melancholic man, one who possesses a cold and dry humoral complexion, to avoid "drinking of hote wynes, and grose wyne, as red wyne," presumably because such consumption would lead to even greater dryness.[17] For women, who were believed generally colder and moister, excessive wine consumption could very well lend undesirable male attributes to an already volatile female humoral complexion. Moreover, as Anthony Fletcher notes, "with the precise boundary between the heat which made man a man and the cold which predominated to make woman a woman difficult to draw, gender, in fact, seemed dangerously fluid and indeterminate."[18] The Dutch physician Levinus Lemnius (1658) observes that "women are subject to all passions and perturbations . . . when she chanceth to be angry, as she will presently be, all that sink of humours being stirred

fumeth, and runs through the body, so that the Heart and Brain are affected with the smoky vapours of it, and the Spirits both vitall and animal, that serve those parts are inflamed."[19] One would certainly not want to stir that toxic pot! Unfortunately, excessive wine consumption by women could reportedly do just that. As Boorde observes, "Wyne is full of fumosyte," which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, indicated a condition full of fumes and vapours.[20] Fumosity, which gives certain foods their flatulent quality, was also believed to create the intoxicating effects of wine, resulting in the undesirable behavior Lemnius describes. Rather, as Markham advises, "Let [the early modern woman's] diet be wholesome and cleanly prepared at due hours, and cooked with care and diligence; let it be rather to satisfy nature than our affections, and apter to kill hunger than revive new appetites."[21]

One of the appetites that excessive wine consumption was believed to revive was sexual desire. While the Porter from Shakespeare's Macbeth argues that drink "provokes the desire but / . . . takes away the performance" (2.3.27-28), excessive alcohol consumption by women was believed to result in lechery. If drunkenness rendered men incapable of performance, it turned women into sexually voracious creatures. As Robert de Blois's thirteenth century diatribe against women, *Le Chastoiment des Dames* declares,

> She who gluts more than her fill
> Of food and wine soon finds a taste
> For bold excess below the waist!
> No worthy men will pay his court
> To lady of such lowly sort.[22]

The belief that excessive consumption resulted in uncontrollable female lechery goes back to ancient Rome. Valerius Maximus argued that there was a "connection between intemperance in wine and lechery in body; drinking wives were adulterous wives."[23] Perhaps this was one reason why Boorde advises that "there is no wyne good for children & maydens."[24] It is understandable why children should not drink wine, although it has been well established that they drank watered down ale in the early modern period. Boorde's admonition seems to function in a different capacity in regard to young, unmarried women. If one factors in the early modern maiden's disease, greensickness, which was purportedly cured through marital sex, it is understandable why Boorde advises against wine consumption by maidens. Moderation in both food and drink proved crucial not only to bodily health,

but to female behavioral control as well. Dietary immoderation in women could well produce disastrous consequences, as evidenced in Shakespeare's Danish play.

The overindulgence that troubles *Hamlet* arguably comes to mirror that of the playwright's own early modern world. Hamlet's observation that the Danes' drinking customs are "more honoured in the breach than the observance" (1.4.18) refers to the dietary excesses against which both early modern physicians and moralists had warned. That "other nations" (1.4.20) label the Danes "drunkards" (1.4.21) speaks less of momentary lapses on the occasion of a royal wedding, but rather of a generalized propensity for overindulgence. The Rhenish draughts that Claudius drains to the beat of "the swagg'ring upspring reels" (1.4.10) presents a powerful image of such excess, which, as Hamlet's disparaging observations conclude, condemn Elsinore as an overindulgent court.

How does Gertrude fit within this overindulgent court? Is she, like Hamlet, an unwilling or perhaps unwitting participant in the male ritual of drunken revelry? Or is the queen, in fact, a regular imbiber herself, one who embraces the same pattern of excess that earns Claudius such scorn from the cold sober Hamlet? At the very least it seems clear that she is an integral part of the festivities that surround her sudden marriage to Claudius. After dismissing the concerns of the yet grieving Hamlet, Claudius declares,

> . . . Madam, come.
> This gentle and unforced accord of Hamlet
> Sits smiling to my heart; in grace whereof,
> No jocund health that Denmark drinks today
> But the great cannon to the clouds shall tell,
> And the King's rouse the heavens shall bruit again,
> Re-speaking earthly thunder. Come away. (1.2.122-28)

The bacchanalian revelry that the King proposes here is to be shared with Gertrude. Unlike the festivities that the absent Othello organizes in honor of his marriage, Elsinore's royal couple directly indulges in the drunken celebration that earns such scorn from Hamlet and ostensibly the world at large. Certainly, as Martin has observed, "Weddings [in early modern England] were . . . occasions for often copious consumption."[25] Admittedly, though early modern physicians had warned against the practice, we must to some extent attribute the indulgence in which both Claudius and Gertrude engage to the celebratory fervor that accompanies their recent nuptials. But when such consumption is

coupled with Gertrude's "most wicked speed . . . / to incestuous sheets!" (1.2.156-57), we tap into an understanding of the humoral consequences of women and wine. Indeed, the critique in this play about excess is not limited to celebratory drunkenness; it is likewise about the perceived outpouring of female lechery that results from the consumption of too much wine.

Gertrude's sexuality is, of course, a major source of contention within the play. From an early modern humoral perspective, moreover, it proves crucial that we link Gertrude's dietary excess to her sexuality. Hamlet represents his mother as a sexually voracious widow when she prematurely sets aside her grief to enter into a lustful union with her murderous brother-in-law. As Hamlet charges, she lives "in the rank sweat of an enseamèd bed, / Stewed in corruption, honeying and making love / Over the nasty sty—" (3.4.82-84). Robert Burton's suggestion that "foolish, drunken, or hair-brained women most often bring forth children like unto themselves, morose and languid"[26] could, to some degree, describe the melancholic Hamlet. Richard Levin, however, argues that "Gertrude is the victim of a bad press . . . since she and her libido are constructed for us by the two men who have grievances against her and so must be considered hostile and therefore unreliable witnesses, while she herself is given no opportunity to testify on her own behalf."[27] Yet if Gertrude is not quite the lascivious creature Hamlet envisions, she is likewise not Markham's ideal English housewife, one who is "of great modesty and temperance as well inwardly as outwardly."[28] Rather, Gertrude becomes a caricature of the grotesquely painted creature Hamlet invokes to punish Ophelia: "You jig, you amble, and you lisp, and nickname God's creatures, and make your wantonness your ignorance" (3.1.143-45). Gertrude is, in other words, a creature of great appetite, whose consumptive excess plays handily into Claudius's power scheme.

Yet in some respects, it is an early modern cultural text that best explains Gertrude's fatal appetite, one declaring that female wine consumption results in an overly-sexualized humoral disposition. As the playwright and wit Robert Greene observes, "Drunkenness desires lust."[29] Hamlet and the ghost merely give voice to what an early modern audience would have already believed regarding women and dietary overindulgence. When Hamlet charges Gertrude with gross crimes against his father, he in fact couches his accusation in the language of consumption and excess. Forcing her to confront the counterfeits of his father and Claudius, Hamlet demands, "Have you eyes? / Could you on this fair mountain leave

to feed, / And batten on this moor?" (3.4.64-66). The lust and gluttony that Hamlet attributes to his mother ultimately constitute a metaphor for the drunkenness that characterizes the Danish court as a whole. When he advises Gertrude not to "let the bloat King tempt [her] again to bed" (3.4.165-66), Hamlet functions as a sage early modern physician, warning his patient to practice abstinence. In a sense, Gertrude has both gorged with and on Claudius, whose own greed renders him the very image of gluttony. Avoiding the "bloat king" becomes the only remedy against the dangers such excess yet represents to the queen.

Perhaps nowhere is the danger of overindulgence more apparent than in the final act of *Hamlet*. The excess which structures the play comes full circle as Gertrude drinks from the poisonous stoup to celebrate Hamlet's unexpected victory against Laertes. Raising the cup, Gertrude announces, "The Queen carouses to thy fortune, Hamlet" (5.2.232). Claudius's belated directive—"Gertrude, do not drink" (5.2.233)—ironically becomes that of an early modern dietary warning against excessive consumption, for this final sip, however seemingly miniscule, ultimately proves too much. Gertrude is rendered a mirror image of the morally bankrupt Claudius: an overindulgent imbiber who wreaks havoc on the humoral body.

In his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1632), Robert Burton advises that "our own experience is the best Physitian; that diet which is most propitious to one is often pernitious to another; such is the variety of palats, humors, and temperatures, let every man observe and be a law unto himself."[30] Burton's caveat proves instructive to a reading of *Hamlet*. If Claudius falls due to his greed and lust for power, Gertrude succumbs to an appetite that she fails to hold in check. If Claudius's consumptive excess manifests itself as murderous greed against a brother, his throne, and his queen, Gertrude's results in an insatiable sexuality, one which, from Hamlet's tortured perspective, metaphorically allows her to gorge on garbage. The toxic wine Gertrude defiantly consumes at play's end becomes representative of the poisonous excess that plagues the Danish court as a whole, setting in motion the tragic chain of events that, in the end, leaves the stage littered with corpses.

Notes

1. All Shakespeare citations are from *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).

2. Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9.

3. Ibid., 10.

4. Thomas Elyot, *Castel of Helthe* (1541), quoted in Michael C. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 26.

5. Galen, *On the Natural Faculties*, trans. Arthur John Brock, M.D. (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, [n.d.]), 49.

6. Andrew Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment; or, A Dyetary of Helth* (1547; New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 289.

7. *Homily Against Gluttonie and Dronkennes* (1563), quoted in Joan Fitzpatrick, *Food in Shakespeare: Early Modern Dietaries and the Plays* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2007), 16.

8. Fitzpatrick, *Food in Shakespeare*, 15.

9. *Homyly Against Gluttonie and Dronkennes*, 16-17.

10. William Bullein, *The Gouernment of Health* (1595), quoted in Fitzpatrick, *Food in Shakespeare: Early Modern Dietaries and the Plays* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2007), 17.

11. Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment*, 254.

12. Elyot, *Castel of Helthe*, 27.

13. Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment*, 253.

14. Gervase Markham, *The English Housewife* (1615), ed. Michael R. Best (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), 18.

15. A. Lynn Martin, "Drinking and Alehouses in the Diary of an English Mercer's Apprentice, 1663-1674," in Mack P. Holt, ed., *Alcohol: A Social and Cultural History* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), 99.

16. Ken Albala, *The Banquet: Dining in the Great Courts of Late Renaissance Europe* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 106.

17. Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment*, 289.

18. Anthony Fletcher, *Gender, Sex and Subordination in England 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 11.

19. Levinus Lemnius, *The Secret Miracles of Nature* (1658), quoted in Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, 36.

20. Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment*, 254.

21. Markham, *English Housewife*, 8.

22. Robert de Blois, *Le Chastoiement des Dames*, quoted in Martin, "Drinking in Alehouses," 48.

23. Martin, "Drinking in Alehouses," 9.

24. Boorde, *A Compendyous Regyment*, 254.

25. Martin, "Drinking and Alehouses," 98.

26. Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), quoted in Martin, "Drinking and Alehouses," 45.

27. Richard Levin, "Gertrude's Elusive Libido and Shakespeare's Unreliable Narrators," *SEL* 48, no. 2 (2008): 305-26, 323.

28. Markham, *English Housewife*, 7.

29. Robert Greene, quoted in Martin, *Alcohol, Sex, and Gender in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 1. An interesting anecdotal account of Greene's death proves rather interesting in terms of excessive alcohol consumption. According to Thomas Nashe, Greene died in after consuming large quantities of pickled herring and Rhenish wine. See Stephen Greenblatt, *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 210.

30. Robert Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1632), quoted in Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, 21.

"Confusion Now Hath Made His Masterpiece": (Re)Considering the Maddening of *Macbeth*

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Scholarship surrounding the tragedy of *Macbeth* has sought in various ways to explain Macbeth's depravity and the character's seemingly limitless potential for evil. While Macbeth attempts to justify his murder of Duncan, at a certain point in the play we realize that the protagonist is hopelessly beyond justification. Whether readers reach this point in act 2, scene 2, when Macbeth has just murdered the king and his two guards and cannot say "Amen," or after act 4, scene 2, when Macbeth's hired murderers kill Macduff's wife and son, at some point readers must come to terms with the fact that the "brave Macbeth" who was "valor's minion" (1.2.16, 19) in the first act tops "the legions / Of horrid hell . . . in evils" (4.3.55-56, 57) by act 5.[1] Yet the play is more complicated than an exposé of perverse ambition, and accomplishes more than "defin[ing] a particular kind of evil—the evil that results from a lust for power."[2]

Macbeth is a complicated character, and while understanding his complexity does little to expunge his bloody deeds, closer study can identify in Macbeth a profound confusion which fuels his actions, his paranoia, and his eventual downfall. This essay takes into consideration several factors available in the text of the play that help to explain how once-noble Macbeth is led down this tragic path (after all, how could it be tragedy if Macbeth were completely evil?). I argue that the play takes great measures to ensure that readers are aware of Macbeth's confusion and that this confusion stems both from the contradictions of those around him—he is the "butcher" who is "too full o' the milk of human kindness" (5.8.69, 1.5.15)—and from his misunderstanding of his role as an active, and later inactive, military general. While Macbeth ultimately acts in ways that can best be described as evil, his

understanding of his position and his history of being rewarded for acts of violence may help readers understand Macbeth's personal justification for killing Duncan. Ultimately, however, it is Macbeth's inability to stop acting after he has become king that especially makes him into the play's monster.

Of course, it is not unique to this argument to see Macbeth as confused. More commonly, though, this confusion is seen as a sign of Macbeth's evil nature. In G. Wilson Knight's 1978 edition of *The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of Shakespearean Tragedy*, Knight argued that "*Macbeth* is Shakespeare's most profound and mature vision of evil,"[3] that practically everything from the darkened imagery, contradictory language, and night-fallen action contribute to the play's over-arching evil. A key point to Knight's argument is that the confusion and "doubt" of Macbeth's characters lends to this sense of evil. Part of the play's ubiquitous tone manifests in Ross's utterance, "We . . . do not know ourselves" (4.2.19). Knight added that "we, too, who read, are in doubt often . . . ; we are confronted by mystery, darkness, abnormality, hideousness: and therefore fear."[4] Knight drew heavily on the imagery of the play, at times even connecting the shrieks of birds to the psychology of the characters. Because much of the play's actions are dealt at night, for example, Knight suggested that readers also "grope in the stifling dark, and suffer from doubt and insecurity . . . of suffocating, conquering evil."[5] In this respect, Knight only elaborates on the position held by A.C. Bradley, whose 1904 lecture said of *Macbeth* that "all the later tragedies may be called tragedies of passion, but not all of them display these extreme forms of evil."[6] In a similar argument, Camille Wells Slights argued that the imagery of specific scenes exposes readers to the signs of evil in the play. Particularly, she describes the dagger soliloquy of act 2, scene 1 as depicting "the growth of evil in the mind."[7] This becomes particularly apparent if we attach Knight's description of fear as a sort of evil to Slights's interpretation of the dagger scene, where Macbeth is noticeably unsettled by the vision, calling the dagger "a false creation, / Proceeding from the heat oppresséd brain" (2.1.37-38).

It is difficult to see the dagger soliloquy as an expression entirely evil, though, if we also take into account Macbeth's confusion about the vision. Characteristic of the confused language throughout the play, Macbeth talks back and forth about the dagger, considering its meaning and then reminding himself of its insignificance:

> Mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses,
> Or else worth all the rest. I see thee still,
> And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
> Which was not so before. There's no such thing. (2.1.43-46)

Were Shakespeare attempting to show "profound and mature visions of evil" or "that consciousness of fear symbolized in actions of blood," he might have handled this scene differently to do so more effectively.[8] If Macbeth were overcome by fear of the dagger, he might try to flee it, or, as when he sees the ghost of Banquo in act 3, scene 4, verbally accost the dagger in defense of his thoughts and actions. Rather, Macbeth's soliloquy tries fruitlessly to understand the dagger, and through it his own mind. At once he realizes that his eyes "are made the fools" by this apparition, and yet he sees it and seeks to understand why it is now covered by "gouts of blood." When the thoughts become overwhelming for Macbeth—perhaps he realizes the bloody nature of the murder he is considering, and perhaps the evil of killing Duncan has entered his mind—his thoughts abruptly change; he reminds himself that the dagger is a vision. "There's no such thing."

This behavior is a trend for Macbeth as he considers the murder of Duncan. Our first description of Macbeth details his prowess in battle, yet it appears as though the killing he performs in the subsequent action of the play requires a great deal of reasoning and emotional deliberation. In *Shakespeare and Violence*, R.A. Foakes argues that this deliberation results from Macbeth's questions of manliness and valor and the relationship of those questions to acts of violence. While Macbeth is a figure deeply involved in violence, Foakes's argument, that these acts are inspired by his insecurity or confusion about manliness, contribute further to the argument for reading Macbeth as a vision of evil. Foakes additionally relates this growing evil with the dagger vision, suggesting that the "alternation in Macbeth between moral horror at the thought of murder and fulfillment of an idea of manliness in carrying it out is focused in the double significance of his soliloquy and vision of a dagger."[9] This double significance, Foakes argues, represents in the dagger both the violence of murder and the "manliness" of sexual conquest. Seeing the dagger as a sort of phallus, in this case, Foakes implies that the murder of Duncan is both literal murder and figurative penetration, further symbolic of "this point on [which] Macbeth alternates between a 'manly readiness' (2.3.133) to rid himself of those who stand in his way and a condition in which a 'torture of the mind' (3.2.21) unmans him."[10] If Macbeth's confusion symbolizes his evil nature,

this dichotomy in Macbeth's mind—between swift, masculine action and hesitating on the consequences of that action—is his primary offense. The implication of the dagger as Macbeth's tool for imposing his manliness, though, is unlikely, since our first introduction to Macbeth describes him "disdaining Fortune, with his brandished steel, / Which smoked with bloody execution" (1.2.17-18). If the play has shown us Macbeth's imposition of his masculine self, it is in this description of act 1, when he "carvéd out a passage" through the rebel army and "unseamed" Macdonwald, all with a sword.

The dagger, rather, is not so much a sign of Macbeth's masculinity, which we have already seen displayed through the description of the wounded sergeant, but an additional sign of Macbeth's internal conflict. In "Macbeth's Rites of Violence," Derek Cohen observes that the use of a dagger is not necessarily emasculating, but a sign of cowardice. "Macbeth's use of the dagger off the field of battle is remarkable and uncharacteristic," Cohen argues, "for its sheer if inevitable cowardliness: he stabs three sleeping men to death."[11] To consider the vision of the dagger—a floating symbol of cowardice—Macbeth must once again consider a contradiction: is he "brave Macbeth" from the battlefield, or the silent wielder of a "bare bodkin"?

Cohen essentially aligns himself with the arguments of Knight and Foakes, that the way Macbeth contemplates violence is seeded in an evil nature. Knight argues that this nature is visible in every aspect of the play, applying the environment and even the time of day of actions to Macbeth's character. Foakes additionally suggests that the way Macbeth hesitates over action contributes to this evil character—that we see in his hesitation an internal struggle to prove manliness. Cohen's article then connects these two in suggesting that Macbeth's murders are the outward sign of internal corruption, that his "use of violence is the measure of his depravity."[12] If the symbol of the dagger shows Macbeth's evil nature, and the soliloquy surrounding the vision shows his "growth of evil,"[13] then Macbeth's thoughts, actions, and words are unanimously evil.

This reasoning takes us full circle, then, and we are left, in a way, where we might have started with Knight and "the metaphysic of evil." How can Macbeth be entirely evil? If the backdrop of the play, from the screech of birds to the confusion of the characters, are part of a sort of a magnum opus of evilness, how can we claim with any certainty that one character is more evil than the next? If thoughts themselves are evil, how can action be any more or less

evil? What does it matter if Macbeth flees from the dagger in terror or says, "Come, let me clutch thee?" (2.1.33). The play is a terrible and awesome exploration of evil, but it is also necessarily more complicated. Macbeth is given no introductory villain lines like Richard III, who is "determined to prove a villain" (1.1.30) or Iago who "hate[s] the Moor" (1.3.387). I do not mean to simplify these characters, but to illustrate Macbeth's inability to be categorized: he is not a villain, but he is no longer a hero; he is determined to understand himself, but he is hopelessly confused about himself. I would add that this confusion comes from Macbeth's training as a soldier: he is a skilled warrior, but must act only as a result of being given orders or instructions. When he seemingly begins to receive orders from authorities other than Duncan (the witches, his wife, and even the visions of his "heat-oppresséd brain"), he becomes confused about whether he must follow these orders, whose orders he is obligated to follow, and whom the orders should ultimately benefit.

The play gives several obstacles to the Macbeth-as-evil interpretation, among them the use of contradictory language demonstrating Macbeth's and others' confusion throughout the play, the portrayal of Macbeth's misconception of his role as a soldier, and the system of reward for violence he has experienced through that role. These obstacles are tangible elements present in the play, and while Macbeth's actions become unjustifiable after the murder of Duncan, the struggle of Macbeth before and immediately after he kills the king require a multifaceted approach to understanding the play.

From the play's opening, we are introduced to the obscure language that continues until its close. In the first scene, the nearly-nonsensical meeting of the three witches conveys almost no meaning to the reader—we can parse out that they will meet again "upon the heath" after a battle, "There to meet with Macbeth" (1.1.7, 8). All together they then declare, "Fair is foul, and foul is fair" (1.1.10); we could read this line as a sort of curse on the remainder of the play, which adopts similar language and an atmosphere of panicked confusion hereafter. Even Macbeth, first appearing amid a thundering storm, claims not to have seen before "so foul and fair a day," mirroring the language of the witches. If foul *is* fair, Macbeth is already a voice of redundancy, calling the day "foul and fair" in his first line. The witches perpetuate this contradictory language in their prophesy, telling Banquo he is "lesser than Macbeth, and greater" and "not so happy, yet much happier" (1.2.66-67). It is perhaps Macbeth's most lucid line that

cries, "Stay, you imperfect speakers!" (1.2.71). In a way, the witches are an active force of confusion. Whereas the dagger passively floats and bleeds, the witches hurl confusion into the play with their paradoxical language and half-formed prophesies.

This ambiguity is further compounded when we consider the play as viewed in performance. In *The Masks of Macbeth*, Marvin Rosenberg introduces Macbeth as a play in which nothing is as it seems and argues that this effect is layered during performance. When we first meet Duncan, for example, we do not know who has just walked on the stage. "What bloody man is that?" (1.2.5) the scene begins. "Is the bloody man Macbeth?" Rosenberg asks; "The speaker turns out to be a king: is he Macbeth?"[14] In performance, the ambiguity of the text is projected, and audiences are not only disoriented by contradicting language, but by new information and not enough information at the same time. The audience sees the action, but is not given enough information to understand it. Similarly, Macbeth is given these whispers of prophecy, but not enough detail to determine how he should act as a result.

Already affected by the witches' language by scene 3, Macbeth tries to reason through the encounter: "This supernatural soliciting / Cannot be ill, cannot be good" (1.3.130-31). It is apparent that Macbeth must wrestle with this new information, but it is unclear that either argument—good or ill—will emerge victorious. When Macbeth argues with himself, it seems fated that he will always lose. His conviction about killing Duncan is sincere and powerful, and yet his reason is consistently thwarted by moments of contradiction that nullify his arguments. He finishes his first consideration of the murder realizing that his "thought, whose murder yet is fantastical, / Shakes so my single state of man that function / Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is / But what is not" (1.3.139-42). These repeated poetic and philosophical claims propel Macbeth into the moral relativism that allows him to kill Duncan. The first half of the thought might lead Macbeth to abandon the murder, since it upsets and "shakes" him so; yet the second reveals what Rosenberg calls "the psychic bewilderment of this fearless warrior,"[15] where the world seems turned upside down, the impossible seems possible, and the bounds of reality seem to be bending: "Nothing is / But what is not."

Beleaguered by the witches' curse, or else by his own inner turmoil, Macbeth arrives at the dagger scene with a conscience divided between the physical and fantastic, the perceivable and prophetic. His vision of the dagger, as he suggests, is "a dagger of the mind," the subject of his anxieties. In an article applying forms

of criminal psychology to *Macbeth*, Kevin Curran says that the dagger symbolizes, in a way, the liminal space between the extremes Macbeth considers. "To interrogate the line between innocence and guilt, Shakespeare seems to tell us, is also to interrogate the line between mind and matter, subject and object, conceiving and doing, being and feeling."[16] The dagger bridges the gap between thought and action, and Macbeth uses the vision to question whether action or thought determines innocence or guilt. A major factor for Macbeth in rationalizing his action is separating it from thought—he seems to decide here that too much thinking has more to do with guilt than action. As he watches the dagger begin to drip with blood, he stops his thoughts: "There's no such thing" as the floating dagger, he says, only "the bloody business which informs / Thus to [his] eyes" (2.1.46, 47-48). Were he to perform the action without thinking on the deed (as he did, perhaps, in the battle with Macdonwald), he would be free from guilt, or, as Curran argues, from "feeling guilty" for killing Duncan. Macbeth hastens to commit the act, since "words to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives," (2.1.60), and the soldier whose "brandished steel . . . smoked with bloody execution" (1.2.18) cannot allow his deeds to be cooled by the reason which only brings contradiction and confusion.

That Macbeth shows an unwillingness toward reason, or at least deference toward action, likely originates with his role as a successful, career soldier. It might be argued that Macbeth's guilt does not originate with his "vaulting ambition" (1.7.27), but rather in over-stepping his role as a soldier. By considering killing his own targets, for the benefit of Macbeth rather than the benefit of Scotland and Duncan, Macbeth falls into a space *between* valor and depravity, the soldier and the assassin, where an internal conflict rises over understanding how killing can be both honorable, even rewarded, or deplorable and punished. In an article which highlights these dualities throughout the play, Unhae Langis argues that Macbeth's error is not ambition but "ignobly substitut[ing] honor for virtue," further suggesting that "Macbeth's actions illustrate contrasting examples of praiseworthy and censurable ambition."[17] While Macbeth is right in describing his ambition as "vaulting," it has been a noble ambition, fighting under Duncan's command. We are given an example of this "virtuous ambition" when we hear of Macbeth's valiant exploits in the battle which earns him the title of Cawdor.[18] He makes an error, though, when he allows himself to equate the honor of kingship with the virtue of obedience and service. The battle against the rebels gives us a

clear representation of Macbeth's honorable soldierliness before he encounters the witches—Duncan ostensibly ordered Macbeth to attack, and, based on the account of the sergeant, he appears to have done so heroically. He is then rewarded as such a hero for his show of "bloody execution."

As a good—even heroic—soldier, then, Macbeth must have grown accustomed to acting under orders. But the play takes place between battles for Macbeth, as the battle against Macdonwald has already been won when the play begins. As a result, Macbeth walks onto the stage as an idle soldier in this play, unable to act and awaiting orders. When the witches tell Macbeth he will be king, he questions how it might happen (since "the Thane of Cawdor lives"); his conflict is twofold: can he act? and can he do it guiltlessly?

Lady Macbeth gives him the order to act, to take the crown, and Macbeth ultimately obeys this command. Lady Macbeth gives him the clear directives he needs to perform again. Foakes argues that Macbeth has grown accustomed to making "images of death" on the battlefield (1.3.98) and that it is actually the new "challenge" of killing Duncan that overcomes his moral reservations against killing his king.[19] Macbeth himself seems to contradict this argument, though, with his wish that "if chance will have [him] king, why, chance may / crown" him (1.3.142-43). Macbeth is not driven by the challenge of killing Duncan—a feat which, physically, he accomplishes easily—but rather by the combination of satisfying noble ambition, fulfilling the prophesy, and following orders. He begins to believe that he must become king, by fated prophesy and by the order of Lady Macbeth, and he wishes it could be done quickly and be over with: "If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well / It were done quickly" (1.7.1-2).

While he grapples with whether it is criminal to consider killing Duncan or criminal to actually kill him (as in the dagger scene), Lady Macbeth calls into question his manhood and his ability to act. When she makes the murder into a question of success or failure for Macbeth, he is able to react as a good soldier should: with an assessment and affirmation of his ability to complete assignments. Lady Macbeth's statements of absolutes, such as, "When you durst do it, then you were a man" and "Screw your courage to the sticking place, / And we'll not fail" (1.7.49, 60-61), invigorate Macbeth's sense of action. They remove the ambiguity from the actions that have been tormenting him, and narrow them down to simpler equations: killing Duncan, Macbeth will prove a man; with enough courage (an attribute in which we

know Macbeth is not lacking), he will not fail. Her affirmations function as orders to Macbeth's soldierly impulses and clear away the contradictions hindering him from action.

In addition to following orders, Macbeth has also been conditioned to receive reward for his martial prowess. When Ross delivers the news that Macbeth has been given Cawdor, Macbeth's excitement grows not out of his surprise at being rewarded, but at the fulfillment of the witches' prophesy. The reward itself makes perfect sense to him once he learns of the former Cawdor's fate. In *If It Were Done:* Macbeth *and Tragic Action*, James Calderwood ties this system of reward directly to the murder of Duncan. As killing earns him promotions, Calderwood observes, "so death defines Macbeth and enlarges him. He stands over dead men on the battlefield, he is singled out by the Witches immediately afterward for prophetic glory, he is honored by the king with thaneship. And all for killing. Why should he doubt that death will make him King of Scotland?"[20] Throughout the first act of the play, we see Macbeth honored by his friend, his peers, a soldier under his command, and even his king, all for his efficient and bloody killing. Foakes adds that part of Macbeth's confusion may be that he fails to understand the difference between types of killing until after he has killed Duncan; the play "brings out the discordances between open violence in battle and secret violence in murder."[21] Foakes suggests symptoms of post-traumatic stress in the general, who has partially lost his ability to feel emotionally and can no longer distinguish between settings in which killing is "appropriate" or not.[22] In this light, Macbeth is no less guilty for the murder of Duncan; he still killed the king, but his character in doing so becomes something much different from the current discussion defining just how purely evil is Macbeth. Understanding Macbeth's murder of Duncan involves considering his perception of murder and how that perception relates to his experience of being rewarded for killing.

Despite his profound confusion throughout the play, his misunderstanding of his role as a soldier and his altered perception of killing and murder, Macbeth ultimately abandons his reservations about killing, and we lose sight of the once noble general who has somehow metamorphosed into a paranoid tyrant-butcher. After Macbeth becomes king, it is as though he realizes the depths of his depravity and there are no more boundaries which cannot be crossed. He becomes a character difficult to feel sympathy for, both for his enemies in the play and his audience.

Arguably Macbeth's problem at this point is his inability to stop killing. Again, we might consider ambition, but he has nothing to gain from killing after he takes Duncan's throne. His killing is a means of holding onto the crown, but, as Cleanth Brooks phrases it, it is as though he attempts to "conquer the future,"[23] with the next threat to be removed constantly in mind. The contemplative, conflicted Macbeth of act 1 is replaced in act 4 with a new Macbeth who acknowledges that his hands will now do the business of the impulses of his heart: "From this moment / The very firstlings of my heart shall be / The firstlings of my hand. And even now / To crown thoughts with acts, be it thought and done" (4.1.146–49). He will no longer consider consequences, but "crown thoughts with" action, to just think and do those things necessary to keep the crown. He instigates the deaths of Banquo and Macduff's wife and son. By the play's final scene he deserves neither Cawdor nor Glamis, but only the remaining title of "butcher."

Whether it changes how we perceive Macbeth as a character to reconsider his motives and his struggles before he kills Duncan will depend largely on the reader. In Macbeth's final scene, we are reminded he is a soldier, as he seems to break free of the fog of his confusion for a few brief lines. As we witness his impending demise and sudden death, "there is disillusion and despair, and the elemental struggle of the splendid warrior trained to live until killed."[24] Shakespeare makes clear that Macbeth is not *only* a butcher, and his conscience brings scholars back to reconsider and question the play. Perhaps Macbeth can be understood as a conflicted human being, one who struggles in turn with his ability to cope with his military experience, his interpretation of the witches, and his failing reasoning. We cannot deny that what he becomes is evident in evil actions, but maybe Macbeth really was once "too full o' the milk of human kindness." Calderwood notes that we must remember the Macbeth of the play's beginning in order to better understand the implications of its end. As Malcolm invites his lords to meet him at Scone, we should be reminded that "between the king's loyal defenders and Scone lie a good many wild and witch-ridden heaths."[25] The play ends much as it began, and implies that if good soldiers like Macbeth can be changed to butchers, the cycle of violence may very well continue long after his death.

Finally, it is of note to suggest some implications of this way of viewing Macbeth for early modern audiences. Benjamin Parris, in "'The Body Is with the King, but the King Is Not with the Body': Sovereign Sleep in *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*," compiles several

statements, especially those of James I, in which the king explains his two bodies: the physical and political. "In *A Paterne for a Kings Inavgvration*, James I of England advises his son Charles that the king must be 'a great watchman and shepheard . . . and his eye must neuer slumber nor sleepe for the care of his flocke, euer remembering . . . his office, beeing duely executed.'"[26] Of course, the "sleepe" to which James I refers is figurative; as Kantorowicz described in *The King's Two Bodies*, it is the sleep not of the physical body, but of the political and spiritual body, the "sleep" of a negligent ruler.[27] Parris argues that Shakespeare experiments with this dual nature of the king when he allows good kings to be murdered in their sleep. Both King Hamlet and Duncan are seen as kings who are executing their duties sufficiently, and yet they are killed during the sleep of their physical bodies. In both cases, the supernatural world is upset by the imbalance caused by this perverse violence; the Ghost of Hamlet rises from the grave to exact revenge, and Macbeth almost immediately hears the voice crying out that "Macbeth does murder sleep" and "Macbeth shall sleep no more" (2.2.34, 41).

Macbeth, who "murdered sleep," is punished essentially for his lack of judgment, for killing Duncan—a good king—in his physical sleep. The implication might be that deposing a "sleeping" body politic or removing a negligent or tyrant king could potentially be honorable, but killing the physical body of the king as he sleeps is never honorable, especially in the case of a good king. It is a secret act of vile murder, and Macbeth, having "murdered sleep," is no longer able to sleep after he kills Duncan. Macbeth himself becomes an ineffective king (sleeping politically), who also cannot sleep physically. Duncan was not sleeping politically—he was not a negligent king—and the play seems to punish Macbeth both for taking advantage of the physical body of the king and for killing a good king. The play, which James I likely watched, would have served as a warning to those taking advantage of the king's mortal vulnerability. Perhaps Shakespeare had been aware of James's "Speech to Parliament" of 1605, which describes the difficulties of kings, "being in the higher places like high trees" and therefore "most subject to the daily tempests of innumerable dangers."[28] James, who had recently suffered an assassination attempt, decries the vulnerable state of the king's physical body. Alongside *Hamlet*, the murder of the sleeping king in Macbeth functions as a sympathetic argument to that of James's speech and a warning to would-be villains of the horrors awaiting those who would attack their sovereigns.

Notes

1. William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, ed. Burton Raffel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). All *Macbeth* citations come from this work.

2. L.C. Knights, "Macbeth," in *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Macbeth: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Terrence Hawkes (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977). 87.

3. G. Wilson Knight, *The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of Shakespearean Tragedy*, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1978), 140.

4. Ibid., 146.

5. Ibid., 144, 140.

6. A.C. Bradley, *Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 83.

7. Camille Wells Slights, *The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, and Milton* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 111.

8. Knight, *The Wheel of Fire*, 140, 158.

9. R.A. Foakes, *Shakespeare & Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 152.

10. Ibid.

11. Derek Cohen, "Macbeth's Rites of Violence," *Shakespeare in Southern Africa* 23 (2011): 57.

12. Ibid.

13. Slights, *The Casuistical Tradition*, 111.

14. Marvin Rosenberg, *The Masks of Macbeth* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 36.

15. Ibid., 137.

16. Kevin Curran, "Feeling Criminal in Macbeth," *Criticism* 54, no. 3 (2012): 398.

17. Unhae Langis, "Shakespeare and Prudential Psychology: Ambition and Akrasia in Macbeth," *Shakespeare Studies* 40 (2012): 46-47.

18. Ibid., 46.

19. Foakes, *Shakespeare & Violence*, 151.

20. James L. Calderwood, *If It Were Done:* Macbeth *and Tragic Action* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 79.

21. Foakes, *Shakespeare & Violence*, 151.

22. Ibid., 156.

23. Cleanth Brooks, "The Naked Babe and the Cloak of Manliness," in *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Macbeth: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Terrence Hawkes (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977): 47.

24. Rosenberg, *The Masks of Macbeth*, 676.

25. Calderwood, *If It Were Done*, 114.

26. Benjamin Parris, "'The Body Is with the King, but the King Is Not with the Body': Sovereign Sleep in *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*," *Shakespeare Studies* 40 (2012): 101.

27. Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

28. Quoted in Parris, "The Body is with the King," 114.

"You've Read the Book. Now See the Play!" Shakespeare and the London Book Trade

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According to the venerable A. L. Rowse, "Shakespeare's dearest wish was to be, and to be taken for, a poet,"[1] and as a poet-playwright is how we usually think of, and study, Shakespeare. My studies lead me to believe we also should think of him as an actor-entrepreneur, who also wrote damned good plays and a few poetic works. Compared to his contemporary writers, like John Lyly, George Chapman, and Ben Jonson, Shakespeare's literary output is pretty slim if his prime career be that of an author. Indeed, we might thank Ben Jonson for establishing play scripts as literature, else half of Shakespeare's plays (plays not published until the *First Folio*), including the Utah Shakespeare Festival's 2013 *King John* and *The Tempest*, might have perished altogether.

Officialdom and the *literati* in London viewed him as an actor. In 1594 his name is included as a payee for court performances. The cryptic *Willobie His Advisa*, dated 1594, alludes to Shakespeare as a player.[2] In 1602, the York Herald complained of the granting of a Coat of Arms to "Shakespear ye Player."[3] In 1603 the poet and writing master John Davies of Hereford (*Microcosmos*) praised Shakespeare and Burbage as actors skilled in their use of voice and realistic portrayals. As late as 1605 the anonymous author of *Ratseis Ghost* refers to Shakespeare as a player. Even our first sure reference to Shakespeare's theatrical career in 1592, Robert Greene's celebrated death bed "Blast," clearly designates Shakespeare as an actor with delusions that he was a poet, and Greene's famous pun—"his Tyger's heart wrapt in a Player's hide"—curiously points as much to a particular role in *3 Henry VI* as to the Henry VI plays themselves.[4]

It was Shakespeare's entry into full partnership as an actor in the newly organized Chamberlain's Men in 1594 that signals the

beginning of his financial success. The usual playwright's fee was £6 to £10 per play, plus a "benefit" performance yielding another £5. At Shakespeare's average 2 or 3 plays per year, his income would be about £45. But Shakespeare's one-eighth share as a partner in the acting company would be about 14 to 17 shillings per performance. At the average of 230 performances per year, his annual income from acting would amount to £160 to £195, equal to ten to thirteen years' wages to the skilled artisan. Table 1 presents his rapid rise to prosperity after he becomes a partner in the Chamberlains's Men. Note how quickly after that he secured a coat-of-arms at a fee of £30, invested £327 (an amount about the same as the income of a country squire) for 120 acres of land in Stratford, bought the second largest house in Stratford at a cost of £60, and bought an eighth share in the Globe theatre at £60.[5] Note also the comparison of these sums to the average annual income of a skilled artisan, £15—an income about the same as paid to a "hired man," an actor who was only an employee of the company.[6]

Table I: Shakespeare's Rise to Riches

YEAR	THEATRE CAREER	PERSONAL LIFE
1578		Father mortgages some lands
1582		Marries Anne Hathaway
1583		Daughter Susanna born
1585		Twins born, Hamnet & Judith
1586		Father removed as alderman
1589	Goes to London (?)	Father sued for debt
1590	Ref, as minor actor	Father sued for debt
1592	Ref. to growing prominence	Father fined as recusant
1594	Partner, Chamberlain's Men	
1596	Partner, Chamberlain's Men	Buys Coat of Arms, £30
1597	Partner, Chamberlain's Men	Buys Stratford land, £327
1598	Partner, Chamberlain's Men	Buys house in Stratford, £60
1599	Partner, Chamberlain's Men	Buys Globe share, £60

Shakespeare continued investing throughout his career. In 1602 he paid another £320 for another 107 acres of farmland and 20 acres of pasture near Stratford. Sometime before his death, he bought The Maidenhead and Swan Inns and adjoining houses in Stratford.[7] His will mentions orchards, gardens, tenements, stables, and barns—always in the plural.[8] He also owned, or controlled,

other properties, from his marriage to Anne Hathaway (we need to remember the young William married a local heiress) and from inheritance from his father, who died in 1601. By the time he retired from the theatre, Shakespeare was the largest property owner in Stratford-upon-Avon.[9] We also know he invested in tithe futures and grain futures. In 1605 he spent £440 for a half interest in the tithes of part of Stratford and two neighboring towns—an investment yielding a net income of £60 per year.[10] In 1608 he added to his one-eighth ownership in the Globe, a one-sixth ownership in the Blackfriars theatre. Finally, in 1613 he invested £140 to buy the gate house at the Blackfriars complex.[11] Estimates of his probable income from all these sources—income from the theatre and his investments—suggest an annual income of about £830, an income close to that of a knight of the shire, and almost fifty-six years' wages for the average artisan. That puts Shakespeare well within the top 5% income bracket of his time. Just the cash bequests in his will total about £378,[12] a sum equaling slightly more than the average yearly income of a "country gentleman," and about twenty-five years' wages to the skilled artisan. Perhaps that is a major cause for his "retirement" from the stage in 1613. His bachelor brother Gilbert, who was his agent in Stratford, died in 1612,[13] and Shakespeare may have returned to Stratford to manage his properties and investments.

Shakespeare's attempts to preserve and increase his holdings reveal a "sharp," and perhaps a bit unscrupulous, businessman. Because of his land investments, Shakespeare shows up in lawsuits over enclosures. Though heading the list of "ancient freeholders" in a document contesting enclosures, Shakespeare seems to have hedged his bets, for he also secured a promise of compensation from the parties seeking the enclosures. We know he sometimes acted as a moneylender; in 1604 and 1608 he took debtors to court.[14] And, as recently touted in the British press, Jayne Archer, lecturer in medieval and Renaissance literature at Aberystwyth University, shows that court records accuse Shakespeare of hoarding grain in a time of famine and of evading taxes.[15] Samuel Schoenbaum writes that London tax records show that Shakespeare was in default of taxes owed there in 1597, 1598, and 1600.[16]

Now what does all this have to do with the book trade? Well, just as the returns yielded an actor-partner-investor like Shakespeare enormous rewards, theatre costs in London also were enormous. From Philip Henslowe's *Diary* (his account book—Henslowe owned the rival Rose and Fortune theatres) and sums listed in civil litigations, we can calculate some of those costs.

Table 2 lists some of those costs, along with estimates of the ticket sales collected at the theatres that covered those costs and made profits for the theatre owners and the actor-partners.[17]

Table 2: Comparison of Selected Theatre-Related Monies to Wages of an Artisan

Item	Pounds Sterling	No. Years' Wages
Construction costs: Burbages "Theatre"	£666	44.4 Years
Construction costs: Henslowes "Rose"	£816	54.4 Years
Construction costs: "The Globe"	£600	40 Years
Construction costs: Henslowe's "Fortune"	£600	40 Years
Averagae construction costs (4 Theatres)	£673	45 Years
Average play productionn costs: Annual	£900	60 Years
Average building maintenance costs: Annual	£100	6.7 Years
Costumes properties: "The Swan"	£300	20 Years
Average daily receipts: "Globe" or "Rose"	£8.5	7 Months
Annual receipts: "Globe" or "Rose"	£1955	130.33 Years

Only those who practiced business skills and who viewed and shaped their artistic talents as if they also were business commodities could meet those costs and derive handsome returns on their labors and investments. So, looking at Shakespeare as an actor-entrepreneur suggests he was probably just as inspired to write plays that would likely bring those pennies through the doors at the Theatre or the Globe as he was by his dramatic and poetic muse. Someone shrewd and cautious enough to hedge his bets in a land dispute probably would be shrewd enough to look for indications of what would likely entice the public to spend their pennies at his theatres' doors.

Not only Henslowe at the Rose, but also his rivals at the Globe seem to have used gate-receipts, not necessarily artistic merit, to determine a play's stage life. From Henslowe's *Diary* we see a popular old war-horse like *Spanish Tragedy* revived, and revived, and revived. However, a play that saw drastic reductions in gate-receipts after its first few performances was removed from the repertory, seldom to be reintroduced. Henslowe backed no "sleepers." In the same fashion *Titus Andronicus* and *Hamlet* played again and again at Shakespeare's Globe, but other plays, even those by the Globe's premier playwright, such as *Taming of the Shrew*, *Love's Labors' Won*,

and *Cardenio*, became figuratively, and sometimes literally, lost—or perhaps revised and recycled under a new name. From Henslowe, branded by literary critics as a "hardheaded capitalist," we expect such ruthless disposal of plays with limited popularity. Yet it seems that Shakespeare, a partner in the acting company and a partner in the theatre—in other words, a man with a prominent voice in the company's operations—was ruthless with his own creations.[18]

By the same token, popular plays invited imitation. Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy*, so popular that it went through sixteen printings in just over as many years, contained scenes of "feigned" madness. Even the fastidious Robert Greene copied that device in his *Orlando Furioso*. Shakespeare used it in *Titus Andronicus,* in *Hamlet*, in *Lear*, even in *The Taming of the Shrew*. Blood and gore were another feature of *Spanish Tragedy*, and one certainly finds the plays of Shakespeare and other dramatists littered with corpses and replete with scenes of almost gratuitous violence—beatings, slow, theatrical strangulations, throat-cutting, eye-gouging.[19]

"Box-office" success meant giving the popular audience what it wanted. Literary and dramatic criticism over the years has carefully isolated themes, plots, and dramatic devices tailored to the tastes of artisans and tradesmen and courtiers. Sheer instinct, however, or trial and error could not have been the playwrights' only arbiters of taste, so where did Dekker, Chapman, Shakespeare, and other playwrights learn what was "in"? No good businessman would risk substantial investments to intuitive intangibles. Theatre businessmen—and recent research stresses Shakespeare's hardheadedness as a businessman in the eyes of his own contemporaries—must have done some kind of market research, and the London book trade offered an indication of what was of interest to the various classes of sixteenth-century London.[20]

Many have underestimated literacy among the artisan classes of sixteenth-century England. Sir Thomas More's boast in the first quarter of the sixteenth century that sixty percent of all Londoners were literate should be accepted, perhaps increased for the London of Shakespeare's day. By that time each county in England averaged ten grammar schools, most subsidized by the Gentry, the guilds, or the Church. Proximity and cost kept schooling within the reach of all but the poorest boys. Education was a matter of concern to Elizabethans, as evidenced by a number of treatises written about schooling and the government's periodic check-ups on the quality of schoolmasters through episcopal visitations and written inquiries. Even some servant girls

could read and write. Remember, the joke in *Romeo and Juliet* is that the servant cannot read his list of invitees; but also remember, Father Capulet assumes his servant can read. The emphasis on reading and writing was so strong that each and every guild *required* literacy of anyone admitted to apprenticeship. The sheer number of university and grammar school trained men jostling for patrons in London demonstrates that schools produced more "scholars" than there were jobs for them.[21]

Neither should one assume, as do some scholars, that the popular classes "did not read much." Throughout the last half of the sixteenth century, London supported an average of twenty-five printing establishments. Though the Stationers' Guild limited printing per edition to 1,250 to 1,500 copies, the yearly average of new titles printed was about 200; each printer, therefore, averaged about 9,600 printed copies per year. Hence annually, 200,000 to 240,000 copies of books and pamphlets were printed and available for sale. Such considerable numbers indicate a brisk market. Sales to the aristocracy, to the gentry, to church libraries, and to the provinces could not have amounted to more than one-third of the total output. Writers and their publishers clearly catered to a less well-off and less well-educated clientele. Most books sold in unbound copies, in Black Letter font, costing from 2 to 4 pence, not more than one-third the daily wage of an artisan (12 pence). Grafton's and Stowe's Chronicles competed with one another, thus were periodically reissued in simpler, shorter, cheaper editions. Between 1564 and 1599 there were sixteen separate editions of Grafton and fifteen editions of Stowe. Philamon Holland flatly stated that his translations of Greek and Latin classical literature specifically were designed to make the classics available to "the husbandman, the mason, the carpenter, goldsmith, painter, lapidary, and engraver, with other artificers."[22]

It was simplified English history books like Grafton's and Stowe's *Chronicles*, Greek and Latin classics in translation, and geography and travel books that were among the most popular titles printed for the working classes. As regards playwrights like those working for Henslowe, or like Shakespeare, it seems to have been the appearance and popularity of these simplified history books and the classics in translation that helped trigger their muse. Scholars have identified the sources (and probable sources) of Shakespeare's plots. What is intriguing, as seen in Table 3, is the chronological relationship between the appearance of printed copies of those sources and subsequent productions of Shakespeare's plays drawing upon those sources. Since precise

dating of the plays is the subject of scholarly debate (especially Shakespeare's earlier plays), dates are not meant as absolutes. The table uses the traditional dating system merely as a chronological framework, with a plus or minus variable of a year or so.[23]

Table 3: Chronologies of Sources and Plays

A. English History and Travel Books (No Direct Year-by-year Relationship

History/Travel Books	Pub. Year	History Play	Trad. Dates
Foxe's *Martyrs*	1570	*1 Henry VI*	1589-90
Stowe's *Chronicles*	1580	*2 Henry VI*	1589-90
Anon. *Henry V*	1586	*3 Henry VI*	1590-91
Holingshed's *Chronicles*	1587	*Richard III*	1592-93
Mirror for Magistrates	1587	Collab. on *Thomas More*	1594-95
Anon. *Reign of John*	1591	*King John*	1594-95
rev. Stowes *Chronicles*	1592	*Richard II*	1595
Daniel's *Civil Wars*	1595	*1 Henry IV*	1595
rev. Foxe's *Martyrs*	1595	*2 Henry IV*	1596-97
Stowe's *London*	1598	*Henry V*	1599

B. Greco-Roman Books (No Direct Year-by-year Relationship)

English Translations	Pub. Year	Greco-Roman Play	Trad. Dates
Appian's *Civil Wars*	1578		
Plutarch's *Lives*	1579	*Titus Andronicus*	1593-94
Lefevre's *Troy*	1595		
Homer's *Illiad*	1598		
Tacitus' *Annals*	1598		
Daniel's *Cleopatra*	1599	*Julius Caesar*	1599
Livy's *History*	1600		
rev. Plutarch's *Lives*	1600	*Trolilus & Cressida*	1601-02
Pliny's *History*	1601	*Anthony & Cleopatra*	1606-07
rev. Plutarch's *Lives*	1603	*Coriolanus*	1607-08
Suetonius *Lives*	1606	*Timon of Athens*	1607-08

C. Comedies–Tragedies (Nearer Year-by-year Relationship)

Book	Pub. Year	Play	Trad. Dates
trans. Plautus' *Menaechmi*	1594		
trans. Plautus *Amphitruo*	1594	*Comedy of Errors*	1593-94
trans. *Gesta Romanorum*	1595	*Merchant of Venice*	1596-97
Gerard's *Herbal* (songs)	1597	*Rev. Love's Labors' Lost*	1597
trans. Contarini's *Venice*	1599	*Othello*	1604
Jones' *Songs & Airs*	1600	*Twelfth Night*	1601-02
Hall's *Popish Imposters*	1603		
trans. Montaigne's *Essays*	1603	*King Lear*	1604
Twine's *Painful Adventures*	1607	*Pericles Prince of Tyre*	1607-08
Jourdain's *Bermudas*	1610		
Virginia Council's *Virginia*	1610	*The Tempest*	1611
trans. Cervantes' *"Quixote"*	1612	*Cardenio*	1612-13

Table 3 suggests that Shakespeare may have operated on a principle much like, "You've read the book. Now see the play." The relationship between the publication of a popular work and Shakespeare's subsequent and speedy use of that work seems quite clear in Part C, as, for example, Jones' *Songs and Airs* in 1600 and Shakespeare's use of some of those songs in *Twelfth Night* a little later, or the publication of Jourdain's *Bermuda* in 1610 and the performance of *The Tempest* in 1611, just as the earlier popularity of Brooke's poem *Romeaus and Juliet* with the Inns of Court gallants led to the play *Romeo and Juliet*. Such a close relationship is not as obvious in Parts A and B until the books and plays in each category are examined as groups.

Whether one adopts the traditional dating of Shakespeare's first plays, or the newer view that dates them earlier, the writing of comedy-romances, and to a lesser extent tragedies, is distributed somewhat evenly throughout his theatrical career. Parts A and B, however, illustrate that the writing of English history plays, and the writing of plays on Greco-Roman stories, is concentrated primarily into two separate periods—English histories up to 1599, Greco-Roman plays from 1599 to 1608. In each of these periods the London book trade produced several publications whose genre, content, or theme parallel the same pattern as Shakespeare's plays.

A strong interest in history and geography, especially English history and English landmarks, was prevalent in England during the latter half of the sixteenth century. Between 1550 and 1600 about one hundred and ten travel and history books were published, some, like Holinshed's, Grafton's, and Stowe's *Chronicles*, and *The Mirror for Magistrates*, going through multiple printings. The surge of national concern and feeling produced by the threat of, and "defeat" of, the Spanish Armada quickened that historical interest in the late 1580s and early 1590s, about the time Shakespeare himself went to London. Specifically, in 1587 Holinshed's popular *Chronicles*, as well as the widely read *Mirror for Magistrates*, both used heavily by Shakespeare in his history plays, were revised, expanded, and reprinted. From that date on, until the end of the century, over thirty-nine books dealing with travel or England's history were printed—an average of three new ones per year.[24]

Many scholars have noted how Shakespeare's history plays reflected this surge of English nationalism, becoming, as A. L. Rowse puts it, "the very voice of England in those years. . . . He caught the mood and made himself the mouthpiece; hence his earliest success."[25] Yet reflecting the spirit of the time is insufficient to explain why Shakespeare, who had written nine history plays—an average of one a year—abruptly stopped writing them after 1599. English nationalism did not drop off abruptly in 1599, but the publication of books about English history did. Only three English history books appeared in 1599; *none* were printed in 1600, 1601, or 1602.

Printers now began to issue new kinds of books. Translations of Greco-Roman sources, which, though a few were printed in the late 1570s, but had not frequently appeared in the 1580s and 90s, now gained popularity among the printers rather rapidly. At least twenty-one different translations of works by Livy, Ovid, Sallust, Homer, and other Greco-Roman writers were printed between 1599 and 1610—at least one, sometimes two or more, new editions each year. Shakespeare and his partners seem to have followed the printers' lead. From 1599 until 1607, Shakespeare wrote, and his company staged, plays based on Greco-Roman stories on an average of one every eighteen months. *Julius Caesar* and *Anthony and Cleopatra* read like virtual word-by-word dramatizations, down to the some of the minutest of details, of selected Plutarch's *Lives*. One might attribute Shakespeare's shift away from English history plays around the turn of the seventeenth century to mere coincidence, or boredom, or a change in his and his acting company's artistic tastes, *if* he and his acting company were alone in following the pattern described above. They were not. Graphs 1

and 2 illustrate that not only the Chamberlain's Men, but also the Admiral's Men, and (after 1599) other London acting companies followed the same pattern. The graphs suggest that the repertories of all the London acting companies paralleled the trends in the book trade.[26]

Graph 1: History books and History plays, 1587-1601



Henslowe's *Diary* and other theatrical records reveal that, like Shakespeare for the Chamberlain's Men, playwrights for the Admiral's Men produced new comedy-romances at a relatively consistent pace, tragedies playing a lesser role in the Admiral's repertory until after 1599. On the other hand, Henslowe's *Diary* shows that new English history plays were added at an average of two per year from the year of the Armada (1588) until 1599. *But* from 1599, and throughout the time Shakespeare continued writing, the Admiral's (later Prince Henry's) Men commissioned few new histories. The same holds true for the newest London acting company, Worcester's (later Queen Anne's) Men.[27]

Graph 2: Greco-Roman books and Greco-Roman plays, 1594-1608



After 1599, however, as Graph 2 suggests, Shakespeare and other playwrights, writing for his company and for its competitors, produced Greco-Roman plays at a similar rate, slightly lower than they had English history plays, but again paralleling the book trade. The fact that none of the companies produced Greco-Roman plays with the same alacrity as they had history plays is not too surprising. The book trade also was far less vigorous in publishing the classics, probably reflecting lower popular demand.[28]

Tragedies also made a comeback in the theatres. Tragedies like Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* and Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta* were popular in the 1580s and early 1590s, but after 1592 or so few new tragedies appear in Henslowe's *Diary* or in the Stationers' Register, and we need to remember that only two of Shakespeare's tragedies—*Titus Andronicus* and *Romeo and Juliet*—were written and staged before 1599. About 1599-1600, however, tragedies seem to revive on the London stages, and, of course, many of the Greco-Roman plays also can be classified as tragedies. Tragedies now began to be produced by all London companies with a frequency almost matching the previous popularity of English history plays. Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* and *Hamlet* were performed by the Chamberlain's Men in the Autumn of 1599 or early 1600, contemporary with the staging of Chettle's *Tragedy of Hoffman* and Dekker's (et al.) *Lust's Dominion* by the Admiral's Men, and Marston's *Antonio's Revenge*, performed by Paul's Boys.[29]

What accounts for this abrupt change in the output of the printers and the players? Most likely it was fear. Fear first on the part of the government, because of the uneasy political situation about the intentions of the Earl of Essex in 1599, when in April, amid cheers and huzzahs from the London populace, he set off for Ireland heading the largest army Elizabeth's government had ever raised, and then returned, unauthorized, in September from Ireland. Throughout the rest of that year and the following, 1600, Essex supporters brawled in taverns, preached against "corrupt" councilors, and started rumors and libels against his enemies at Court, especially Robert Cecil and the Lord Admiral, Charles Howard. The matter culminated in February, 1601, with Essex's abortive *coup d'état*.[30]

The government's fears about Essex in 1599 led to an act of censorship. Shortly after Essex sailed for Ireland, Sir John Haywood's *History of Henry IV* appeared. The book was dedicated to the Earl of Essex, described Henry Bolingbroke's return to England and his deposition of King Richard II, and contained a long section describing Richard's abdication. As early as 1597 Sir

Walter Raleigh noted Essex's fascination with Bolingbroke, and Privy Council documents mention Essex's frequent attendance at performances of *Richard II*. At Essex's treason trial much was made of his emulating Henry Bolingbroke and how his actions seemed to parallel the deposition of Richard II. Haywood's *Henry IV* was a best-seller, selling out before the end of the month, and was reprinted in May. At that point the Privy Council ordered the Stationers' Guild to confiscate the new printing and turn the entire run over to the Bishop of London. The bishop had all copies burned and ordered that "noe English historyess be printed excepte they bee allowed by some of her maiesties privie Counsell." In July Haywood was imprisoned in the Tower, and his printer and the censor who passed the book were grilled by the Attorney General. Haywood was still in the Tower 18 months later in 1601 when the Essex coup failed.[31]

Other than against Hayward, no other official action was taken against printing and staging English history, but, in view of Hayward's plight and the proscription of the Bishop of London, printers and players must have come to believe that any themes concerning English history were too dangerous to risk. Best to shift to translations of Greco-Roman classics, almanacs, books and plays about long-ago, far-away, and *non-English* history topics. Both the book trade *and* the theatre had recent examples of what the government *could* do if provoked.

Printers (and authors) could look to the example of John Stubbs. In 1579 Stubbs produced a pamphlet opposing the proposed marriage between Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou, brother of the French King. Stubbs contended, among other things, that at forty-six years old Elizabeth was too old to bear children, and that marriage to the French duke would erode English values, customs, and language. A royal proclamation forbade circulation of the pamphlet, the government sought (unsuccessfully) to gather up all copies, and Stubbs, his printer and his publisher (the book seller) were arrested. All three were tried and convicted of "seditious writing." Elizabeth wanted the *death penalty*, but was persuaded to accept a lesser sentence, the cutting off of their right hands. The printer was pardoned, but the punishment was inflicted on Stubbs and his publisher, and Stubbs also was imprisoned for eighteen months.[32]

Players and theatre owners could look to a more recent example. In 1597 the Privy Council took offence at the production of Thomas Nashe's and Ben Jonson's *The Ile of Dogs* at the Swan Theatre. The Council shut down all the theatres and hunted down

and destroyed every copy of the script. Nashe fled London, but Jonson, along with the two principal actors in the company, spent three months in prison. *All* the London theatres spent three months dark. Though the Chamberlain's Men got off easy in 1601—by pleading that the company had been paid to perform the play by Essex supporters (and probably because of the status of their patron)—Shakespeare and his partners in the Chamberlain's men and the Globe Theatre must have been fearful when they sent Augustine Phillips to answer angry inquires by the Council as to why they staged *Richard II* the day before the Essex uprising.[33]

Such a climate of censorship punched quite a hole in the repertories of the acting companies. Shakespeare's company, for instance, immediately must have dropped *Richard II*. More significant, Shakespeare's very recent *Henry V* became unsafe to perform within a few months of its first staging. Fear of Privy Council objections obviously also would kill the staging of Shakespeare's *1* and *2 Henry IV*, with those plays' constant references to the deposition of Richard II. Also unsafe would be *1*, *2*, and *3 Henry VI*, and *Richard III*, stories of tangled claims to the throne, Yorkist pedigrees superior to the Tudors, uprisings, usurpations, and the killing of kings. Even *King John* could be suspect, with its tale of disputed succession, Prince Arthur's imprisonment and death, the rebellion of the barons against John, and the poisoning of the king. All nine of Shakespeare's English history plays, and that accounts for the works of just one playwright for the Chamberlain's Men, would be deemed unsafe after 1599. The Admiral's Men, as seen by titles listed in Henslowe's *Diary*, faced a similar situation. The company would be forced to drop about 18 to 20 plays from its repertory, and the new (to London) Worcester's Men, forced to drop its new *1* and *2 Edward IV* by Thomas Heywood.[34]

That sudden loss of repertory helps explain the heightened production of Shakespeare between 1599 and 1604, with the revising of *Merry Wives of Windsor*, and the writing of *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Hamlet*, *Twelfth Night*, *Julius Caesar*, *Troilus and Cressida*, *As You Like It*, *All's Well That Ends Well*, *Othello*, and *Measure for Measure*. A similar flurry of activity occurred within the Admiral's Men. More than seven new plays (all non-history) were added to the repertory, and hurried revivals and revisions were made to old standbys like *The Jew of Malta*, *Faustus*, and *Spanish Tragedy*. For the next decade, other older plays like *Patient Grissell* and *Old Fortunatus*, some of them dating back as much as thirty years, were revised or rewritten. Though we tend to forget the fact, Shakespeare did the

same thing. *Hamlet* and *King Lear* were re-writes of plays dating back to the 1580s or early 1590s.[35]

Many scholars also note "borrowing" taking place among playwrights. Shakespeare may have "borrowed" from Heywood's *Iron Age I*, for *Troilus and Cressida*, Heywood may have "borrowed" from Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* for *Iron Age 2*. The success of Heywood's domestic tragedy, *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, may have inspired Shakespeare's (sort of) domestic tragedy, *Othello*. The popularity on stage of Dekker's and Chettle's *Patient Grissell* and several printings of novels featuring the long-suffering wife may have inspired Shakespeare's "Grissell," that is, Helena in *All's Well That Ends Well*. The satirical "Cittie comodies" of Jonson, such as *Every Man Out of His Humor*, of Dekker, such as *Shoemaker's Holiday* and *Westward Ho*, perhaps influenced Shakespeare's scripting of *Measure for Measure*. This flurry of activity over a very short time, suggests that all the companies were scrambling to find new additions to their repertories.[36]

A very few plays dealing with English history were scripted after Elizabeth's death, like Dekker's and Webster's *Sir Thomas Wyatt* or Heywood's *If You Know Not Me You Know Nobody*, but these new plays dealt not with great political upheavals in English history, but with Protestant martyrs and Popish plots against Elizabeth. Even the so-called "War of the Theatres" among the Boys' Companies, when Jonson, Dekker, and others brought out plays attacking each other's acting companies and playwriting, smacks of haste. What quicker way to get witty, yet seemingly politically innocuous, new plays on the boards than to burlesque theatrical rivals with parodies of each others' acting styles, repertories, and lines? In short, the acting companies had to fill up the holes in their repertories with plays that were politically non-controversial.[37]

The book trade displays a similar scramble to find safe material. Favorites of the 1580s and 90s, like Grafton's and Holinshed's *Chronicles*, saw no new printings. The even more popular Stowe's *Chronicles* and *Survey of London*, saw a hiatus in publishing until 1603 and 1605, in other words until after Elizabeth's death. New history books concentrated on other countries, like Edward Grimstone's histories of France, the Netherlands, Spain and Venice. Almanacs, which declined in printings around 1590, reappeared in larger numbers. Song-books, books on rhetoric, translations of Italian, French, and Spanish romances, stories of Protestant martyrs under Queen Mary, and play scripts—none of which were printed in quantity in the 1590s—saw increased printings. Novels about merchants, artisans, and tradesmen, like the fabled Dick

Whittington, became popular. Books not published for years were reprinted—a treatise on the compass from 1581, a treatise on horsemanship from 1565, a treatise on navigation from 1561, the story of Sir Bevis of Southampton, dating from 1500.[38]

The increase in printing Greco-Roman works, especially English translations of Plutarch's *Lives*, Sallust's and Lucan's *Histories*, Caesar's *Gallic* and *Civil Wars*, may represent the book trade's attempt to satisfy the public with alternatives to the now politically dangerous English histories. These were histories, but of times, places and people long ago and far away, less likely to be visited by Privy Council disapproval.[39] Sir Walter Raleigh, writing his *Historie of the World*, during his confinement in the Tower (1603-1616), observed that it was safer to write ancient history because "whosoever, in writing a modern history, shall follow truth too near the heels, it may haply strike out his teeth."[40]

That same imperative also may explain the theatre's shift to Greco-Roman plays, and tragedies like Chapman's *Bussy D'Ambois* and Shakespeare's *King Lear*. These are still chronicle type plays; they still offer the great men, battles and spectacles, grand themes, pathos and bathos that English history plays had offered. Most attractive, no new investment need be made to stage them. Except for some draping about the shoulders of major characters to suggest Greco-Roman costume, plays were staged in (Elizabethan) "modern costume." By utilizing Greco-Roman and other tragedies, all the velvet doublets, robes, gowns, crowns, swords, armor, chariots, and so on, that had been used to good effect to dramatize the Wars of the Roses could be used to dramatize stories of the Trojan War (Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, Heywood's *Iron Age*), or the Battles of Philippi (Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*) and Pharsalus (Chapman's *Caesar and Pompey*), or the pageantry of a *Charles Duke of Byron* or a *King Lear* or a *Macbeth*.[41] Yet even these seemingly "safe" plays sometimes felt the weight of government disapproval. In 1603 Ben Jonson was summoned before the Council because of objections to his play *Sejanus*. Either the play summoned up too many possible allusions to the Essex conspiracy or to King James' Court (we're not sure because the original does not survive). In 1604 Samuel Daniels was brought before the Council for his play *Philotus*. Like Jonson's *Sejanus*, it too was a play based on a Greco-Roman story, but it too dealt with conspiracy, and, in the eyes of the Council, perhaps alluded too closely to Essex.[42]

Hence, the seeming synchronized relationship between the printing of popular books and the appearance of Shakespeare's and others' plays paralleling those books, makes sense. Printers

and players were motivated by profit. Both groups sought to sell their products to the public, and neither group wished to incur the wrath of the government and lose buyers or audiences by being shut down. Scholars have remarked on the London theatre's adaptability to changing popular tastes, and its use of topical material in its offerings. Book printings and sales presented theatre entrepreneurs a tangible index of topicality and tastes. As much as Shakespeare's manipulation and adaptation of sources for his plays reveals his artistic genius, it also reflects his and his fellow players' and playwrights' opportunistic genius at cashing-in on sure-fire hits. When a particular literary genre proved popular (and safe), he, along with other writers, duplicated that genre in his plays; when its popularity (or safety) waned, he, along with the others, ceased utilizing that genre. Just as a "docu-drama" on the Civil War or a mini-series based on a best-seller is almost guaranteed strong Nielson ratings today, Shakespeare and other members of the theatre community probably realized that the best-sellers of their day guaranteed many pennies at the doors of the Globe or the Rose. Granted, political reasons influenced the abrupt halt to the publication of English history books and the staging of English history plays, but that story too reveals how closely linked the book trade was to the offerings at the theatres.

Notes

1. A. L. Rowse, *William Shakespeare: A Biography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 73.
2. Pertinent passages from *Willobie His Advisa* are reproduced in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 1836.
3. Samuel Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare: A Compact Documentary Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 231.
4. Pertinent passages from Greene's *Groats-worth of witte* are reproduced in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 1835.
5. E. J. A. Honigman, *Shakespeare's Impact on His Contemporaries* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 9, 10, 23; Schoenbaum, A Documentary Life, 220-21, 234-36.
6. James H. Forse, *Art Imitates Business: Commercial and Political Influences in Elizabethan Theatre* (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1993), 52-53.
7. Schoenbaum, *A Documentary Life*, 245-46.
8. Shakespeare's will is reproduced in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 1832-33.
9. Schoenbaum, *A Documentary Life*, 75-80, 247.
10. Ibid., 246-47.
11. Ibid., 272-74.
12. Shakespeare's Will, *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 1832-33.
13. Schoenbaum, *A Documentary Life*, 245.
14. Ibid., 241, 281-83.

15. http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/04/02/study-shakespeare-was-a-ruthless-businessman-hoarded-food/ (accessed 8 August 2013).
16. Schoenbaum, *A Documentary Life*, 220-23.
17. Forse, *Art Imitates Business*, 22-31.
18. Ibid., 30-31.
19. Ibid., 32.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 32-33.
23. Ibid., 33-34.
24. Ibid., 36.
25. Rowse, *Shakespeare*, 61.
26. Forse, *Art Imitates Business*, 37-39.
27. Ibid., 39-40.
28. Ibid., 40-41.
29. Ibid., 205-09.
30. Ibid., 209-18.
31. Ibid., 210-22.
32. *Dictionarry of National Biography*, ed. Sidney Lee, 1st ed., vol. 55, (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1898), 118-19; see also Donald Stump and Susan Felch, *Elizabeth I And Her Age* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009), 282; Neville Williams, *Elizabeth, Queen of England* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 202.
33. Forse, *Art Imitates Business*, 167-80, 218-22.
34. Ibid., 222-24.
35. Ibid., 224.
36. Ibid., 224-25.
37. Ibid., 225.
38. Ibid., 225-26.
39. Ibid., 225-27.
40. G. E. Hadrow, ed., *Sir Walter Raleigh, Selections from His Historie of the World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), 61.
41. Forse, *Art Imitates Business*, 227.
42. Ibid., 228-29.

Magic and the Early Schoolroom of Humanist Learning in *The Tempest*

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Penning during the quintessentially humanist ascendancy in the English Renaissance,[1] Shakespeare dramatizes a powerful presence of various forms of humanist pedagogy and pedagogues in his plays. Some familiar scenes of schooling readily come to mind: private lessons in *The Taming of the Shrew* where false schoolmasters Lucentio and Hortensio attempt to instruct Katherine and Bianca "in good bringing up" according to the humanist program of music, instruments, and poetry (3.1), as well as mathematics and classical literature;[2] in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, the young William Page struggles with the declension of the term "lapis" when Latin schoolmaster Hugh Evans quizzes him (4.1); *Love's Labor's Lost* introduces the pedant Holofernes flaunting his false Latin phrasings and thesaurus lists of puns (5.1.2) so much so that Moth slyly whispers to Costard that he has been "at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps!" (5.1); in *Measure for Measure*, Claudio wryly describes Isabella as a well-schooled rhetorician who "hath prosperous art/ When she will play reason and discourse/ And well she can persuade" (1.3).[3]

Beyond being employed perhaps for enlarging his broad "comedic" effects and purposes, these scenes can inform us of the kind of curriculum the humanistic liberal arts learning comprised. But they are also a collection of dramatic renderings of disquieting instruction. What can be gleanable from them is a hint about Shakespeare, once a grammar-school student and later a professional lifelong learner, writing from a stance of standing the contemporary notions of humanist education on its head. Namely, Shakespeare's tones toward these scenes can be heard as quiet carriers of his larger thematic foils and intimations. This last point particularly stands out in *The Tempest*, whose preoccupations with instructive authority, in the figure of Prospero, appears

to express Shakespeare's most radical doubt about humanist education as magical art.

Seen through the prism of the Tudor and early Stuart pedagogic precepts and ideologies, this play is indeed deeply committed to the meaning of humanist learning and is filled with scenes of teachers and students. First to be noticed is the idea of schoolroom itself. The action takes place on an island, and this is felicitous for Shakespeare to imagine an ideal grammar schoolroom setting where different modes of pedagogy, methodologies, and learning, both humanist and otherwise, can be tested. This premise about the setting is not only fruitful, but also supportable since, by the time Shakespeare wrote the play, the formal site of education was not confined to the typical, structured grammar schoolroom. As Nicholas Orme traces its historical practices, the schoolroom could be sited in the church (in *Twelfth Night* Maria refers to the "pedant that keeps a school i' th' church," [3.2.73-74]), the hall of the private house designated for the schoolroom ("Schoolmasters will I keep within my house/ Fit to instruct her youth," so says Baptista in *The Taming of the Shrew* [1.1.96-97]), a purpose-built special building that contained the schoolroom, such as Shakespeare's own King's New School in Stratford, or a part of Winchester College, Eaton College, and Magdalen College.[4] It appears that there could be no such thing as a typical schoolroom. Reflecting this changing social reality, the island then becomes a unique analytical site where Shakespeare abstracts humanist pedagogy from its usual setting, the schoolroom, and from its usual learner, the schoolboy,[5] and explores instead its potential outcomes, namely, what the Tudor educationalist Roger Ascham hoped his "hard wits"—those students who with "forward diligence"—would attain, a "love of learning" by schoolmaster's "good teaching."[6]

Characters and their interactions also mirror an ostensive practice of "an ideology of routine, order, and, above all, 'method'" in a civilizing community of schoolroom.[7] The arch-pedagogue on this island is Prospero, who serves as Miranda's teacher for all their twelve years of exile: "Here / Have I, thy schoolmaster, made thee more profit/ Than other princes can" (1.2.6).[8] Miranda is Prospero's most heedful and careful student, always mindful to "Obey, and be attentive" (1.2.48, 96, 107)—the time's expected student behaviors. Prospero is a schoolmaster to Caliban as well, whom Prospero did "teach [me] how / To name the bigger light and how the less / That burn by day and night" under his civilizing tutelage in "language" (1.2.400-2, 437, 439). Miranda also "took pains to make [Caliban] speak," and "endowed [his] purposes /

With words that made them known"; she also showed him a basic course in science when she "taught [him] each hour / One thing or other" (1.2.425, 429-430, 425-27). Even Caliban has something of pedagogical ambitions, first imparting to the newly arrived Prospero his knowledge of the island's natural world (1.2.403-5) and later telling his new masters Trinculo and Stephano that he'll "Show thee a jay's nest, and instruct thee how / To snare the nimble marmoset" (2.2.174-176).

A more formal sense of contemporary "culture of teaching"[9] obtains as well when Prospero is examined from what counted as prescriptive expectations to be considered "learned" to qualify for the Tudor and early Stuart pedagogues. For one, Prospero has no equal ("being so reputed / In dignity" and "Without a parallel") as a scholar of humanistic studies when he tells Miranda that he has absorbed and mastered "the liberal arts" (1.2.91-92). His own scholarly acclaim suggests that he is thoroughly trained in what was deemed the traditional humanist studies of the *Trivium* (grammar [meaning history and literary studies], logic, and rhetoric), as well as the *Quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy).[10] Contemporary accounts of the well-known educationalists' academic backgrounds or qualifications all show that they were trained in a liberal arts curriculum and most of them were graduate masters of arts (MAs) having completed the liberal arts course at the university or the equivalency:[11]

- Thomas Elyot: St. Mary Hall, the University of Oxford; author of *The Boke named The Governour*, the first book on the subject of education written and printed (1531) in the English language; advocated education in the native tongue of pupils; also concerned with the education of gentlemen;
- Richard Pace: Winchester College, the University of Oxford; author of *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur (On the Fruits of a Liberal Education)*, a textbook of the liberal arts contributing to early Tudor pedagogy;
- Desiderius Erasmus: the University of Turin; the Dutch humanist; a great influence on and a friend of John Colet, Thomas More, and John Fisher of Henry VIII's time; an indispensable force in the English humanistic educational movement;
- John Brinsley: Christ College, the University of Cambridge; author of Ludus Literarius, or, The Grammar School, a book designed to assist provincial grammar school schoolmasters;

- Edmund Coote: Peterhouse, the University of Cambridge; the author of *The English School-Maister* (1596), a script for a debate about spelling;
- Richard Mulcaster: King's College, the University of Cambridge; first headmaster of the Merchant-Taylors' School; authored *Positions concerning the Training Up of Children* (1581); recommended special university training for teachers; advocated teaching in the native tongue of pupils;
- Roger Ascham: St. John's College, the University of Cambridge; author of *The Scholemaster* and noted for the "double translation" for teaching Latin; concerned with the education of gentlemen; also an advocate of the use of English in teaching;
- John Colet: Magdalen College, the University of Oxford; an Elizabethan educational pioneer and founder and Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, friend of Erasmus, collaborator with Thomas More.

Along with his own self-assessment of his scholastic devotion ("I, thus neglecting worldly end, all dedicated / To closeness and the bettering of my mind" [1.2.109-10]), then, Prospero certainly can qualify to teach Miranda, Caliban, and even Ariel, by the contemporary professional standards and practices.

About Miranda, a privately schooled student, Prospero says, "I . . . made thee more profit / Than other princes can, that have more time / For vainer hours and tutors not so careful" (1.2.206-8). By Prospero's account, Miranda is about fifteen-years-old (about three years when she fled Milan [1.2.51]; twelve years in exile [1.2.332, 351]). This is the age when, by Thomas Elyot's Christian humanistic program, Tudor aristocratic boys turned to logic and rhetoric (speech and writing), reading Cicero and Erasmus's *De Copia Rerum* and *De Copia Verborum*, and began history study; then at seventeen, the boys took up philosophy concentrating on the works of Aristotle and Plato, Cicero's *De officiis*, the Bible (especially the New Testament), and Erasmus's *Education of a Christian Prince*.[12] Prospero's speech here indicates that Miranda has profited (i.e., better educated) from studying the liberal arts subjects more than "other princes" tutored by less qualified teachers. In the light of the general notions of educating youth, her education, on the surface, may sound exceptional for a girl of Shakespeare's time. But, judging by the time's leading educational theorizing and practices, Prospero can measure up

to, for instance, Thomas More, Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, and Thomas Cooke, who all believed in women's intellectual educability. In his treatise *The Defense of Good Women* (1540, 1545), Elyot expounded positively on women's educative potentiality. Following Plato in the *Republic*, he reasoned that one system of virtues exists for both sexes since women can participate in virtue equally with men, and as a consequence, educated women are as capable of living moral lives as educated men.[13]

More also had great respect for female intelligence and rational education, believing that women benefited equally from a sound classical education. His philosophy is embodied in his daughter Margaret Roper, whose intellectual accomplishments included her translation of Erasmus's Latin text *Treatise on the Lord's Prayer* (1524), one of the earliest publications by a woman.[14] Anthony Cooke, tutor to Henry VIII's son Edward VI, educated his daughters according to the Christian humanist program. Anne Cooke, one of his daughters, was a serious student of Greek and Latin and translated Bishop Jewel's Latin text and published it as *Apology, or Answer, in Defence of the Church of England* (1562).[15] A Tudor humanist, educationalist, and tutor to Princess and then Queen Elizabeth, Ascham's admiration for a thirteen-year-old Lady Jane Grey's love of learning and classical language mastery is legendary.[16] These contemporary exemplars can corroborate that Miranda has received an excellent education befitting the elite, aristocratic princess, although Ferdinand's schoolboy-boast when he first meets Miranda—"My language! Heavens! / I am the best of them that speak this speech, / Were I but where 'tis spoken" (1.2.512-16)—may sound as though his education in eloquence is derived from his gender as well as his social rank.

Even the aristocratic traveling party's spontaneous display of classicism in their casual colloquy bears witness to a permeation of humanistic literacy among the nobility and gentry classes. In act 2, scene 1, where the castaways come ashore, the conversation turns to the marriage of Alonso's daughter at Tunis. Adrian remarks, "Tunis was never graced before with such a paragon to their queen" (2.1.77-78). Gonzalo agrees, adding, "Not since widow Dido's time" (2.1.79). Sebastian and Antonio are surprised by the name of Dido since she was queen of Carthage and not of Tunis. Yet Gonzalo affirms with, "This Tunis, sir, was Carthage," "I assure you, Carthage" (89), to the incredulous Sebastian and Adrian, who quibbles with, "She was of Carthage, not of Tunis" (2.1.86-90). Antonio joins in their knowledge rivalry, displaying his even more educated reading of classics. He mockingly says,

"[Gonzalo's] word is more than the miraculous harp," which Sebastian follows with, "He had raised the wall, and houses too" (90-91). The miraculous harp is a lyre used by the mythological musician Amphion, who charmed the stones of the destroyed walls of Thebes in place, thereby restoring them. Antonio and Sebastian's combined analogues here mean that Gonzalo's words have restored not only the walls but an entire destroyed city of Carthage in antiquity—a historic and factual impossibility. Their confusing topographical and historic knowledge aside, the three characters' ready allusions to Virgil's *Aeneid* (Sebastian alludes to "widower Aeneas" [83] one time, he and Antonio mention "widow Dido" five more times [81, 84, 85, 105, 106]) attest to their collective classical consciousness among not only the social and political elite boys, but also for the grammar school students like the youthful Shakespeare, to whom reading and translating the *Aeneid* were obligatory schoolroom translation exercises. When the undeterred Gonzalo continues with his classics-leavened speech about an idealistic utopian society in the same scene (2.1.162-71, 175-80), his wistful yearning for the return of "the Golden Age" (2.1.184) harkens back to the Golden Age recounted in Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, though ironized by Thomas More in his work *Utopia*. Early English humanists, like Richard Pace, adopted educational philosophies from European educationalists who stressed the knowledge, values, and manner of the best of classical antiquity, especially its poetry, history, oratory, and moral philosophy. Besides the intellectual content, they believed that such humanist education would have an ethical purpose and should prepare youths to take up leadership roles in courts and civic life.[17] An education then should aim to mold the particular type of humanities-cultivated person: virtuous, prudent, eloquent, and public service-minded. In this idealized sense, together with Adrian, "[a] noble Neapolitan," Gonzalo's classical training and his status as a trusty councilor to Alonso here then confirm the fruits of the humanist schoolmaster's classroom labor (1.2.192).[18]

Yet for all these faithful enactments of ideological icons and compliances with the time's pedagogic culture, the play strongly suggests something much more purposeful and deliberate about the way Shakespeare dramatizes Prospero's instructive authority. Particularly, with its subtext dense with such humanistic themes as humaneness and savagery, freedom and slavery, emancipation and confinement, natural and magical, the play certainly pivots on Shakespeare's imagining about what can go wrong in the

classroom and goes straight to his troubled questioning of what counts as teaching for the humanist, and as learning: is the work of teaching to give knowledge its shape so that students will have learned to understand something significant? This epistemological turn helps Shakespeare to probe the darker side of Prospero's school-mastering based on humanistic learning, and it inevitably finds ironies centered on the misfit between Prospero's claim to the humanist mastery of "the liberal arts" (1.2.91) and his practice of it on Caliban, Prospero's disaffected grammar school student.

At its base, this undercurrent of ironic dissonance grows out of the original intents and outcomes expected of liberal arts studies. In language borrowed from classical antiquity, humanist educationalists, from the outset, claimed to teach "free men," people who did not have to work for a living—hence the expression *artes liberales* (the arts proper to a free man)—with the final goal to be freedom and transformation, not utility: namely, students were to be molded into morally, ethically better and more literate, and culturally liberated beings, as Richard Pace advances in his work *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur (On the Fruits of a Liberal Education)*.[19] Roger Ascham's *Scholemaster* (1570) also illustrates this core humanist philosophy in his double translation program.[20] His language program intended to make his pupils linguistically competent and enriched via the double translation exercises of Latin texts. But more ambitiously, closely linked to Latin literacy is his interest in the pupil's interior mobility "the double translation of a model book" effects. In the section called "the bringing-up of youth," he takes up the discourse on a more richly achieved self-literacy that occurs during language practices. He first attributes differences in the pupil's transposed text to choices that each pupil makes in order for the original text to be reborn. But Ascham also believes that, like the translated text, the pupil's interiority by turns will be reborn and similar transformative benefits will accrue to his pupils' mentality, compelled by the inevitable mental drills of definition, reaction, extension, reaffirmation, or re-vision of his own self. This turn then will call up the pupil's unconscious act of inscribing himself and others in the likeness of a model superior to what had been before, and eventually reshape their old selves and replace them with a self superior to what had been before.

It is ironic, then, that Prospero's proud pedagogy does not quite bear its desired fruits with Caliban. Intellectually, Prospero's (and Miranda's) civilizing efforts to teach language and speech can lead to Caliban's acquiring only the ability to curse that Prospero had stolen the island from him (1.2.396-97). Prospero's lesson is

parodied later when Caliban meets Stephano and Trinculo who ply him with sack—"Here is that will give language to you, cat" (2.2.79, a parody of proverbial "Liquor that will make a cat speak)—and repeatedly urge him to "kiss the book" (2.2.135, an allusion to the practice of kissing the Bible before taking an oath, to which Caliban readily obeys)—a further parody of Prospero's love of liberal arts books that he prized above his dukedom (1.2.198, 200). Instead of the freedom and transformation a humanist education is supposed to realize, Caliban instead loses both: first, he is forced into physical servitude to Prospero ("Here comes a spirit of his, and to torment me / For bringing wood in slowly" [2.2.15-6]); second, his movement is limited since Prospero pens him up "in this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me / The rest o' th' island" for his alleged attempt on Miranda's honor (1.2.406, 409-411).[21] Nor can Prospero instruct Caliban to cultivate a higher sense of self: not only does Caliban remain Sycorax's son, but he also chooses Stephano to be his new master, kneeling to the magic of Stephano's "celestial liquor," which is to Caliban the real god that, he believes, will also set him free (2.2.121).

A curious irony further develops when Caliban the savage "slave's" cognitive potentiality is closely examined because he is innately intelligent, knowledgeable, competent, and even finely reflective. He knows "all the qualities o' th' isle, / The fresh springs, brine pits, barren place and fertile" (1.2.404-5). He knows where the berries and crabs grow; he can fish, fetch wood, and "instruct" Stephano and Trinculo to snare the marmoset; he knows how to gather the clustering filberts and the young scamels from the rock; he can tread so softly that the blind mole cannot hear his footfall (2.2.166-78). He also has the soul of a poet that appreciates the beauty of his natural surroundings and expresses his appreciation of it in language of lyrical sensitivity ("The isle is full of noises, / Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not" [3.2.148-49]). In the political sense, too, Caliban comes to know that he is a slave (in a sense that he is abjectly, physically subservient to Prospero and his influence; more on this term late), but he also has an insider's shrewd knowledge that not only he, but also other spirits on the isle, "all do hate him / As rootedly as I" (3.2.103-4). So he knows how to organize a revolutionary plot to destroy Prospero. Most important, he knows that without his books (including a magic book, the most feared, yet most valued and revered repository of forbidden knowledge, a conjuring book), Prospero is "but a sot, as I am" (3.2.101-2). And to win

back his island ("This island's mine" [1.2.396]), he knows that the first thing to do is to cut off the source and course of Prospero's power, that is, to seize and burn his books (3.2.103-4), one of the manifestations of Prospero's scholarly learning, as well as an agent for his "secret studies" (1.2.95).

Above all, the crucible of pedagogic irony is kindled by Caliban's plangent belief that he is learning from "a tyrant, a sorcerer" (3.2.47) who has instilled in him nothing but the fear of punishment. Caliban's remark of "a tyrant" here evokes the real-life counterpart of a schoolmaster often depicted in Renaissance woodcuts, showing the master in his chair holding a birch rod and watching his pupils' progress while they study their books.[22] This punitive imperative in Prospero's pedagogy goes against the time's precepts of how not to teach. In another section of *The Scholemaster*, Roger Ascham disapproves the general notion that punishments such as beating carry lessons and says that "children were sooner allured by love than driven by beating to attain good learning."[23] He insists that the schoolroom should be a "sanctuary against fear"; it should be a place where students are drawn on to learning by "playing and pleasure." Mulcaster, quoting Erasmus, also says the fear of punishment will lead the student "to harden himself to a state of utter wickedness."[24] Compellingly resonant, in view of Prospero/Miranda's disparaging epithet for Caliban ("Thou most lying slave," "Abhorred slave," "So, slave, hence," [1.2]) is the contemporary term for boys who were subjected to excessive punishment, and that term is "slave." Mulcaster warns punishing masters that "learners be not slaves."[25] Instead of punishment, the most vital part of good teaching is love. Further, Ascham, for instance, not only uses words like "lead," "draw," and "persuade" to characterize good teaching, but also explains that those boys will flourish in school who "love learning"; it is the schoolmaster's work to cultivate that delight. It is no wonder then that Prospero fails Caliban, who refuses to learn profitably: initially providing "humane care" and lodging him "in mine own cell" (1.2.415-16), Prospero the schoolmaster does not "lead," "draw," nor "persuade" Caliban's natural abilities to flourish, nor his ignorance and inexperience (the salient of which may be perhaps his attempt at amity with Miranda, who misunderstands it as attempt to violate her honor) to correct or overcome. He so instills punishment in Caliban that Caliban "harden[s] himself to a state of utter wickedness"[26]—the murder of his master—the complete opposite of schoolmasters' goal for students. Prospero's punishment-marked teaching thus refuses to foster transformative

learning; rather, his becomes a "sorcerer's" "charms" (Epilogue) parodying humanist best intentions.

In foregrounding Caliban's (as well as Ariel's) fear, Shakespeare finally identifies the shaping origin of Prospero's failed pedagogy with the "roughness" of "a sorcerer's" (Caliban's description) "so potent art" (5.1.59). Indeed, Shakespeare's culminating irony is that as Prospero uses corporeal exercise, or threatens exercise, of pedagogic punishment, his "art" (1.2.31) degenerates into a mere sublunary classroom tool of the schoolmaster's birch rod, not a testament to the learned human power over nature which the refined scholarship of the liberal arts would confer on man; magic becomes a radical extension of his corrective classroom tool.

This ironic reorientation of the magician's feat naturally summons questions about Shakespeare's fundamental conception of Prospero's magic and his moral status as a man of deep learning: how could the same man be a brilliant humanist scholar, an ardent schoolmaster, and a feared conjurer of spirits, while craftily designing revenge on Antonio's usurpation of his duchy of Milan through magic? Most crucially, why does his magical power not suffice in the end, as Prospero formally admits, "Now my charms are all o'erthrown / And what strength I have's mine own, / Which is most faint" (Epilogue 1-3)? Implicit in his admission can be seen the identical moral purposes of learning, teaching, and magic closely coalescing. Especially can be read retrospectively is Shakespeare's radical musing on the intellectual power of magic like Prospero's and its limitations when applied in the real world of people's experiences.

To read Shakespeare's mind this way necessarily leads to an inquiry into how far Prospero's activities can reflect a popular application of theories on natural magic and magician current in Shakespeare's intellectual world. In this sense, a persuasive parallel can be drawn between the doctrines and pursuits of the Florentine Neoplatonic rationale on magic and the playwright carefully casting his humanistic understanding of it into the foundational character make-up of such a learned magician as Prospero.[27] Particularly appealing to him seems to have been Marcilio Ficino's notions of natural magic as an alliance between a magician's inwardness and his action in the service of redemption. Keith Thomas observes that "in England esoteric magical speculation [of the Florentine Renaissance with Platonism] was largely a derivative affair," and that "by the time this magical tradition had begun to make any substantial impact upon the population at large it was beginning to lose its intellectual repute."[28] But he also reports that because

magical inquiry possessed "some intellectual respectability," "[at] the universities many Jacobean students were interested in magic both in the natural variety and in the conjuration of spirits"[29]—a phenomenon inevitably recalling Marlowe's Dr. Faustus who is "scholarism grac'd" and "with learning's golden gifts."[30] In the light of Prospero's moral ascent he makes when he learns to change from being a sterile self-regarding book-magician to an others-regarding man of self-instruction in Christian grace, those historical and intellectual trends must have appealed to Shakespeare's keen awareness of the elevating effect of the Neoplatonic idealization on Prospero's magic and his character.

It is then Ficino's notions of natural magic as a form of human art that Shakespeare seems to have absorbed into Prospero. Ficino's is the integration of Plato's Ideas and Christian views on the world, which may be summed up: "Human arts make by themselves whatever nature herself makes, as if we were not the servants of nature, but her rivals. . . . Humankind imitates all the works of divine nature, and the works of lower nature we perfect, reform, and amend."[31] But Ficino also says that those who purify the soul not only imitate God through their creative endeavors; they also actually become God's agents, and act at times, granted the power to assist Him, in restoring aspects of fallen world to their prelapsarian purity; by mystical regeneration it is possible for man to regain domination over nature, which he had lost at the Fall.[32] Magic, being the noblest of the arts, springs from the full completion of the contemplative ascent toward God by "internal action (reflection)" and "external action (art)." Natural magic of Ficino's kind can make the intellectual magician the supreme artist and become one with God. Such a magician can produce marvelous effects by using the studied hidden natural forces as Caliban acknowledges: "His art is of such power / It would control my dam's god, Setebos, / And make a vassal of him" (1.2.448-50). With the power he receives, he can perform such feats as alchemical transformation, the control of tempests, and the attainment of prophetic visions to help nature fulfill providence, not to thwart it. Unlike Sycorax, who is a witch and whose black magic causes maleficia by reversing the laws of nature, Prospero's is, by his own intellectual evaluation, white or natural magic aiming to exploit natural law to perform such feats as raise a tempest, control spirits like Ariel, engineer a love match between Miranda and Ferdinand, create a celebratory masque, and make time stop and start again—especially by his potent use of magical music over humans (Miranda, Ferdinand, the castaway

crew), music being Ficino's most potent tool since music imprints itself on the air and its disembodied sounds are more pure than forms influencing the soul.[33]

At the same time, Shakespeare deftly ironizes the expected Ficinian inwardly turned dimensions of Prospero and his power by overlapping them with those of the village sorcerer. To create this image, he especially accentuates Prospero's stage appearances, often accompanied with a certain technology or tools to command his power, "with a kind of majestie, and with authoritie," as opposed to a Sycorax-like witch who works "with a baggage tode or a cat," as Reginald Scot so notes of the practitioner of natural magic.[34] This is a familiar image of a sorcerer that is depicted in the frontispiece (1620) to Christopher Marlowe's *The Tragicall History of the Life and the Death of Dr. Faustus*, showing Faustus standing in a magic circle and conjuring Mephostophilis. Like Faustus's, the cloak, for instance, is part of Prospero's tools to effect the tempest with Ariel at the beginning of the play. Later, Miranda says, "If by your art . . . you have put the wild waters in this roar, allay them"; Prospero tells her to "pluck my magic garment from me," and when it is off, orders it to "lie there, my art" (1.2.1-2, 29, 31), ironically using the Ficinian sense of human art. He also requires his staff to call forth and control spirits and "some heavenly music," a staff which he finally needs to break and bury "certain fathoms in the earth" (5.1.60-64) before he can perform the most "magical" act of his life. The most important is that one book, the one that Caliban fears and wants to destroy, the very one that Prospero goes offstage to consult before preparing the masque ("I'll to my book" [3.1.3]). Indeed, Shakespeare paints a man in the traditional magical profession unduly relying on hidden virtues of the external technology of the cloak, staff and, most crucially, his closely guarded magic book someone else has already written and he has inherited—not on the ideal strengths of the Ficinian inward turn.

In fact, Prospero's imagery here is a man tragically limited in intellectual knowledge and capacity and deeper inner vision. Such imagery links his being profoundly at odds with his consciously held pedagogue-cum-magician authority. The play, by most critics' conjecture, was composed in 1610-11. This is a time that coincides with the intellectual circumstances making traditional concepts of the magician appear increasingly outmoded, while new epistemological possibilities began to appear. What Shakespeare gradually reveals is the limits he marks out by having "the enchanted island"[35] and the "brave new world"

(5.1.217) meet in order to accentuate Prospero as a figure trapped at the juncture of the moral and epistemological threshold of the early seventeenth century. Inevitably then, Prospero's diminishing stature as a traditional magician is caused, on one hand, by what Michel Foucault, among scholars, posits as the epistemic shift dissolving the former knowledge acquirement based on the recognition of similitude and hierarchy within God's creation.[36] In its place, the origin of individual thought and action resulted from a new mechanistic, scientific way of knowing based on the accurate descriptions of nature, things, and people and their relation to each other. Implicit in this shift is the rejection of the traditional magical, microcosmic "arrangements of knowledge" based on the accepted, traditional "order of things";[37] what follows is the collapse of the whole intellectual basis of traditional magic (astrology, alchemy) and diminishment of the Ficinian faith in the possibility of divine inspiration as the ultimate source of human magic. Indeed this new epistemological demand for accurate knowledge of nature and people caused "the decline of magic" generally,[38] undercutting the status of the magician and every kind of magical belief. As Keith Thomas has noted, under such circumstances, gone is the intellectual respectability of learning and scholarship as magic—all of this despite what Shakespeare has Marcellus say to Horatio in *Hamlet* (composed 1600-1601): "Thou art a scholar [know Latin]; speak to it [the Ghost], Horatio" (1.1.51), and in *The Chances* (1647), John Fletcher still more has Petruchio say to Peter Vecchio, a teacher of Latin and music, as well as a reputed wizard, "Believe it, he's a most sufficient Scholar, / And can do rare tricks this way; for a figure, / Or raising an appearance, whole Christendom / Has not a better; I have heard strange wonders of him" (5.1).[39] These plays make the magical association with the word scholar. Yet what is Prospero's learning for if only to deal with spirits like Ariel and its associates? More crucially, what is his magic if he cannot teach and improve Caliban and some of the castaways and, most of all, himself, as the learning of the liberal arts is expected to attain? As the plot moves forward, Prospero proves to be a scholar-schoolmaster-magician in need of some truly "magical" lessons for himself.

Throughout the play, Shakespeare has Prospero perform staging and sabotaging a variety of didactic protocols as if they were a series of teaching gestures underpinned by his magic: not only through Caliban, but also by his autocratic treatment of Ariel, his unpleasant treatment of Ferdinand (leading him to Miranda and then imprisoning and enslaving him), trapping the conspirators

with "glistering apparel" (4.1.217), and finally, interrupting the marriage masque. If these teaching gestures can be taken to be Shakespeare questioning the burden of pedagogy, about the art of schoolmastering, they also suggest his dark views of pedagogic methodologies, not to mention anything of his views on traditional magical practices. In this sense, the vantage view of the masque in act 4, scene 1, can be taken as how Prospero's magic has been used as his moral foil as well as an agent for the transformative process of his self-learning. In the masque, which blends nature's fruitfulness with a sanctified love of Ferdinand and Miranda, Prospero exerts all the artist's powers of the Neoplatonic order to conjure up an illusion close to the realm of the transcendent and most spiritual order, so much so that Ferdinand exclaims, "So rare a wonder'd father and a wife / Makes this place Paradise" (4.1.138-39). Yet his island schoolroom has contained "the foul conspiracy" of various kinds of "hardened" students (4.1.155), leading Prospero to realize the realm of empirical experience where he himself has been "such stuff /As dreams are made on" (4.1.173-74). He learns here not only the limits and boundaries of the magician's technical craft, but also that such craft can teach him his nature, his true magical powers as a pedagogic authority and a person. The summation of his learning from experience is made in the final act where he displays the Ficino-like notion of right qualities of a true magician: he learns of the maturation of things in good time ("Now does my project gather to a head. / My charms crack not, my spirits obey, and time / Goes upright with his carriage" [5.1.1-3]); he importantly learns to curb the impulse of punishment and anger toward revenge ("The rarer action," he concludes, "is / In virtue than in vengeance" [5.1.35-6]); most significantly, he comes to terms with both his pride and his impatience in the symbolic acknowledgement of Caliban as "this thing of darkness I / Acknowledge mine" (5.1.330-31), changing himself from the secret, book-learning magician to a man of experience, freedom, and forgiveness ("I do forgive / Thy rankest fault—all of them" [5.1.85-92, 151-52]). The final triumph of his schoolmasterly magic of charity is confirmed when he forgives Caliban's plot against him. Facing Prospero's renewed love, Caliban reciprocates Prospero's self-learning with his own moral lesson, saying, "Ay, that I will, and I'll be wise hereafter / And seek for grace" (5.1.351-52).

Richard Pace, like the later Renaissance educationalists, repeatedly connects the fruits of learning to the five cardinal qualities of the abstract and reality combined: the beautiful

(pulcher), the right (rectum), the laudable (laudabile), the honourable (honestum), and the expedient (utile).[40] He also offers a paradox of a learned man: "The more learned you are, the less wise you become," a paradox reflecting a necessity of a new version of learning from experience, a paradox Shakespeare, both inspired and troubled by his lifelong schooling, might well have appreciated. His time's new epistemological demand must reconcile and improve with the vital synthesis of empirical knowledge-making and book learning.[41] The confrontation between Prospero's authority by humanist learning and the actual experience and understanding of students in his island classroom is Shakespeare's abstract understructure to the play's pedagogic action. The final vision of schoolmaster and student in their final reconciliation between Prospero and Caliban in the afore-noted scene enacts the consummation of the hard-won lesson that true humanist learning or any significant learning arrives by trial and error on the part of both students and schoolmaster. Shakespeare's final prophetic vision of his humanist schoolmaster is one who exercises a "potent" yet "rough magic" that he must abjure because it is "rough" (physically violent, morally untutored) and supported by technology (staff, books), but not born of love, faith, or wisdom (5.1.59-60, 63, 66). Emancipating and forgiving not only Caliban, Ariel, and other errant courtiers, but also himself from the bondage of anger/fury, pride, and revenge ("The rarer action is/In virtue than in vengeance" [5.1.35-6]), Prospero perhaps now can see a new version of pedagogy ("my project," "art to enchant" [Epilogue 12, 14]), not in ivory-tower aloofness, but by the wise, redemptive magic of learning the world as well as himself.

Notes

1. According to Warren Boutcher, the life-span of English humanism is of "*longue duree*," spanning 1410 to 1680. Refer to his "Humanism and Literature in Late Tudor England: Translation, Continental Book, and the Case of Montaigne's *Essais*," in *Reassessing Tudor Humanism*, ed. Jonathan Woolfson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 243-68. For a good introduction to Richard Pace, refer to Cathy Curtis's "Richard Pace's *De fructu* and Early Tudor Pedagogy," in the same volume, 43-77.

2. These last two subjects are added by Petruchio when he presents Hortensio to Baptista as a tutor who would "instruct her [Katherine] fully in those sciences / Whereof I know she is not ignorant" (2.1.57-58).

3. All citations of these plays come from editions by The Folger Library Shakespeare. See Note #8.

4. The formal site of education was not confined to the regular school classroom by the time Shakespeare wrote *The Taming of the Shrew*, which reflects

this social reality: Baptista Minola sets up Katherine and Bianca's education as a schoolroom in his home. See Elizabeth Hutcheon's "From Shrew to Subject: Petruchio's Humanist Education of Katherine in *The Taming of the Shrew*," *Comparative Drama* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 322. See also Nicholas Orme's *Medieval Schools from Roman Britain to Renaissance England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 136-45.

5. Girls were more likely to be taught informally at home, in a great household, or in a nunnery (this before the Dissolution of the Monasteries in 1540s) (Orme, *Medieval Schools from Roman Britain to Renaissance England*, 129).

6. Roger Ascham, *The Scholemaster* (1570) is quoted from *Renascence Editions*, An Online Repository of Works Printed in English Between the Years 1477 and 1799, http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/ascham2.htm.

7. Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 123.

8. See also 1.2.332, 1.2.351, and 1.2.205-7. The text of the play used here is that of the New Folger Library Shakespeare, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1994). Subsequent citations appear in the text parenthetically.

9. The phrase is taken from Rebecca Bushnell's book title, *A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

10. This last subject (astronomy—the study of the movements of the heavenly bodies) is of crucial importance in light of Prospero's magic powers. The extension of it is astrology, the study of the effects of those movements. According to Keith Thomas, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "the term astrology was often used as synonymous with astronomy," in *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 338.

11. The information relevant to each Tudor schoolmaster was obtained via the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. About Prospero as schoolmaster, it is not clear whether or not he has had university training. But applying the critical approach of the "afterlife of character" or "the character effect" (a speculation about the extra-textual life of a fictional character) makes one imagine that he could have studied at the University of Padua, the closest academia to the Duchy of Milan.

12. Summary of Sir Thomas Elyot's *The Boke Named the Governor* (1531), Renascence Editions (An Online Repository of Works Printed in English Between the years 1477 and 1799, in the public domain), obtained at http://www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/gov/gov1.htm

13. Thomas Elyot, *The Defence of Good Women*, ed. Edwin Johnston Howard (1540; Oxford, OH: The Anchor Press, 1940). Refer especially to the pertinent pro-women argument Elyot develops by way of the discussion between two characters Candidus and Caninus. The text is accessible at the Online Books Page, University of Pennsylvania, ed. John Mark Ockerbloom, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupid?key=olbp16611. For cautious views on the progress of contemporary female education and literacy, refer to David Cressy's "Educational Opportunity in Tudor and Stuart England," *History of Education Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1976): 301-20, and Joan Gibson's "Educating For Silence: Renaissance Women and the Language Arts," *Hypatia* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 9-27.

14. Pamela Joseph Benson, *The Invention of the Renaissance Women: The Challenge of Female Independence in the Literature and Thought of Italy and England* (University Park, PA: The Penn State University Press, 1992), 157-59; Elizabeth McCutcheon, "Margaret More Roper: The Learned Woman in Tudor England," *Women Writers*

of the Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Katharina M. Wilson (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1987), 449-80.

15. Illustrated in Jane Stevenson's "Women Translators From the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century," in *Translation—Theory and Practice: A Historical Reader*, ed. Daniel Weissbort and Astradur Eysteinsoon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 128-43.

16. Ascham, *The Scholemaster* (1570), Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeg/public/AscSho.html.

17. Refer to sections titled "The Signs of a Liberal Temper" and "What Liberal Studies Are: A General Treatment" by Pier Paolo Vergerio in his *The Character and Studies Befitting A Free-Born Youth Dedicated to Ubertino Da Carrara*, collected in *Humanist Educational Treatises*, trans. Craig W. Kallendorf (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 4-7, 14-17. Also refer to Craig W. Kallendorf's "Introduction," vii-xvi. See also Note #19.

18. It must be noted, however, that Shakespeare presents two kinds of courtier in the play. One group is Gonzalo, Adrian, and Francisco, who comfort Alonso and find good in what has happened (the tempest, shipwreck). The other is Sebastian and Antonio who are cynical, mocking, and joke at Gonzalo's expense.

19. Richard Pace, *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur (On the Fruits of a Liberal Education)*, ed. and trans. Frank Manley and Richard S. Sylvester (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1967), for The Renaissance Society of America (Renaissance Text Series, 2), 22-25.

20. Refer especially to the section called "the bringing-up of youth." As noted above, an earlier expression of this philosophy is made by Richard Pace in his *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur*, 14-15.

21. Is this a real rape attempt since there is a sexual connotation in Caliban's retort—"I had peopled else / This isle with Calibans" (1.2.420-21)? But could it also be a gesture of his genuine friendship, but misinterpreted?

22. Many English woodcuts of a school show the master in his chair holding a birch, which was a tool for a common penalty. Nicholas Orme notes that some educationists called for leniency in beating, in *Medieval Schools from Roman Britain to Renaissance England*, 146-47.

23. Ascham, A Preface to the Reader, *The Scholemaster*, Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeg/public/AscSho.html.

24. Richard Mulcaster, *Positions Concerning the Training Up of Children*, ed. William Barker (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1994), 39.

25. Richard Mulcaster, *The First Part of the Elementarie*, ed. E. T. Campagnac (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 19.

26. Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, 86 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 26:328.

27. The early modern conception of magic, as the play itself most often describes (Prospero vs. Sycorax, magician vs. sorcerer/witch, for instance), was twofold in popular beliefs: on one hand is black magic whose aim is to reverse the laws of nature; on the other is white or natural magic whose aim is to exploit them. As for the specific influences, one is Agrippa's *De occulta philosophi* as Frank Kermode speculates in his "Introduction" to the Arden edition of the play, while a John Dee-like magus of the Hermetic-Cabalist tradition is another according to Frances Yates. See The Introduction, *The Tempest*, ed. Frank Kermode, The Arden Shakespeare (London: Methuen, 1954), lxxxiii; Frances A. Yates, *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age* (London: Routledge, 1979), 187.

28. Thomas, *Religion and The Decline of Magic* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 267-68.

29. Ibid., 268.

30. Christopher Marlowe, *The Tragicall History of Dr. Faustus,* in *The Longman Anthology of British Literature, Volume 1B*, ed. David Damrosch (New York: Longman, 2003), 1144.

31. For this section of the paper, I am indebted first to John S. Mebane's essay, "Art and Magic in the Philosophy of Marcilio Ficino," in his *Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age: The Occult Tradition & Marlow, Jonson, & Shakespeare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992), 22-35. Quotations come from Mebane's translation of Ficino's *Theologia Platonica* (2:223-45). Secondly, my interpretation of Prospero draws on Keith Thomas's above-noted book, especially sections titled "Magic" (209-332) and "Astrology (335-458).

32. According to Keith Thomas, Ficino was influenced by and translated into Latin Corpus *Hermeticum*, the ancient Greek Hermes Trismegistus, whose astrological and alchemical lore helped to create an intellectual environment sympathetic to every kind of mystical and magical activity in the Florentine Renaissance (267).

33. Mebane, "Art and Magic in the Philosophy of Marcilio Ficini," 31.

34. Reginald Scot, *The Discouerie of Witchcraft*, accessed via Open Library at archive.org/details/discoverie of wit00scot, or at: archive.org>Ebook and Texts Archive>Princeton Theological Seminary. Shakespeare used such witches in *Macbeth*.

35. This phrase is taken from the subtitle of William D'Avenant and John Dryden's comedy adapted from Shakespeare's play: *The Tempest*; or, *The Enchanted Island* (1670).

36. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 14.

37. Ibid.

38. This phrase is the title of Chapter 22 of Keith Thomas's *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 769-71.

39. Quoted from "Full Text of the Works of Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher," an Etext provided by the New York Public Library, made available by The Internet Archive, and accessed at: http://www.archive.org/stream/worksoffrancisbe04beau/worksoffrancisbe04beau_djvu.txt.

40. Pace, *De fructu qui ex doctrina percipitur*, 26-27; cf. 30-35.

41. Ibid., 14-15.

Reconstructing the Morality Play and Redeeming the Polity in William Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*

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In the beginning of William Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, Vienna is morally corrupt. The Duke has the responsibility of guiding his subjects into making righteous choices by combining spiritual with secular authority. He makes his way through most of the play in disguise as a friar, meddling with the characters' lives and potential afterlives in order to return Viennese subjects to a way of life governed more fully by moral standards. His intentions are never to cruelly punish, though some citizens of Vienna—Lucio for one—may disagree. As head of state, it is his duty to provide fair judgment while also being merciful. The Duke says in the beginning of the play,

> I love the people,
> But do not like to stage me to their eyes.
> Though it do well, I do not relish well
> Their loud applause and aves vehement;
> Nor do I think the man of safe discretion
> That does affect it. (1.1.67-72)[1]

In this statement, the Duke is acting as both an ecclesiastical ruler and a temporal ruler. He, like God, loves all of his subjects, but he does not desire praise for being a ruler, which allows him to be a man of sound judgment. The Duke as duke is essentially invisible to most of the characters in the play—oddly, both before and after his disappearance. In disguise as a friar, he is able to add a dimension of private knowledge of his subjects to the public dimension he already possesses. As he learns about each of the characters, either as confessor or confidant, the Duke amasses the raw material for a political program of reform that works

from the inside out: from moral character to social behavior. This combination of the sacred and secular reforms Vienna at the end of the play, effectively healing the political and moral offenses of the citizens: old wrongs are righted, the law is restored, and the city is reconciled with itself and its leader, the Duke. Through his reformation of these issues, the Duke creates a harmonious polity, the most prominent target of his reformation being his temporary replacement, Angelo. At the end of the play, the Duke has essentially saved the man who is the most corrupt within his city. With the Duke performing the role of the all-seeing ruler and Angelo that of the tempted (or reconciled) Everyman, the structure of *Measure for Measure* operates much like that of a medieval morality play.

Contemporary thought on the periodic boundaries (and lack thereof) between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been decidedly split, particularly on the subject of the relationship between morality and dramatic subjectivity. While there is little doubt that the drama of the Renaissance is in part generated by the literature of the Middle Ages, the status of early modern dramatic structures used in medieval plays to create morally didactic moments is, in the current critical conversation, ambiguous at best. In *Reform and Cultural Revolution*, James Simpson argues that the early modern subject is a consequence of simplified and centralized government jurisdiction under Henry VII and Henry VIII, who displaced the medieval culture of jurisdictional heterogeneity. Along these lines, Simpson also resists the opinion that the Renaissance/Reformation was liberating for England or for the literature of the time.[2] He suggests that the drama of the early modern period was an extension of medieval dramatic traditions, in which theater was used as an instrument of discipline against characters and spectators alike, not a rejection or reformation of them. Simpson argues, for instance, that the Renaissance "youth plays" demonstrate a close resemblance to the medieval morality play. These plays, which often portray Henry VIII himself as a youth, adapt a comedic structure and use pedagogical techniques to instruct. Simpson remarks on this structure typically used in morality plays, "The instructional comic mode has a tripartite structure, of ideal state, degradation of that ideal state, and restoration through instruction and absorption of moral lesson."[3] For Simpson, then, the earliest early modern plays preserved both the medieval comic structure and the didactic purpose of this structure, yet combined the media of religions and

politics. The chastened protagonist became both a better Christian and better royal subject.[4]

On the other hand, the focal interest of Curtis Perry and John Watkins' compilation, *Shakespeare and the Middle Ages*, is Shakespeare's influence upon the conception and oftentimes "invention" of the Middle Ages.[5] Unlike Simpson's work, Perry and Watkins suggest that early modern drama is as revolutionary as critics have traditionally maintained. These articles suggest that many of Shakespeare's plays offer the foundation of our historical perspective on medievalism, despite many of Shakespeare's facts being incorrect. In the introduction, Perry and Watkins provide a view contrary to one of James Simpson's main arguments: they believe the transformation of medieval to early modern drama is "revolutionary" and actually reinforced by the emergence and strengthening of a centralized monarchy, and not displaced, as Simpson suggests. They argue that drama changed as the monarchy changed, and that this was advantageous to both the literature of the time and the historicity of the Middle Ages. Perry and Watkins go on to say that "authority was typically derived from and anchored in the exemplarity of the past."[6] For Perry and Watkins, the early modern stage does not envision itself as a continuation of the medieval stage. Rather, within the tensely authoritarian political climate, early modern plays reinvented medieval drama (as well as the medieval period as a whole) as a source of their own political and literary legitimation.

In this paper, I will offer a more measured approach. Literature in the Renaissance not only laid the foundation for a better understanding of the past, but also revamped these traditions in the process of commenting on the Middle Ages. I want to argue that the Renaissance is revolutionary, yet at the same time conscious of its debt to native as well as to Classical traditions. The early modern stage, then, reorients dramatic traditions from the Middle Ages and uses them to evolve. This may seem like a fairly obvious point in relation to literature more generally, but it is less so given the surprisingly different religious and political contexts surrounding the medieval morality play and early modern drama, respectively.[7] Early modern playwrights constantly returned to the morality structure in order to explore a variety of problems and questions related to the ethical status of the individual (for example, as in *Doctor Faustus* or even *Women Beware Women*). While medieval traditions present themselves in the Renaissance, the didactic purposes behind these traditions are inherently altered. Critics have been exploring the methods in which *Measure for*

Measure exploits and understands morality for decades. However, the play's "problem play" status has made it difficult to dissect the ethics of how justice is enacted in Vienna. My reading primarily focuses on how the structure of the play aids the restoration of the corrupt city and citizens of Vienna.

In *Measure for Measure*, William Shakespeare repurposes the morality play to function within a largely secular realm. Shakespeare is repurposing the morality play in a polity in which the roles of the state and of the divine are virtually indistinguishable.[8] The form is no longer efficacious exclusively in matters of the sacred. Instead, it has adapted to judicial matters. However, this adaptation (orchestrated by the Duke) and the reformation that it generates do not respond to a correlative desire among his subjects. Instead, reformation is forced upon them. This is a fundamental problem in *Measure for Measure*. Though the Duke may have good intentions, he may also be making the moral issues of Vienna worse by imposing penance on his subjects instead of guiding them towards penance. The morality play format makes sense of the expanded nature of the Duke's authority, though at the end there is still tension among the "saved." Virtue is thrust upon them instead of being developed within them, though it seems as if there is little difference in the end. In a morality play structure, there is little room for grey areas; at the end of the play, all of the characters are on the path to lead virtuous lives. The only mortal experience that matters in their lifetimes is their final act of penance. All of the characters acquire virtue in *Measure for Measure*, from the pious Isabella to the promiscuous Lucio, because of the Duke. This final gesture made by the Duke allows his subjects both to live and die well.

However, contemporary criticism has turned against the interpretation of the Duke as a benevolent ruler concerned with both the salvation of his subjects and the social reform of his city. Many see him rather as a tyrant. Sarah Beckwith, in her article, "Medieval Penance, Reformation, Repentance and *Measure for Measure*," takes a practical approach to understanding the play, arguing that the Duke cannot be both confessor and ruler because it is literally impossible for him to be two people at once. His attempt to be both is, then, deceitful and vindictive. Her argument is centered on the Duke's theatricality throughout the play and on the ways in which his "brutal logic of exposure"[9] diminishes both his credibility as a leader and compassion from the audience. She finds his theatricality especially disturbing as a confessor, asserting that the purely performative nature of his role as a friar eliminates

any sense of regret for breaking the seal of the confessional. His theatricality, Beckwith claims, unmasks his selfishness as a ruler. She also claims that the Duke's primary concern is not to find a way to reconcile politically the sacred and secular responsibilities of a ruler, but rather to use the guise of religion in order to extend his political dominion over his subjects to include the realm of sexual mores and practices, making the Duke even more villainous.

Debora Kuller Shuger, on the other hand, considers the Duke to be a benevolent ruler in her book *Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England: The Sacred and The State in* Measure for Measure. Her final chapter, titled "The King of Souls," focuses on the question of how Christianity is reformed by the Duke into a political praxis. She claims that the Duke has a deep concern for the salvation of his subjects, which leads him to "extend his mercy to those whom common sense would label as castaways,"[10] such as Barnardine and Angelo. Shuger assigns the Duke the title "King of Souls" because, as a temporal ruler, he is focused on the "inner man" of his subjects and how this "inner man" will affect their afterlives. She finds this especially relevant in the case of Barnardine, who refuses execution because he was not ready to repent and die. Shuger explains that the Duke is responsible to God for his subjects' souls, and if Barnardine were executed without repenting, then both Barnardine and the Duke would be damned. She compares the Duke with Angelo, whom she identifies as a Puritan, and discusses the tension between Puritan and Anglican punishment. The Duke's political theology is one modeled on "penance rather than law enforcement,"[11] whereas Angelo favors a harsh penal enforcement of virtue. While Angelo would rather purge Vienna of its sinners, the Duke would rather reform them. The Duke does not merely mediate between the sacred and secular, he is a result of the combination of the sacred and secular.

Beckwith's argument against the Duke is driven by her understanding of the significance of medieval practices of sin reformation and penance. The Duke rejects these traditions, which may suggest that if *Measure for Measure* can be understood to function as a morality play, it does so unsuccessfully because of the Duke. The Duke destroys the possibility of *Measure for Measure* functioning as a morality play because he uses religion primarily as an instrument with which to manipulate his subjects instead of as a resource to mercifully "save" them. If, however, we understand *Measure for Measure* to be operating within two different conceptual realms—the explicitly political as well as the explicitly spiritual—

then Shuger's argument is an excellent point of departure for a discussion that aims to decipher the shape of a "secularized" morality play. Her reading becomes useful in discovering how this temporal ruler, the Duke, expands his jurisdiction to include the spiritual lives of his subjects. If a morality play is meant to teach the audience how to be good Christians, then *Measure for Measure* reorients this tradition in order to teach the audience how to be good subjects and, in turn, good Christians as well.

In early modern England, the relationship between the morality of a ruler and of his subjects was considered to be quite close. The ruler was uniquely identified as the head of the church, as well as the head of the state. Leading a virtuous life is imperative, especially for a ruler, for his subjects will inevitably model the virtues (or, alternatively, the vices) of their leader. *Basilikon Doron*, written by King James I, identifies this as an essential trait within a King. *Basilikon Doron* is written as a letter to instruct "a Prince in all the points of his calling,"[12] and James is particularly interested in the problem of how to promote virtue within his subjects. According to James, it is the King's duty to perform both justice and equity in order to be a good ruler. However, he rejects the notion that a king is the creator of virtue, but believes instead that he is a vessel through which God's virtue can be brought to the people:

> Consider that GOD is the authour of all vertue, hauing imprinted in mens mindes by the very light of nature, the loue of all morall vertues . . . and preasse then to shine as farre before your people, in all vertue and honestie, as in greatnesse of ranke: that the vse thereof in all your actions, may turne, with time, to a naturall habitude in you; and as by their hearing of your Lawes, so by the sight of your person, both their eyes and their ears, may leade and allure them to the loue of vertue, and hatred of vice.[13]

According to James, a king must use his social position to spread the morals and virtues of God. He is truly a representative of Him on earth, and not a model of Him. The laws of rulers, and the execution of these laws, are examples to God that His people are on the path of virtue. James recognizes that he is merely a vessel of the divine, which in turn allows him to combine the offices of both the king and head of the church on earth. If the King uses his authority, the law, to properly bestow virtue upon his subjects, then virtuous behavior in the king will become a "naturall habitude." This passage offers an example from early-seventeenth century political theology that allows us to make sense of some of

the apparently outlandish things the Duke does in Shakespeare's play. *Measure for Measure* seems to be making the same claim for the Duke as James is making for himself. If, according to James, a ruler uses his unique power to spread the love of virtue to save his subjects, he is performing an act of God.

The Duke in *Measure for Measure* rules his subjects in a way that makes it clear he is mindful of crafting them into virtuous people. He is not a middleman (as James claims to be), but the sole source of sacred and secular authority within Vienna. The virtues he attempts to instill within his citizens are rooted within the law, but also transcend the letter of the law, because virtue for the Duke is the result of a conceptual balance between justice and merciful equity. The Duke does not need to prove the virtuousness of his people to any higher being because he is the highest being in the lives of the Viennese, in both temporal and ecclesiastical matters. While the Duke as a ruler is very similar to James, Angelo enforces these rules without mercy. Angelo rules Vienna strictly according to the laws, which in his mind are put in place to maintain virtuousness and order amongst the people. However, in time, he becomes consumed with the power of being a ruler and becomes tyrannical through his unmerciful nature. He lacks the balance between an ecclesiastical ruler and a justice enforcer that the Duke so skillfully manages. Angelo punishes those who commit acts against virtue while also deliberately stripping virtue from characters like Mariana and Isabella, only further enforcing the idea that virtue is a judicial matter, not exclusively an ecclesiastical matter. In the end, Angelo becomes so thoroughly corrupt that only the Duke can save him.

The Duke chooses Angelo specifically to become an interim Duke because of his reputation for strong moral uprightness.[14] He recognizes that he has been a lenient ruler of Vienna, and that with Angelo in charge, the sin and moral transgressions of his citizens may be amended. This, then, gives the Duke ample opportunity to save his citizens, but more importantly, to save Angelo himself, who, we later learn, is the most morally corrupt citizen of Vienna. The Duke is the only character besides Mariana that knows of Angelo's previous sins that have gone unpunished; Angelo is not what he seems to be. The Duke, upon revealing his plan to become a friar, says to Friar John,

> Lord Angelo is precise,
> Stands at a guard with envy, scarce confesses
> That his blood flows, or that his appetite

> Is more to bread than stone. Hence shall we see
> If power change purpose, what our seemers be. (1.3.50-54)

The Duke has put Angelo on the throne not only to monitor the "evil deeds" of his citizens, but to give Angelo a position of authority that will hopefully unleash his own desires (which seem to be consciously suppressed). According to the Duke, Angelo sees himself as something more than human and refuses to recognize his own limitations. This position will encourage Angelo's ideas about his personal superiority, which will in turn ultimately change his purpose as a ruler. The advantages of possessing a stately title will lead him to act carelessly, though he believes it impossible that he will ever be tempted or sin. While the Duke seems nothing more than skeptical of Angelo at this point in the play, we will see later that he has successfully predicted Angelo's corruption.

Angelo's time as a ruler is similar to the pilgrimage God requires of *Everyman* in the morality play Everyman. Initially, during Angelo's time in charge, he enacts justice as the law sees fit. Even though the law is punitive in nature, Angelo firmly believes that he is doing what is expected of him by both Vienna and God. However, there is no balance between justice and mercy in his ruling. In fact, both of these concepts become lost to him as he begins to allow his erotic desires to overtake his judgment. Angelo becomes obsessed with desires of the flesh, which ultimately prevents him from being the level-headed leader he promised the Duke he would be. It is after his first meeting with Isabella that Angelo discovers his sexual desires. He admits to being sexually attracted to Isabella for her virtues and questions whether it is more sinful to be the tempter or the tempted. Angelo, surprised by the newborn desires within him, says after their meeting,

> Most dangerous
> Is that temptation that doth goad us on
> To sin in loving virtue.
> . . . . . .
> But this virtuous maid
> Subdues me quite. Ever till now
> When men were fond, I smiled, and wondered how
> (2.2.185-91)

Angelo, in this passage, is beginning to reorient his behavior towards the pursuit of pleasure. He displaces the blame for his passion to Isabella instead of accepting responsibility for his lust. However, as the passage progresses, Angelo begins to recognize himself as an active participant in the pursuit of pleasure. Previous

to this speech, he never understood how men could be so fond of a woman. This lack of understanding brings him to punish Claudio. He only has fondness for the law, and enacts, he says, his pity through justice. After Isabella begs him to "show some pity" (2.2.102), Angelo replies "I show it most of all when I show justice" (2.2.103). Now that Angelo is intoxicated with power, he feels able to freely pursue his desires. Throughout the passage, virtue and sin go hand in hand as Angelo works through what he finds so attractive about Isabella. Angelo's pleasure, and not morality, drives his authority the moment he realizes he has the ability to manipulate Isabella to please him.

Typically in morality plays, the protagonist becomes tempted and pursues his desires until he recognizes his transgressions and repents. Angelo, like the morality play characters Everyman and Mankind, experiences a similar progression in *Measure for Measure*, beginning with his initial temptation, discussed above. Angelo's "pilgrimage" as a ruler, and the penance that is forced upon him by the Duke, secure his salvation. Like Mankind, Angelo begins the play as a pious and obedient character who eventually falls into temptation and is saved by Mercy. They both also share a struggle between flesh and soul that have contrary desires. Neither ever learns how to negotiate these desires, but instead indulges in their passions over their virtue. When describing this tension to Mercy, Mankind says,

> My name ys Mankynde, I have my composycyon
> Of a body and of a soull, of condycyon contrarye.
> Betwyx þem tweyn ys a grett dyvisyon;
> He þat xulde be subjecte, now he hath þe victory.
>
> Thys ys to me a lamentable story;
> To see my flesch of my soull to have governance.[15]

Mankind asks Mercy for spiritual comfort so that he may learn how to prioritize, and suppress, the desires he finds to be so shameful. This tension is described through language that suggests warfare, with Mankind suggesting that both his virtue and passion are victorious some moments and failures at others. Mankind, like Angelo, does not allow himself to be guided by passion until temptation becomes too apparent to ignore. The tension between passion and virtue is precisely what forces Angelo to forfeit his moral authority in order to explore the inclinations of his desires.

In *Mankind*, as in *Measure for Measure*, temptation subdues virtue when characters begin to rely too fully on themselves as sources of moral authority. The morality play as a form is

concerned consistently with restoring its protagonist to a more fully communal framework for moral behavior, generally through the actions of God or a God-like character. In the beginning of *Everyman*, for example, God says of the human race,

> Every man liveth so after his own pleasure,
> And yet of their life they be nothing sure.
> . . . . . .
>
> They be so cumbered with worldly riches,
> That needs on them I must do justice,
> On every man living, without fear.[16]

God is frustrated with the greed and materialism he recognizes within humankind. They live for worldly pleasures, and these perpetual desires are encouraged by the fact that they are unable to see beyond the horizons of their own lives; God's chief complaint is that "every man liveth so after his own pleasure." This focus on personal satisfaction blinds them to the larger responsibilities they have to God's law. According to God, justice is the means by which he—and by extension, any ruler—can extend and command virtue within his people. God requires that Everyman go on a pilgrimage, which is essentially God enacting justice for Everyman's sins; Everyman performs penance, granting him salvation. For God, then, enacting justice entails enacting mercy. By reminding Everyman of the authority of God's law, God simultaneously introduces the framework through which Everyman can be reconciled fully, both to God and to the church. The Duke plays a role similar to that of God in *Everyman*. Though it is true that the Duke both enables and reacts against Angelo's temptation, it is more important that this temptation allow Angelo to move toward a form of legal and spiritual reconciliation (which, of course, the Duke has stage-managed). These must occur simultaneously in Vienna, as Angelo's example reveals that the law itself is insufficient as an instrument of moral discipline.

Initially, of course, this is not the case; before Angelo ever threatens Isabella, he is a strict enforcer, and believer, of the law. He is not aware that he is influenced by desire or sin, and his strict, puritanical view of the world allows him to be an objective leader. In fact, he imagines himself to be a cipher for the law, which he implements literally throughout Vienna. Angelo says when speaking to Escalus,

> What's open made to justice,
> That justice seizes. 'Tis very pregnant.

> The jewel that we find, we stoop and take't
> Because we see it, but what we do not see
> We tread upon and never think of it. (2.1.22-26)

To Angelo, justice is a duty that the law must provide the state. Rulers must continually seize opportunities to make the state a better one, which ultimately means punishing the citizens as they break the law. He also mentions that should he sin against the state, he expects to be tried according to the law, claiming himself to be no different from the rest of Vienna: "When I that censure him do so offend, / Let mine own judgement pattern out my death, / And nothing come in partial" (2.1.29-31). Early on, then, the law serves for Angelo as a comprehensive measuring stick with which to judge his own behavior as well as that of his fellow citizens. Law creates a moral and social baseline according to which all action should be judged; it is, in a sense, Angelo's god.

Yet as Angelo demonstrates following the arousal of his desire for Isabella, there is nothing intrinsically linking the institution of the law with virtue. He proves that the law is capable of being manipulated. He once felt himself responsible to uphold ethical and moral principles for Vienna, but now, he is in a position where he can maneuver these principles to satisfy his lust. He says to Isabella, "By the affection that now guides me the most / I'll prove a tyrant to [Claudio]. As for you, / Say what you can, my false o'erweighs your true" (2.4.168-70). In this speech, he makes it clear that he no longer believes that there is a close relationship between the law and virtue. Instead, he allows himself to be overtaken with desire to the point that he sees himself as essentially above the same law he is charged with enforcing. He recognizes that what he is asking of Isabella is against the law; however, he believes his virtuous reputation will prove to be an impenetrable cover. Angelo is willing to use his reputation and his power in order to further his own lustful desires, and in doing so turns inward from the one social mechanism that he recognized as something that linked him with other Viennese citizens. The law can no longer serve as an infallible instrument of moral discipline because Angelo has subverted it for immoral purposes. After this, what he and the play both need is a character who is capable of refiguring the law along specifically moral lines.

The Duke, then, begins this project in a controversial way. He appears to extend his public into private jurisdiction by disguising himself as a friar and, more importantly, by undertaking the confessional duties of a friar. Though he does mislead his subjects

as a physical presence, he does not mislead them in guidance or in leadership. He visits both Claudio and Juliet to help them repent their sins, which have landed them in trouble with the law. While aiding in Juliet's repentance, the Duke says, "But lest you do repent / As that the sin hath brought you to this shame – / Which sorrow is always toward ourselves, not heaven, / Showing we would not spare heaven as we love it, / But as we stand in fear " (2.3.32-36). This passage, unlike his future consultation with Claudio, is entirely spiritual. The Duke makes sure to remind Juliet to express sorrow towards heaven, and not just herself, as repentance is about acknowledging that there is a greater spiritual authority. When he asks her, "Repent you, fair one, of the sin you carry?" (2.3.19), the Duke is using his role as confessor to guide her towards recognizing her responsibility as a Christian. Once she is a better Christian, she can, in turn, become a better citizen of Vienna. The Duke, in his role as confessor with Juliet, combines temporal and ecclesiastical offices insofar as his role as confessor enables him to reconcile his subjects with a larger community of belief. Once this moral reform is accomplished, social reform immediately follows.

As pragmatically effective as this may be, modern readers and critics frequently argue that the Duke's assumption of ecclesiastical jurisdiction here is itself an ethical problem.[17] Yet within sixteenth-century political thought in England particularly, there are arguments to be made for the Duke's actions not only as a right, but as a duty. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Richard Hooker suggests that all subjection is reminiscent of God's institution, from the power parents have over children, to the power a husband has over a wife, to the power a King holds over his citizens. Hooker writes, "On all sides therefore it is confessed that to the King belongeth power of maintaining laws made for the Church regiment and of causing them to be observed. But the principality of power in making them which is the thing that we attribute unto Kings, this both the one sort and the other doth withstand."[18] Without the King, then, the laws of the Church would never be enforced nor followed. This power also gives him the authority to reinterpret the law as he sees fit, for he is the principal component in maintaining his citizens' virtue. Hooker goes on to say that "every human law should be held a deadly sin,"[19] essentially advancing secular law to the realm of sacred law, which means that judgment, mercy, and punishment are all integral within the King's law. In Juliet's confession scene in *Measure for Measure*, then, the Duke is both a spiritual and political confessor.

It is also important to note that the Duke's efforts to reform the moral lives of his subjects are not solely religious in nature. For example, the Duke's Christian language shifts once he acts as a confessor to Juliet's betrothed, Claudio. Here, he transforms from a solidly Christian character into a Stoic, essentially using two different strategies, though his role as a confessor remains. In these confessions, he is methodically using strategies of the sacred and philosophical to heal his temporal rule, since laws themselves do not seem to be enough to contain his subjects. During his consultation with Claudio, he pleasantly encourages Claudio to his impending death. The Duke says,

> Be absolute for death. Either death or life
> Shall thereby be the sweeter. Reason thus with life.
> If I do lose thee, I do lose a thing
> That none but fools would keep. A breath thou art,
> Servile to all the skyey influences
> That dost this habitation were thou keep'st
> Hourly afflict. Merely thou art death's fool,
> For him thou labour'st by thy flight to shun,
> And yet runn'st toward him still. (3.1.5-13)

In this passage, the Duke is using both political and philosophical strategies to gauge the depth of repentance of people who are both sinners and criminals. While the Duke consulted Juliet on the merciful side of repentance, the Duke here is trying to get Claudio to accept the justice of his sentence and not to value his earthly life. Claudio accepts his fate with a calm resolve. Reformed Vienna will work according to a balance of both justice and mercy. With this, the Duke is collapsing distinctions between Christianity and Stoicism because, within the framework of his role as the political head of state, the spiritual, philosophical, and political are merged. The Duke recognizes that sin and crime are closely related categories, and that by using both Christianity and philosophy to help guide his subjects, he will be able to achieve a more fully secularized form of repentance.[20]

In the final scene of the play, the Duke brings together the effects of this repentance as he reconciles the citizens of Vienna with each other and with himself. Here, again, social reform is enabled by moral reform, and not the other way around. The character who exemplifies this idea most clearly is Isabella. Though wronged by Angelo's cruelty, she pleads for the Duke to be merciful to Angelo in her last spoken lines. This plea is significant because Angelo never asks for mercy, but only admits his own guilt: "Let my trial be mine own confession, / Immediate sentence

then, and sequent death, / Is all the grace I beg" (5.1.364-66). Isabella, however, makes the case that Angelo should be granted mercy because he was ultimately prevented from committing the crime he attempted to commit:

> My brother had but justice,
> In that he did the thing for which he died.
> For Angelo,
> His act did not o'ertake his bad intent,
> And must be busied but as an intent
> That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects,
> Intents but merely thoughts. (5.1.440-46)

Though Isabella never actually committed any wrongdoing during the play, she is still expected to prove her virtue and good nature in this last scene, like every other character. In this passage, she establishes her understanding of justice and mercy, which pleases the Duke and subsequently saves Angelo. Not only does Isabella argue for the reorientation of law according to a principle of moral charity, but she also serves to instruct Angelo in a lesson he has not yet learned. As he has done throughout the play, Angelo attempts to set the terms of his fate himself in this scene. Isabella's plea on his behalf reminds him that the nature of the authorities to which all subjects owe allegiance is not one-dimensional. Submitting oneself to a religion or to the law entails looking outward rather than inward, and trusting the justice and mercy of others.

Isabella's merciful reconciliation (between Angelo and herself and between Angelo and the state), then, becomes the pattern according to which the Duke pronounces all of his remaining rulings. Again, Isabella urges the Duke to recalibrate the law along more merciful lines, and the effect of this in the end is to generate even more merciful forms of punishment. Angelo is married to Mariana; Lucio is also married; and Barnadine is pardoned. Even Claudio, Isabella's brother, is reconciled with his sister: "If he be like your brother, for his sake / Is he pardoned; and for your lovely sake / Give me your hand, and say you will be mine. / He is my brother too" (5.1.484-87). These reconciliations inspire the Duke to propose to Isabella who is, then, reconciled with the state as well as the divine. The Duke reconciles society by mercifully employing the law. As Angelo's example demonstrates, the problem with the law in Vienna is that it can be used as an instrument of moral corruption. In order to reform the law, the Duke is forced to begin at the heart of the problem, namely, with morality itself.

Notes

1. All Shakespeare quotations are from William Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, in *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: Norton & Company, 2008). Further citations of the play will be included parenthetically in the body of the paper.

2. James Simpson, *Reform and Cultural Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

3. Ibid., 542.

4. Simpson's view is similar to those expressed in many recent theater histories. See for example John Cox and David Scott Kastan, Introduction, in *A New History of Early English Drama*, ed. John Cox and David Scott Kastan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

5. Curtis Perry and John Watkins, eds., *Shakespeare and the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

6. This is a prominent opinion among literary critics, especially as regards the nature of the individual. For two of the most influential assertions of this claim, see Catherine Belsey, *The Subject of the Tragedy: Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama* (New York: Methuen, 1985), and Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

7. The standard account of this development is still David Bevington, *From Mankind to Marlowe: The Growth of Structure in the Popular Drama of Tudor England* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

8. The morality play elements of *Measure for Measure* have begun to attract critical attention recently. For one example, see Robert B. Pierce, "Being a Moral Agent in Shakespeare's Vienna," *Philosophy and Literature* 33 (2009): 267-79.

9. Sarah Beckwith, "Medieval Penance, Reformation Repentance and *Measure for Measure*," in *Reading the Medieval in Early Modern England*, ed. Gordon McMullan and David Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 199.

10. Debora Kuller Shuger, *Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England: The Sacred and The State in* Measure for Measure (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 132.

11. Ibid., 133.

12. King James I, *Basilikon Doron,* in *King James VI and I: Political Writings*, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

13. Ibid., 49.

14. See Martha Widmayer, "'To Sin in Loving Virtue': Angelo of *Measure for Measure*," *Texas Studies in Language and Literature* 49 (2007): 155-80; esp. 156-57.

15. All quotations from *Mankind* are taken from *Medieval Drama: An Anthology*, ed. Greg Walker (Malden: Blackwell Publishers), 194-99.

16. All quotations from *Everyman* are taken from *Medieval English Literature*, ed. J.B. Trapp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 40-62.

17. See Beckwith, "Medieval Penance, Reformation Repentance, and *Measure for Measure*."

18. Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 199.

19. Ibid., 191.

20. For a reading of the play that suggests that the law in the end remains the province of justice alone, see Jeremy Tambling, "Law and Will in *Measure for Measure*," *Essays in Criticism* 59 (2009): 189-210.

Telling Stories About Marriage: Intent and Instability in *Measure for Measure* and the Early Modern English Courts

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Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* depicts multiple breaches of faith that render characters' matrimonial intentions and marital status uncertain. Claudio and Juliet ratify their matrimonial contract through intercourse, believing themselves to be man and wife, but the ruling authority disagrees and charges them with fornication. Angelo thinks he has successfully revoked a former commitment to Marianna, but Duke Vincentio disagrees and engineers a bed-trick that results in the consummation of their relationship at the same time it echoes the offense for which Claudio received a death sentence. Lucio disclaims any obligation to Kate Keepdown after she bears his child, but the Duke's requirement that the pair marry signals his judgment that Lucio's previous words and actions created a matrimonial obligation. Even the Duke is not immune from scrutiny regarding his intentions and behavior, as his unanswered proposal to Isabella leaves their matrimonial future unclear and open for interpretation; what is "meet you all should know" (5.1.536) is left a mystery at the play's conclusion.[1]

Marianna's paradoxical declaration to the Duke that she is neither maid, wife, nor widow reflects a larger crisis of identity, endemic throughout Shakespeare's fictional Vienna. The inability to fit into an easily recognized marital category is the product of confusion among the agents of the state and their subjects about how to interpret the words, actions, and intentions of others.[2] Literary critics have puzzled over the Duke's marriage pronouncements in the final scene, but his sentences reflect the very types of decisions sought by parties seeking to uphold or dissolve disputed matrimony in early modern England's church courts.[3] This essay argues that *Measure for Measure* presents several recognizable patterns concerning marriage formation, albeit in

exaggerated form, also articulated in contemporary matrimonial litigation and that both sources reveal the practical functioning of real and imagined laws pertaining to sex and marriage to be more fluid and more contested than appear on the surface.[4] Just as a consideration of the intersection of intent, language, and action serves as a backdrop against which *Measure for Measure* explores and problematizes the construction of marriage, it was also a key dynamic in the legal dramas played out in the early modern courts.[5] The texts of both play and courts emphasize not only the importance of consent in making marriage, but also the ways in which attempts to demonstrate matrimonial consent or dissent shaped stories about marriage told by early modern people, both fictional and historical. While the play's improperly formed matrimonial relationships are at least superficially resolved at its conclusion, unanswered questions about what separates intent from action and whether the state should or could regulate its subjects' intentions destabilize its messages about marriage, identity, and intent. A consideration of matrimonial litigation likewise reveals the instability of England's marriage law and of the power of authorities to inform the practices of the English people.

The play and the historical documents problematize the formula for marriage prescribed by the Church of England, but in significantly different ways that demonstrate the power of narrativity and mediation in the making of early modern unions. *Measure for Measure*'s punishments, pronouncements, and discussions of intent, words, and sex have the ability to exaggerate and mock the rules that governed marriage in a way that litigants and witnesses seeking the judgment of those responsible for maintaining the law dared not. In both texts the construction of marriage is joined in *medias res*; neither Shakespeare's characters and audience nor real-life judges, clerks, and other court officials witnessed the exchange of marital vows, as that action had already allegedly taken place before the stage or legal drama commenced. What serves as evidence in each, then, are narratives reflecting the memories and motives of participants; but while real-life deponents sought to present their stories in ways that would generate a favorable judgment, the characters in *Measure for Measure* have more license to tell stories that criticize, obfuscate, and obstruct. The play's omission of words of matrimony invited contemporary audiences not only to determine for themselves the intent of parties who allegedly consented to marriage, but also to consider whether the rules that bound individuals together were

in fact sound ones, something real-life neighbors, friends, and kin who assessed the legality of alleged matrimonial relationships in court suits would not have had ability to articulate.[6] The various iterations of marriage found in the play do more to engender uncertainty and contestation than they do to encode a sense of resolution and standardization concerning the making of marriage, something contemporary English authorities were striving to enact.[7] A consideration of both *Measure for Measure* and early modern legal sources thus reveals much about the institution of marriage by uncovering shared points of debate about what defined marriage, who was eligible to marry, and what happened when the interpretations of intention, word, and deed diverged, problems for which neither contemporary law nor drama had easy solutions.

Matrimonial Narratives in Fact and Fiction. Three distinct matrimonial narratives demonstrate anxieties engendered by early modern matrimony both in the play and in contemporary lawsuits from northwest England's diocese of Chester.[8] The Claudio/Juliet relationship exhibits the fictional equivalent of what is labeled here as the "marriage by mutual consent" narrative, which featured the exchange of matrimonial consent by courting couples as a binding contract even in the absence of clerical supervision or public solemnization.[9] The "jilted woman" narrative, dramatized by the relationship of Angelo and Mariana, and in an alternate fashion, of Lucio and Kate, demonstrates the ways in which disruption of courtship activities rendered women vulnerable during the process of contracting marriage. Both play and court papers also include examples of a "signs of consent" narrative, which shows real-life witnesses observing and interpreting the behavior of prospective spouses as indicators of assent to matrimony and as evidence of their transition from single men and women into husbands and wives in much the way that the final scene of *Measure for Measure* calls upon the audience to interpret the matrimonial intent of Duke Vincentio and Isabella in the absence of the latter's verbal response.

Early modern marriage litigation includes numerous examples of couples who, like Claudio and Juliet, exchanged vows privately, initiated sexual relations, and were frequently regarded by their community as husband and wife, even without three readings of the banns or a marriage license, as prescribed by the Church of England. Because England continued to follow the dictates of medieval canon law, even after the Reformation, the only requirement for contracting a binding union was the expression

of consent between parties eligible to marry.[10] Claudio provides the following narrative concerning his relationship with Juliet:

> Upon a true contract,
> I got possession of Julietta's bed.
> You know the lady; she is fast my wife,
> Save that we do the denunciation lack
> Of outward order. This we came not to
> Only for propagation of a dower
> Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
> From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
> Till time had made them for us. (1.2.134-42)

Claudio admits that they kept their marriage secret and unsolemnized while Juliet's dowry was being negotiated, meaning that friends were unable to identify the pair as married. Still, Claudio's words indicate they clearly consider themselves husband and wife, regardless of the lack of public "denunciation." Further, his statement to Lucio, "You know the lady," suggests his prospective wife's public reputation for honesty and propriety, a concept frequently identified in contemporary court records by the phrase "common fame"; he avers that others would believe Juliet's consent to the initiation of sexual relations as plausible only following a legitimate and binding expression of matrimonial consent.[11]

Evidence indicates that matrimony-by-event, in the form of solemnization within a parish church, was beginning to supplant the kind of matrimony-by-process Claudio describes in many areas of England during the early modern period.[12] Angelo's rigid reliance on solemnization as the sole determinant of valid marriage seems an exaggerated representation of the Church's increasing disapproval of extra-ecclesiastical marriage and its attempt to curb what was apparently a fairly common disregard for prohibitions against pre-solemnization consummation, as does Claudio's death sentence.[13] Shakespeare makes Angelo, whose name evokes both the celestial being and the contemporary English coin that served as a popular courtship and marriage gift, a counterfeit.[14] In creating a superficially upright "angel," who fails to practice himself what he pronounces for others, the play criticizes both godly puritans of his day, of whom Angelo serves as a representation, and contemporary definitions of marriage.[15]

Litigation before the church courts in northwest England indicates the continued expression of matrimonial intent through a process, a circumstance that did not adhere strictly to the Church of England's emphasis on an easily recognizable and verifiable

event, such as a wedding in the local parish church. Of 138 sampled matrimonial suits heard between 1560 and 1653, nearly 40 percent included testimony that "talk of marriage" took place in a setting other than a church or chapel sanctioned for making marriages.[16] Matrimonial contracts were frequently formed in private residences, often in the presence of friends and family who were then called upon to offer assessments of the words spoken, the gifts exchanged between spouses, and, more broadly, the intentions of both parties if a subsequent rupture in the relationship resulted in litigation. Suits also indicate that witnesses established financial settlements between prospective spouses, like the friends Juliet and Claudio sought to win over: plaintiff Anne Powell's pregnancy in 1600, for example, resulted in a "conference" of her friends with those of suitor John Bathoe and the setting of Anne's marriage portion at £16.[17] Twenty percent of the suits expressly mention the couple's failure to announce intent to marry through public reading of the banns or to seek a license that would have sanctioned private marriage.[18] While couples followed talk of marriage with cohabitation in eighteen percent of the suits, forty percent include evidence that, as with Claudio and Juliet, such talk prompted the initiation of sexual relations. In 1582, for example, witnesses reported that Dorothy Huxley and Ralph Farrer exchanged extra-ecclesiastical present-tense matrimonial vows and "were solemlye brought to their bed w[i]th a bride possette (as the manor is) at whiche tyme as allsoe at other tymes the sayd Ralph dyd saye and confesse that he was contractid and married to the said Doritie and that shee was his lawfull wieffe."[19]

Matrimonial litigation reveals that witnesses and litigants frequently conflated the terms "contract" and "marriage," perhaps indicative of a popular perception that contracting was the equivalent of marriage.[20] While their oral testimony passed through a clerical filter to create the extant historical record, it is likely that the written terms attributed to witnesses accurately reflected spoken words, as the court clerk would have understood the terms' differences. Although contemporary moralist and writer William Gouge famously claimed that "contracted persons are in a middle degree betwixt single persons, and married persons: they are neither simply single, nor actually maried," language in the court papers suggests the rejection of a clear separation between married and contracted.[21] On the whole, then, the litigation suggests that, like Claudio and Juliet, men and women in northwest England formed verbal contracts of marriage outside the boundaries of

the parish church that they nevertheless considered effective in expressing consent, which, according to the law, remained the most important element in establishing legitimate marriage in early modern England.

Matrimonial activities deemed irregular, including post-contract/pre-solemnization fornication, could also come to the attention of the early modern English courts, a reality that perhaps served as inspiration for the story of Claudio and Juliet.[22] Court records indicate that the threat of official censure could prompt couples to regularize their marriages without official punishment from ecclesiastic or civil authorities or with relatively light discipline, though, making Shakespeare's Vienna a marked departure from contemporary historical circumstance. For example, in 1572 Thomas Wrench agreed to solemnize his future-tense verbal contract with Ellen Sutton, "vpon w[hi]ch confession and promise they steyed the presentment" of irregular marriage by local churchwardens; the records mention no further disciplinary action.[23] The church courts could use their pronouncements to order individuals to ratify marriages lacking "denunciation" or exhibiting improprieties, and even offered marriage as an option to reduce punishments associated with fornication. In 1578 the court ordered John Sigiswicke and Elizabeth Gillis, for example, to declare "th[ei]r fault[es]" concerning an unsolemnized marriage during Sunday service and then to ratify marriage through a public ceremony; and when Anne Shaw delivered a child five months after her marriage to Randolph Smith in 1582, the only punishment listed for what had clearly been a premarital pregnancy was "open pen[a]nce."[24] Diocesan officials in Chester presented John Moston and Ellen Carter for fornication in 1590, but because the couple intended to marry, their only punishment was "to co[n]fes ther offence the day of ther mariage."[25] Helmholz's survey of marriage law and its enforcement during the sixteenth century identifies as one of the more notable changes the tightening of standards for proof of marriage, a shift designed to curtail the making of private matches.[26] Claudio and Juliet's relationship as well as the ones enumerated in the court records, however, suggest that the shift was far from complete at the turn of the century.

Other relationships in the play break down when one character disclaims matrimonial intent or experiences a reversal of fortune. The Duke describes how Angelo broke off his marriage contract with Mariana after her dowry was lost at sea:

> [Mariana] should this Angelo have married, was affianced to her oath, and the nuptial appointed; between which time

> of the contract and limit of the solemnity, her brother Frederick was wrecked at sea, having in that perished vessel the dowry of his sister. But mark how heavily this befell to the poor gentlewoman. There she lost a noble and renowned brother, in his love towards her ever most kind and natural; with him, the portion and sinew of her fortune, her marriage dowry; with both, her combinate husband, this well-seeming Angelo. (3.1.213-23)

The consequences of Angelo's having "swallowed his vows whole, pretending in her discoveries of dishonour" (3.1.226-27) are most startlingly expressed in an exchange between the Duke and Mariana; upon being questioned by the Duke—"What, are you married?" (5.1.172)—Marianna responds that she is not a maid, a wife, or a widow, an answer that prompts the Duke to declare, "Why, you are nothing then." Lucio's subsequent input, that "she may be a punk; for many of them are neither maid, widow, nor wife" (5.1.180-81), establishes an association of uncertain marital status with sexual immorality.

Contemporary court suits also reveal disruptions in the matrimonial process that could expose women (especially those who became pregnant) to hardship and censure; indeed, their undefined status likely drove the initiation of litigation. In some cases it is clear that a male litigant sought sexual gratification rather than a spouse, perhaps talking vaguely about the possibility of marriage in hopes of convincing the female litigant to sleep with him. Other suits have greater complexity, though, relating accounts of relationships proceeding much like the ones considered above that then fractured, frequently on economic grounds and sometimes because the couple could not secure the support of friends and family. Sixty-three percent of the matrimonial contract suits from the northwest contain sufficient detail to indicate the identity and gender of the plaintiff, and of those suits, female plaintiffs outnumber male plaintiffs by a margin of more than two to one. The majority of those female plaintiffs were seeking the enforcement of a contract rather than its dissolution, demonstrating that the formation of marriage outside the church could leave women open to the possibility of abandonment, as Marianna had been cast away by Angelo in the wake of her loss of dowry and reputation. Without the ratification provided by a church ceremony, women could find it difficult to demonstrate the intent that accompanied promises to marry, exchanges of gifts, or negotiations concerning financial settlements. In a suit from 1564, for example, witnesses indicated that sexual relations and

a subsequent pregnancy followed present-tense vows between Thomas Snelson and Ellen Ricroft.[27] The stable, consensual nature of that relationship changed, however, when Snelson's friends desired him to marry a widow instead, presumably because that second match would bring Snelson greater financial benefits. He twice announced his intentions to marry Widow Joan Willie in the parish church of Prestbury, but on the third occasion, Ricroft objected, citing her own prior contract with Snelson. He responded by relocating the site of his marriage to Willie to the nearby parish of Rushton, thus temporarily evading Ricroft's charge and prompting Ricroft to initiate litigation against him.[28]

Disputes concerning marriage portions and allegations of irregular relationships interrupted early modern courtship in northwest England in much the same way Angelo and Marianna's relationship foundered in the face of unfulfilled financial considerations of marriage and rumors of impropriety. In 1625 John Povall testified that his promise to marry Jane Morres was based on a financial settlement of £30 but that "her said frend[es] fayled" to delivered the sum on the day appointed for the marriage.[29] He was, he concluded, "by law freed from the said condic[i]onall promise he made vnto the said Jane."[30] Rumors of marriage could, however, interrupt subsequent courtship activities. When Thomas Rawland and Anne Booth announced intentions to marry in 1625, Richard Brownesword objected on the grounds of pre-contract, a charge Booth's subsequent suit against him claimed had "hindred & iniured the s[ai]d Anne in her fortunes and p[re] ferment in marriage," particularly because it prevented her public solemnization of marriage with Rawland.[31]

The Lucio and Kate Keepdown subplot provides a further link between licit and illicit sexual relations and an extreme example of the jilted woman narrative found in the court records. According to the Duke, Lucio swore "there's one / Whom he begot with child" (5.1.504-5), and Mistress Overdone claims that "Mistress Kate Keepdown was with child by [Lucio] in the Duke's time; he promised her marriage. His child is a year and a quarter old come Philip and Jacob. I have kept it myself" (3.2.193-96).[32] The Lucio and Kate Keepdown relationship becomes a marriage issue, it seems, once literal issue (a child) results from their coupling. Mistress Overdone's comments emphasize the resulting economic problem: who is responsible for financing the child's care? That question was of particular importance by the writing of *Measure for Measure*, as Elizabethan parliaments had undertaken a massive project of social legislation concerning poverty, operationalized

by a series of statutes requiring local communities to provide financially for bastard children in cases in which a father could not be identified.[33] None of the sampled court records compelled a man to marry a woman with whom his sexual relationship was purely commercial; the play, then, may be exaggerating for comic effect the state's new attempts to regulate sexuality and poverty through the relationship of Lucio and Kate. Yet if the story Mistress Overdone tells about their relationship is correct, the pair provides another example of unfulfilled matrimonial promises, which the returned Duke corrects with enforced marriage. For Claudio and Juliet, as well as for Lucio and Kate, pregnancy and a child, respectively, create incontrovertible proof of pre-solemnization intercourse. In each relationship a child both symbolically and physically represents the intersection of the couples' intent and action.

Narratives about matrimonial consent could focus on couples' deeds and words other than marriage vows, although such evidence made marriage difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the authorities. While the law of marriage was concerned with whether couples said present-tense vows and bound themselves irrevocably, deponents often catalogued alternate signs of matrimonial assent such as kissing, hand holding, and cohabitation. They also described actions associated with spousal behavior, recounting stories about litigants sharing meals together, calling one another husband and wife, and attending church or social functions as a couple, all of which helped create a "common fame" of marriage.[34] What emerges from the records is a sense that local communities evaluated the performance of signs and gestures of consent to assess the seriousness and legitimacy of relationships, in much the way playgoers of *Measure for Measure* watched the performance of matrimonial processes between the play's prospective spouses to interpret their marital status. The Duke's proposal to Isabella serves as a fictional example of this third narrative pattern, since Isabella's subsequent silence leaves the audience to determine by other means whether or not she will consent to marry the Duke.

It is perhaps telling that although the Duke requests Isabella's verbal assent, he first asks for her hand, a gesture contemporaries would have recognized and understood as associated with making a matrimonial contract: "Give me your hand and say you will be mine" (5.1.490). A number of the suits from the northwest, including that between Anna Blackden and Peter Rogers in 1583, report the physical details of handfasting as evidence of consent:

> The said Peter Rogers holdinge the right hand of the said Anne in his right hand spake vnto her theis word[es] or the like in effect: I Peter take thee Anne to my wedded weif to haue & to holde from this daie forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sicknes & in healthe till deathe vs depart & thereto I plight thee my trothe. And the said Anne after they had loosed handes, the said Anne holdinge the right hand of the said Peter in her right hand spake vnto him theis word[es]: I Anne take thee Peter to my wedded husband to haue & to holde from this daie forward for better for worse for richer for poorer in sicknes & in health till death.[35]

In *Measure for Measure* the Duke's final direct comment to Isabella, the request "if you'll a willing ear incline" (5.1.533), places the dramatic focus squarely on the silent gesture of listening, however, rather than the speaking of words aloud. This encourages audiences seeking to understand Isabella's response to watch for physical signs expressing her intentions rather than wait to hear canonical words of consent.

How audience members interpreted signs of intent, spoken or unspoken, would have depended on a wide range of cultural beliefs and practices. The play's contemporary audience assumed the role of the real communities in court suits who determined the legitimacy of a given couple's relationship. By giving this interpretive power to the audience, Shakespeare returns to and reinforces the theme raised at the very start of the play during the initial discussion of Claudio and Juliet's relationship: common fame of matrimonial intent seems to exonerate Claudio, in that most of the characters—save Angelo, in whom the authority of the state temporarily resides—interpret Claudio and Juliet's union as valid, although improperly formed and technically incomplete. The primary distinction between that contract and a possible contract in the making between the Duke and Isabella is that the latter lacks any clear, scripted expression of mutual consent. Isabella's silence forces the audience to determine her intent, and by extension, the future status of the relationship. By making the closing moments of the play a final locus of interpretation, Shakespeare brings the plot back around full circle to the opening scene, this time inviting the play's audience, rather than its characters, to judge the status of a potential matrimonial relationship.

Many suits seeking a judgment of legitimate marriage before the courts relied upon witnesses' accounts of the words, gestures, and practices that helped broadcast the expression of consent to

the wider community. Forty-six percent of the suits catalogued the value and meanings of gifts exchanged between purported spouses. Gloves, petticoats, rings, coins and other items were often exchanged directly between contracting individuals, but others who knew of their giving could offer valuable commentary on the mood and intent of givers and receivers. Thirty-two percent of the suits contained language from litigants and witnesses averring the existence of a common perception of marriage, often resting on various social or economic markers of commitment. A suit from 1570, for example, contained testimony that Anne Helyn shouldered the responsibility of managing Richard Bunburie's household, an action witnesses read as indicative of the formation of a matrimonial contract.[36] In a suit from 1635, Elizabeth Fazakerly attempted to prove her suitor, Lawrence Mather, guilty of a breach of contract by reporting that he "did sell div[er]s good[es] and thing[es] w[hi]ch were hers" and "did carry himself . . . as thoughe hee had bene & were husband of the said Elizabeth."[37] In such suits, litigants pursuing a judgment of valid marriage and their supporters sought to demonstrate the existence of an intent to marry as actualized through words and deeds not legally binding, but nonetheless pregnant with significance.

While the fictional and historical authorities studied here both underscored consent as the key element in determining matrimonial commitment, when evidence of consent could not be determined or had been withdrawn, the texts diverge.[38] Litigation reveals people talking about more circumstantial, but popularly accepted, proofs of marriage to demonstrate their claims, while the play problematizes contemporary rules governing matrimony by relying on irony, showing a commercial sexual transaction and an act of sexual trickery resulting in the same binding commitment as that of the stable, consensual relationship of Claudio and Juliet. *Measure for Measure*, with its consideration of malformed or broken relationships, thus acts as a critique of the construction and "measure" of marriage in early modern England and debated far more boldly than any real-life litigants the intersection between the personal and the public by exposing, often through comic exaggeration, the interaction between characters' intentions and actions.

The Problem of Intent. While contemporaries understood vows of marriage to be speech-acts that transformed words into actions,[39] both the play and the suits clearly indicate that audiences "read" other words and gestures as indicative of externalized mutual intent as well. This circumstance demonstrates the presence

of a complex relationship of intentions, words, and deeds. In the play the only time Juliet speaks is when the Duke, disguised as a friar, questions her about her sin. When Juliet expresses her love for Claudio, the Duke asks, "So then it seems your most offenceful act / Was mutually committed?" (2.3.26-27). It is significant that the Duke confirms their mutual consent, as the concept acts in the play as proof of the legitimacy of matrimony-by-process in Claudio and Juliet's relationship. More problematically, though, mutual consent is overridden in the Duke's decrees that Lucio and Angelo solemnize marriage with women to whom they clearly do not wish to be bound.

The contradictions inherent in the play's messages concerning consent and marriage are in keeping with *Measure for Measure*'s exploration of intent in more general terms. This is accomplished most frequently through a consideration of the words and deeds of the two characters who are, at least superficially, the most fixed and uncompromising: Angelo and Isabella. In pleading for Claudio's life, Escalus asks Angelo to call to mind instances in which he was tempted by the same sin to which Claudio succumbed. Angelo's response seems to establish a chasm between temptation and sin:

> 'Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus,
> Another thing to fall. I not deny
> The jury passing on the prisoner's life
> May in the sworn twelve have a thief, or two,
> Guiltier than him they try. (2.1.17-21)

The rationale for Claudio's punishment is presented as a single, unified idea, but its mixed message instead exposes hypocrisy in the law's functioning. Angelo first establishes a clear separation between thought and action (17-18), but then identifies the true difference between those who do justice and those subject to it as the fact that the faults of the former remain secret and internalized, while the errors of the latter are exposed and externalized (18-21). In her first appeal to Angelo, Isabella, too, problematizes the relationship between internalized and externalized intentions. She claims that even verbal expressions of intent (in this case, Angelo's pronouncement of condemnation) can be put aside: "Too late? Why, no. I that do speak a word / May call it again" (2.2.57-58). For a novitiate preparing to take final vows, the sentiment is particularly striking, since, like words of marriage spoken in the present tense, clerical vows could not be "called again." Later, Angelo, waiting alone for Isabella's return, further muses that words and thoughts/intentions could be at odds in externalizing desire:

> When I would pray and think, I think and pray
> To several subjects: Heaven hath my empty words,
> While my invention, hearing not my tongue,
> Anchors on Isabel. (2.4.1-4)

Isabella also identifies the disconnect between words and intentions during her second interview with Angelo. When he rebukes her for too easily excusing Claudio's actions, she responds, "O pardon me, my lord; it oft falls out / To have what we would have, we speak not what we mean" (2.4.117-18). From the mouths of Angelo and Isabella come contradictory and unsettling interpretations about the intersection of intent, words, and actions, the three requirements of early modern marriage in theory and practice.

Perhaps most intriguing is Isabella's plea for Angelo's life to be spared, when she reasons that one cannot be held accountable for thoughts (in this case, Angelo's attempt to extort sexual favors from her in return for Claudio's exoneration), as long as they are not acted upon. While still believing that Claudio has been executed on Angelo's orders, Isabella nevertheless defends Angelo:

> Look, if it please you, on this man condemned
> As if my brother lived. I partly think
> A due sincerity governed his deeds,
> Till he did look on me. Since it is so,
> Let him not die. My brother had but justice,
> In that he did the thing for which he died.
> For Angelo,
> His act did not o'ertake his bad intent,
> And must be buried but as an intent
> That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects,
> *Intents but merely thoughts.* (5.1.436-46, italics added)

The superficial appeal of Isabella's argument is undermined, however, by the fact that Angelo did, although unknowingly, commit the same act as Claudio in sleeping with the woman with whom he had consented to marriage. Isabella's logic recalls her earlier confession that words can mask a hidden agenda: "I sometimes do excuse the thing I hate / For his advantage that I dearly love" (2.4.119-20). In this case, her entreaty is intended to aid Marianna, but it nevertheless demonstrates how intention shapes and often distorts speech.

In Shakespeare's England, however, once thoughts were voiced as words, they could constitute powerful acts that could not be undone: vows made marriages, promises made binding contracts, seditious speeches made treason. Isabella's impassioned

plea for Angelo's life ironically subverts the institutional efforts to determine intent that lie at the heart of matrimonial litigation and is more broadly bound up in contemporary puritan reformers' attempts to police personal morality. Her dismissal of the significance of "mere" intent challenges the interpretive practices of both the community and the courts in their attempts to discern the matrimonial intentions of specific individuals based on words and signs of consent.

The exploration of differences between internalized and externalized expressions of intent that runs throughout the play's text has significant consequences for its depictions of matrimony. On the one hand, it suggests that externalized assent to marriage was as binding as a church wedding itself, the premise that governed Duke Vincentio's instigation of the bed-trick, as well as his decrees concerning his subjects' relationships. On the other, the bed-trick's circumvention of Angelo's consent to his relationship with Marianna undermines the clarity engendered by the Duke's pronouncements, as do Isabella's declarations that words could be recalled and that thoughts were not subject to the censure of law. Her radical stance on the impossibility of proving intent may, however, have been constructed precisely to provoke the audience's disapprobation and compel them to consider that intent can be inferred and does determine public and legal judgments. Distinct from the historical records, then, the play satirizes the concept of justice itself, most notably in Angelo's description of the jury, the Duke's decrees, and the final, pointed warning concerning the measure of judgment.

Contemporary legal sources also show individuals struggling over the intersection of words, actions, and intentions, particularly, but not exclusively, with regard to matrimony and reputation. While certain words had commonly understood definitions, testimony reveals that the manner and occasion of their speaking could alter their impact; conversely, meanings could exist independently of words, since, as suggested above, gestures or signs apparently had widely recognized communicative power. The noun "intent" and its early modern verbal variant "intented" found their way repeatedly into witness depositions discussing a wide range of topics and behaviors, and several related meanings accompanied the terms' application. Deponents employed the words in accounts of carefully constructed schemes to bring financial harm or cause damage to reputation. In a suit from 1612, for example, Alice Hurleston alleged that Hugh Done sought to trick her into marriage by coaxing her to sign her name to a note

on which was written binding vows. In describing his actions, she noted that he had "form[er]lie plotted his deceitfull strategeme w[i]th a p[re]meditate intent to abuse the simplicitie of this R[esp]ondent."[40] Intent also had considerable legal import in early modern England with regard to abusive speech, as prosecutions for slander required proof of intent to injure to be actionable; it is therefore unsurprising to find several references to intent in suits of defamation before the courts in the northwest as well.[41] On numerous occasions, witnesses were asked to provide their insight into both the meanings of words spoken and the motives of their speakers. According to testimony in a suit from 1617, William Fallowes publicly and "malitiouslie" reported an adulterous relationship with Margery Daniell "w[i]th an intention to take her the said Margery her good name from her."[42] Court documents contain abundant evidence of early modern witnesses offering assessments of litigants' intentions, either in conjunction with specific actionable words of marriage or defamation, or in their absence. Still, the project of defining intent and determining its consequences in both the play and the records reveals that the intersection of the individual and the authorities and of public and private were often sites of contestation and negotiation in early modern England.

Exploring dramatized and historical narratives about marriage allows for the emergence of a composite picture of early modern matrimony and its discontents, even as it demonstrates their related but distinct articulation in both texts. The stories that court witnesses and players provided to their respective audiences about making marriage share a central focus on the issue of consent. Each source also affirms the difficulty of ascertaining such assent, especially when the precise words used to verbalize intentions are unknown or contested. The fact that England had not restructured its matrimonial laws in the wake of the Reformation allowed some men, like the fictional Angelo and Lucio, to attempt to renounce their relationships, while it left some women, like Shakespeare's long-suffering Mariana, wondering whether they were a wife or a maid. The Duke's question to the latter, "What, are you married?" would thus have had considerable resonance with early modern audiences. Seen in this light, the play's conclusion was perhaps not as mystifying or troubling on the matter of marriage in its early seventeenth-century context as it has appeared to more modern audiences and scholars. It did, after all, provide clarity about the future of most of the play's uncertain relationships. Still, in its exaggerated collisions of intent and action, word and

deed, internal and external, and private desire and public censure, it questions these dichotomies in ways that produce no easy or concrete answers and that contemporary litigants and their supporters seeking favorable judgments could not. The Duke's tantalizing guarantee of resolution—"So bring us to our palace, where we'll show / What's yet behind that's meet you all should know" (5.1. 535-36)—becomes the last of *Measure for Measure*'s unfulfilled promises.

Notes

1. References to the text come from William Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. J. W. Lever (London: Methuen, 1965; repr., London: Thompson Learning, 2006). While the Duke apparently has no prior matrimonial quandaries, his apparent departure from Vienna, leaving his people to suffer Angelo's more rigorous application of the law, could be viewed as an alternate form of breach of faith, between ruler and subject. Further, Lucio accuses the Duke of immorality and womanizing, which might have motivated the Duke to seek a "pure" wife in the convent-bound Isabella to improve his image.

2. For a treatment of previous scholarship on the matrimonial contracts in *Measure for Measure*, see Margaret Scott, "'This Our City's Institutions': Some Further Reflections on the Marriage Contracts in *Measure for Measure*," *English Literary History* 49, no. 4 (1982): 790-804; and Victoria Haynes, "Performing Social Practice: The Example of *Measure for Measure*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (1993): 1-29.

3. Marriage was both a civil and spiritual institution in early modern England, but questions about its validity were determined by the ecclesiastical courts, a continuation of medieval practice; civil courts, by contrast, were the more proper venue for questions about inheritance stemming from matrimonial uncertainties. Because England failed to reform its marriage laws in the wake of the Reformation, binding unions could continue to be formed without clerical oversight, a circumstance that could prompt litigation by parties seeking to uphold or dissent from claims of matrimony.

4. This study uses both documentary and dramatic sources to investigate early modern England's matrimonial culture. For recent thoughtful scholarly considerations of this methodological approach, see Lisa Jardine, *Reading Shakespeare Historically* (London: Routledge, 1996); Haynes, "Performing Social Practice"; Alberto Cacciedo, "'She is fast my wife': Sex, Marriage, and Ducal Authority in *Measure for Measure*," Shakespeare Studies 23 (1995): 196; and Debora Keller Shuger, *Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England: The Sacred and the State in* Measure for Measure (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001).

5. The terms "intent" and "consent" appear regularly in this essay, but their meanings are not meant to be conflated. "Consent" was a term that had legal significance with regard to early modern marriage, as canon law required mutual consent for a union to be binding. "Intent," in the discussion below, refers to the motives of early modern subjects, fictional and historical. Luke Wilson's definition of "intention," that it "purports to describe what it's like to feel a certain way about what one does," is useful in differentiating between the two terms. See *Theaters of Intention: Drama and the Law in Early Modern England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 6.

6. The audience's participation in supporting or condemning the play's relationships seems to be encouraged by the characterizations of the *dramatis personae*. While most characters' responses to Claudio's plight seem designed to provoke the audience's sympathy, for example, Angelo's abandonment of Mariana is depicted as a dishonorable deed redressed by the bed-trick.

7. In her study of patriarchy and marriage in *The Taming of the Shrew*, Amy L. Smith notes, "Early modern marriage, like all institutions, exists only in the imperfect and often resistant repetitions of its subjects"; "Performing Marriage with a Difference: Wooing, Wedding, and Bedding in *The Taming of the Shrew*," *Comparative Drama* 36, no. 3/4 (Fall 2002/Winter 2003): 298-320.

8. These categories should be considered as storytelling patterns, as witness testimony indicates a relatively sophisticated understanding of matrimonial law on the part of deponents, who shaped their testimonies to reflect that law and the practices of the courts in making decisions concerning marriage: Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Charles Donahue, *Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages: Arguments about Marriage in Five Courts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 10-11, 46-62.

Materials on matrimony from the northwest are rich in detail and far less thoroughly examined than their counterparts elsewhere in England, making them a useful source base. For records of the diocese of Chester's two courts, see Cheshire Record Office, Deposition Books of the Consistory Court of Chester, 1554-1574 (hereafter, CRO EDC 2/6, 2/7, 2/8, or 2/9); Cause Papers of the Consistory Court of Chester, 1560-1653 (hereafter, CRO EDC 5); and West Yorkshire Archive Service (WYAS) Leeds RD/AC/1-7, the Cause Papers of the Consistory Court of Richmond. Appeals material for both courts is housed at the Borthwick Institute: Ecclesiastical Cause Papers at York: Files Transmitted on Appeal, 1500-1883 (hereafter, Borthwick Institute Trans CP). These archival sources are supplemented by Frederick J. Furnivall, ed., *Child-Marriages, Divorces, and Ratifications, &c., in the Diocese of Chester, A. D.* 1561-6 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1897). Most of the records involve private suits between individuals, known as instance suits.

9. Real-life "mutual consent" marriages usually came to the attention of the church courts either because one party changed his or her mind, after an expression of what seems to have been a legitimate intent to marry, or the couple was presented by local churchwardens or people as being irregularly married.

10. Various impediments could render parties ineligible to contract marriage including age (the age of consent for girls was 12 and 14 for boys), prior contract, force, consanguinity, affinity, and impotence. For a contemporary discussion of requirements, see Henry Swinburne, *Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts*, Garland facsimile edition, vol. 3 of the *Marriage, Sex, and the Family in England 1660-1800* series, ed. Randolph Trumbach (London: S. Roycroft, 1686; repr., New York: Garland Publishing, 1985), 18-44. The marriages described here were binding in the eyes of the church, but irregular in construction; contracts were expected to be "perfected" through a church solemnization.

11. For treatments of spousals and "common fame" in the Consistory Court of Chester's jurisdiction, see Jennifer McNabb, "Ceremony Versus Consent: Courtship, Illegitimacy, and Reputation in Northwest England, 1560-1610," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 37, no. 1 (2006): 59-81, and "'Talk of Marriage' in Northwest England: Continuity and Change in Matrimonial Litigation, 1560-1640," *Quidditas, the Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association* 31 (2010): 213-32. Similar ideas concerning the intersection of female honesty and sexuality in matrimonial activities are voiced in contemporary litigation: witness Alice Mainwaring testified in 1564 that she and her neighbors thought

Ellen Ricroft "so honest" that Thomas Snelson could not have persuaded her to engage in sexual intercourse unless "she toke her[self] as his wife" at the conclusion of their contract; Borthwick Institute TransCP 1564/1.

12. For a recent study examining the "normalization" of matrimonial practices during the early modern period, see R. B. Outhwaite, *The Rise and Fall of the English Ecclesiastical Courts, 1500-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Even in northwest England, where marriage-by-process seems to have maintained a degree of popular support until the eve of the civil wars, episcopal visitations and presentments of parish churchwardens began targeting a host of pre-Reformation traditions, among which was extra-ecclesiastical marriage, by the 1580s. See WYAS Leeds RD/CB/8/1-6, Early Churchwardens Presentments 1577-1700.

13. See Richard Adair, *Courtship, Illegitimacy and Marriage in Early Modern England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

14. Ten shillings is the amount both Diana O'Hara and Loreen Giese identified as the most popular courtship and matrimonial gift in later sixteenth-century Canterbury and London, respectively: O'Hara, *Courtship and Constraint: Rethinking the Making of Marriage in Tudor England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 69; and Giese, *Courtships, Marriage Customs, and Shakespeare's Comedies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 141. It was also the commonly referenced amount in accounts of gift giving from Chester as well.

15. The fact that Shakespeare's first-born child's birth occurred about five months after the reading of the banns established his marriage with Ann Hathaway perhaps shaped the play's critique of marriage by process versus ceremony.

16. "Talk of marriage" could take many forms, ranging from the exchange of present-tense vows to future-tense or conditional vows to less concrete promises or discussions of marriage.

17. CRO EDC 5 1600, no. 12.

18. For a discussion of the use of marriage licenses, see R. B. Outhwaite, *Clandestine Marriage in England, 1500-1850* (London: Hambledon Press, 1995). According to proper procedures, the banns were to be read aloud in church on three Sundays to ensure publicity of the upcoming marriage.

19. CRO EDC 5 1582, no. 34. The "bride possette" refers to a ceremonial beverage accompanying matrimonial festivities.

20. Shakespeare's language, too, frequently equated contract and marriage, both in *Measure for Measure* and in other plays; see B. J. Sokol and Mary Sokol, *Shakespeare, Law, and Marriage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-23.

21. William Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties* (London: John Beale, 1626), 116. He also notes, though, that "so firme is a contract, as the law calleth a betrothed maid, a wife: and a betrothed maid might not be put away without a bill of diuorce" (108), a sign of the difficulty of assessing the boundary between single and married status, for both those who came before the courts and those authorities, like Gouge, who commented on the laws of marriage and their application.

22. This type of suit, an office case initiated by the agents of the court, was known as office litigation (since it proceeded *ex officio*, from the office of the bishop).

23. CRO EDC 5 1572, no. 20.

24. WYAS Leeds RD/A 1, Archdeaconry of Richmond Act Book 1577-1579, p. 85, and CRO EDC 5 1582, no. 65.

25. CRO MF 8/1 (acct. 1308), Diocese of Chester: Visitation: R.VI.A.11 (V. 1590-I CB.3), fol. 109v.

26. R. H. Helmholz, T*he Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol. 1, The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 531-64.

27. Borthwick Institute TransCP 1564/1.

28. A suit from 1598 reveals a similar trajectory. After Joann Whitworth gave birth to an illegitimate child, Ellen Brooke employed her "to spinne" for the space of one year, during which time Whitworth's suitor, Thomas Bostock, came often to visit her and his child. Mistress Brooke granted this access, but only after she "dyd breeke oute and dyd demaund of [Bostock] what was the reason that hee dyd styll resorte into the companie of [Whitworth]." Despite his answer, "I am mynded to marrie her & make her my wiefe," Bostock failed to fulfill his promises, prompting Whitworth to file suit against him on the grounds of breach of contract, a full ten years after the contract had allegedly been created. CRO EDC 5 1598, no. 20.

29. CRO EDC 5 1625, no. 43. Richard Lowe reported to the court in 1561 that he had promised to marry Jane Walkden, but when asked "whie he maried her not, he sais her frendes promysed hym a pece of good, and wold not performe hit," and thus failed to fulfill the marriage settlement; Furnivall, *Child-Marriages, Divorces, and Ratifications*, 56.

30. Some scholars see Angelo's contract as conditional on the receipt of the promised dowry, so when it was lost, he was free to separate from her without legal recrimination. That Angelo casts aspersions on Mariana's reputation and prioritizes her "disvalu'd" reputation in his own explanation of his actions (5.1.220), however, suggests that their initial contract may have been of a more binding nature (that certainly seems to be the disguised Duke's interpretation) and thus required another justification that allowed Angelo to have "swallowed his vows whole." According to Swinburne, impropriety of the sort allegedly committed by Mariana would have given Angelo grounds to withdraw from an unsolemnized and unconsummated union (*Treatise on Spousals*, 237). See B. J. Sokol and Mary Sokol, *Shakespeare's Legal Language: A Dictionary*, Athlone Shakespeare Dictionary Series (London: Athlone Press, 2000), s.v. "pre-contract," for a discussion of this point. Alternately, Angelo may have coupled his withdrawal from the contract with allegations of impropriety for fear that his own reputation would suffer from making the loss of the dowry the sole reason for renunciation of the relationship.

31. CRO EDC 5 1625, no. 44.

32. The feast day of Philip and Jacob was 1 May, the holy day traditionally associated with courtship and betrothal, a circumstance that cautions against a casual dismissal of the relationship between Kate and Lucio as purely driven by commercial sex: Hayne, "Performing Social Practice," 7; Lever's editorial note in *Measure for Measure*, 91.

33. For an overview of the poor laws, see Paul Slack, *Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England* (New York: Longman, 1988).

34. The law itself allowed for a consideration of gestures to determine matrimonial intent, recognizing that not all individuals were able to assent verbally to marriage. While Swinburne cautions against according too much power to gestures, he notes that the law did not prohibit the dumb from marriage, affirming that other means of contracting was possible (Swinburne, *Treatise on Spousals*, 203-12).

35. CRO EDC5 1583, no. 12. The practice of handfasting is hinted at in Claudio's early reference to Juliet being "fast my wife," so its appearance here again at the conclusion of the play is another way in which the play's end is an alternate figuration of its beginning.

36. CRO EDC 5 1570, no. 24.

37. CRO EDC 5 1635, no. 23.

38. In her study of the London Consistory and the comedies *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *Twelfth Night*, Loreen Giese concludes that Shakespeare consistently underscored the significance of matrimonial consent in establishing marriage; Giese, *Courtships, Marriage Customs, and Shakespeare's Comedies*. Consent, as exhibited by a recognized formula of words of matrimony spoken in the present tense or in the future tense then followed by consummation, was the single most important legal proof of marriage. For an overview on the law of marriage during the time of Shakespeare, see Helmholz, *Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction*, 531-64.

39. For an introduction to speech act theory, see J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); H. Paul Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Angela Esterhammer and Douglas Robinson, "Speech Acts," in *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005).

40. CRO EDC 5 1612, no. 5.

41. For a discussion of slander and the law, see M. Lindsay Kaplan, *The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Cyndia Susan Clegg, "Truth, Lies, and the Law of Slander in *Much Ado About Nothing*," in *The Law in Shakespeare*, ed. Constance Jordan and Karen Cunningham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 167-88; and Ina Habermann, *Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003).

42. CRO EDC 5 1617, no. 37.

ACTING SHAKESPEARE: A Roundtable Discussion with Artists from the Utah Shakespeare Festival's 2013 Production of *The Tempest*

Michael Flachmann
Utah Shakespearean Festival Company Dramaturg

Featuring: Henry Woronicz (Prospero), Melinda Parrett (Ariel), Corey Jones (Caliban), Melisa Pereyra (Miranda), Fred Stone (Alonso)

Flachmann:Welcome to the Actor Roundtable, the final event of this year's Wooden O Symposium, a three-day conference for students and scholars of Shakespeare's plays. My name is Michael Flachmann, and I'm the Utah Shakespeare Festival Company Dramaturg. I'll be moderator for our Actor Roundtable discussion on *The Tempest*. First, I'd like to introduce the actors: Henry Woronicz, who plays Prospero; Melinda Parrett, Ariel; Corey Jones, Caliban; Melisa Pereyra, Miranda; and Fred Stone, Alonso.

The Tempest is done so often. It's such a wonderful play. It fits a lot of different times and places. I wonder if we could begin with a question on what *The Tempest* says to today's audience right here in 2013 Cedar City. How relevant is it today? Henry, could we start with you?

Woronicz: That's the question of the theater artist approaching any play. Why are we doing this play? As much as administrators of a theater company like to pay attention to box office and season selection, you spend a great deal of time trying to figure out why you are doing any given play, other than the fact that it might be a good play or it balances out the season or is a cash cow. A Shakespeare play in particular, because it's kind of a Rorshach ink blot, can be many things to many people, and this iteration of *The*

Tempest—this is the second time I've done the role of Prospero—as you work on it, you find different things that rise to the surface in you.

This is a major theme in the play, of course, so it's not a revelation to anybody, but I think the play is an exploration of how we forgive people. How do we forgive these things that are done to us and that we do to others. The role of Prospero, of course, is the focal point in the course of the journey. To me that is why the play is worth doing and that is why the actor finds a thesis statement of some sort that you anchor your character around. All actors ask, "Where do we start, and where do we end up? What's our journey in the arc of the scene, of the speech, of the play, of the summer!" And you end up somewhere. I always look for something to be the grain of sand that the pearl is going to grow around. For me it became the line, "Rarer action is in virtue than in vengeance." If we are really going to walk the walk and talk the talk, we need to forgive people; we need to let things go. Human beings are very good at holding on to things.

I read a story some years ago about a Buddhist psychologist who was dealing with his mother. His father and her husband had died many years ago. He realized one day talking to her that she had still never forgiven him for something, and he turned to her and asked, "Who are you hurting with that? He's gone. What are you holding on to?" There's a lovely line that Prospero says to Alonso late in the play after Alonso wishes aloud that he could ask forgiveness. Prospero says, "There, sir, stop: let us not burthen our remembrances with a heaviness that's gone." If it's gone, let it go. That's the lesson of the play for me as I'm working on it now.

A director would have a larger perspective about why you do this play one time and have a point of view that says something to the audience about themselves because, let's face it, that's why we engage with art: because we want to learn something about ourselves. We want to learn something about the great, great challenge of human beings and this world, which is the fear of the other. What have they got that I don't have? Or who are they, or I don't like them. The sooner we get to us as opposed to the other, the world would be a better place.

Flachmann: Melinda?

Parrett: That is exactly what I think is the importance of this play. The kernel in the middle of it is forgiveness. As for audience reaction, the general comment seems to be—other than "the show is beautiful," "we love the magic"—the personal way that it affects people is, "Oh! that reminded me that I was holding on

to something." As for being in the middle of it, it's really lovely to be the element of the play that actually conveys that realization to Prospero. Ariel's not being human, that's what makes it so profound for Prospero, which he conveys so profoundly.

Flachmann: Corey?

Jones: Listening to Henry's response made me think about Caliban's own course through the play as far as his relationship to forgiveness goes. I have to come to my own terms in forgiving Prospero, because I feel that Caliban has so much done to him in the course of the play. But at the end, even Caliban has a moment of redemption towards Prospero. Henry's response reminded me that that's the moment Caliban ends with, that he gets to go off stage with and ruminate on. We don't ever see what happens after that, if there is another meeting between Prospero and Caliban. But I do think the theme of redemption is the prevalent theme that relates and still resonates with today's audience.

Flachmann: And Melisa.

Pereyra: One of the lines that I really hold on to—I'm not even in this scene—but it's when Antonio says, "What's past is prologue, what to come in yours and my discharge." For me in this play, Miranda has something bad happen to her. We don't know, maybe months prior when she has this encounter with Caliban. Now when we see her, she begins to discover all of these new things, these good feelings. So instead of being afraid of being around somebody she can't even look at, she's around Ferdinand, who's somebody handsome and kind. In this play, I have the luxury of saying, "What's past is prologue"; and as I discover all of these new people and things, I get to revel in that discovery. I think that's what makes it special for me and I hope translates to an audience.

Flachmann: How about you, Fred?

Stone: I find this play really interesting as well, as you probably do, being scholars. It was most likely Shakespeare's final play, so there are a lot of theories that this was based on his own life. Wasn't there a BBC episode about how *The Tempest* related so personally to Shakespeare's life, that in his last days he was letting go and retiring and moving to Stratford for his final days? I find it extremely interesting to see the culmination of his life in this play and all the things about forgiveness and letting go and what you do in the last days of your life. What is most important? From Alonso's point of view, it's his son; it's his family. I think he goes through that journey because he's lost his son and fears that he's lost him forever. That changes him tremendously.

Flachmann: Thanks, Fred. Let's stay on the topic that Fred introduced a second ago about Prospero as Shakespeare renouncing his theatrical magic at the end of the play. I think Mr. Woronicz has perhaps a different opinion on that.

Woronicz: Fred is alluding to a BBC series recently about discovering Shakespeare, and there was the episode on *The Tempest*. It was a posted and narrated by Trevor Nunn, who has been a wonderful director for the Royal Shakespeare Company for many years in England. I've been working in Shakespeare theatre for close to 37 years, and one of the side hazards is that you pick up a lot of information. The notion that Fred is talking about, *The Tempest* being Shakespeare's last play, reveals one of the things we like to do about Shakespeare: Though we actually know very little factual information about him, we romanticize him in terms of what he might have been doing.

Conjectures over the years have led to legends and stories, and—not to dismiss anything Fred said because there are certainly elements in the play that feel valedictory, like saying goodbye to things— it was probably Shakespeare's last solo-authored play. He did co-write *The Two Noble Kinsmen* afterwards and also *Henry VIII*, and he was writing up until probably 16 months before his death at 52; he was fairly young. We like to think that he retired to Stratford, but he really didn't. He owned a residence in London, and he rented out some other rooms in London. He also spent a lot of time there because he was a businessman; he was a shareholder in his company. He made a lot of money. Nobody made money as a playwright in England. But 400 years ago, the reasons and the way people wrote plays was very different from what we do today. And it's very tempting to read into his biography what we would like to see there.

But that doesn't mean that things weren't happening in his life that had influence on his plays. My favorite little biographical episode that I like to pull into *The Tempest* is when Prospero pulls Ferdinand away from Miranda and says, "Don't go to bed with her; you sleep with her, you're in trouble." Then Ariel comes in to do some magic, then those actors leave, and then Prospero says it again: "Look thou be true, the strongest—oh, the straw, the fire in the blood." What did 18-year-old Shakespeare do? He got his 26-year-old girlfriend pregnant. By the time he was 21, he had three kids and a wife, and he was the oldest boy of a failing glove maker, who was the ex-mayor of Stratford-upon-Avon. In the last years of his life, in the last plays of his life, Shakespeare was certainly interested in lost children—especially with finding lost children,

forgiveness. *The Winter's Tale*, *Pericles*, *Cymbeline*, *The Tempest*—all of the Romance Plays have this. They're hard to define, but they have this sense of trying to put the world back together, to put a family back together. This is a man who lived most of his life in London with a family back in Stratford. He went back and forth.

Flachmann: That's a lovely comment. I'd like to morph into something different. Perhaps start with Melinda and Corey and then spread out to other people. Can you talk about physical and vocal choices in making these wonderful roles? How did you choose what you're doing with your voice and what you're doing with your bodies? A question that often comes up is how much of that choice is Corey, how much of that choice is BJ Jones, the director. Is that something you could wrestle with?

Parrett: BJ had a very specific idea of what he wanted with Ariel. When I was first cast, I didn't really know how to approach it because in my mind and other productions that I've seen or read about, Ariel has had a certain androgenous quality—a man, and I just don't see myself as that quality. It wasn't until we got into rehearsal that we talked about it. BJ wanted the relationship between Ariel and Prospero to be of a different quality, so I wasn't a sprite-like, puckish spirit. I was more of an intelligent, evolved spirit—an elegant spirit, sensuous, not sexual, but just a different quality. Then when I saw the way they were going visually with a unitard, I knew that it wasn't just going to be Melinda walking around up there or tap dancing through the show. So it evolved. I really had no idea what I was going to do except keeping in mind that Ariel is a spirit and of the air, an element, and very different from an earth-like quality.

That was what we were trying to accomplish. It really didn't start getting into my body until I had that costume on. Then I knew what I was identifying with and what people would be seeing and Ariel morphed into that. Normally, I'm not the type of actor that would wait until I had a costume for my character to evolve; but with Ariel, it really did help to get that idea into my body and to know what it feels like. It's not comfortable to feel so vulnerable out there, but I have to say it's been a gift to just feel not human. That's how it evolved: the dynamic between us is that Prospero is obviously of the human world and I am not, and to make that as different as I could without flying around or whatever. It is still something that is evolving as the show goes on, something I'm still discovering.

Flachmann: Wonderful, Melinda. And you, Corey?

Jones: I didn't know much about *The Tempest* coming in. This was my first experience with the play, and the immediate thing that jumps out is that Caliban is different. There are so many references to his physical difference. Rick (playing Stephano) has a whole moment about how he smells, and I began to think about that probably before I thought about his dramatic function in the play. How am I going to manifest this other-worldliness? He is the only native in the play, but he's the alien in this world of characters. What came first was the accent. Something jumped off the page even before I talked to BJ, that it felt Caribbean, like somewhere in that mid-Atlantic world. You know, my mom's from Africa, and I learned my language from Miranda and Prospero. That combination just read something Caribbean to me, so I called BJ about a week before we met and said, "Hey, what do you think about a Caribbean accent?" He was open to it, but he was concerned about any Colonial themes coming out, which he wanted to stay away from. So what we worked toward in the development of the language was not being so specifically Caribbean, as in Jamaica or Barbados, but we chose instead an amalgamation of Caribbean and African. In that way, it felt less Colonial.

Then in rehearsing the play, there was something about Caliban being a terrestrial being of the island, that probably his early learning came from animals once his mom had passed and maybe before Miranda and Prospero landed on the island. He would imitate things on the island. I started with his vocabulary and stance, where I started very low with both. It took about one scene for me to realize that my knees were so sore I couldn't possibly do that for an entire show, let alone an entire run. So we began to make it sort of upright. We found this monkey-apish vocabulary that seemed to fit and allowed me to have an upright-man posture, but with something obviously a little different to separate me from the rest of the cast and characters. Those were my two departure points, vocally and physically, that allowed me to find his difference; and as Melinda said, you're never done. I'm still trying to be more specific with the accent. It's very grounded in me, but on some nights I feel like I'm grasping for straws trying to find it. I'm still trying to find the specificity and consistency in the voice and the movement, and I'm sure it will keep evolving throughout the course of the play.

Flachmann: Great Corey, thanks. Let's expand this a little more and get Melisa (Miranda) and Henry involved about whether your costume makes the character or not. Melisa?

Pereyra: When I got to wear the costume the first time, it was

more hindering than not because it's just a wrap, so it's constantly falling. I keep thinking it's going to drop to the ground. How do I walk? It gets stuck, so I make these tiny little steps and I can trip over myself. I was working all of these technicalities with this very simple-looking costume, which I was very surprised by, but we have wonderful dressers that help us with that, and we finally got it down. But it's great to feel so light, now that I'm finally used to it. It's great to feel so light where never, no matter what the temperature is outside, cold or hot, it's always right. It always feels right to me because we are in this island, this Caribbean atmosphere; and having this costume is a great differentiation for me to see what I'm wearing and what Prospero's wearing. Then I see Ferdinand and he has all this stuff and I wonder, what is all this stuff? Why are you wearing this? So it starts there and then his face—all those intricacies that I begin to notice about another person that I've never seen before. In that sense, visually, it's a great place to help me discover as I observe all these other people. Even at the end of the play, I see all these people wearing this awesome stuff of different colors and things that are fascinating. It's helpful to me to be the one that's wearing something so simple and not embellished so that I can really pay attention to those who are wearing luxurious clothes.

Flachmann: Fred?

Stone: The costume is always that final ingredient that helps you feel the character physically. I thought my costume was fairly simple, which I liked because it was easy to move in and easy to maneuver, except for that big cape in the storm scene, which gave me a lot of trouble. But other than that, I think it helps keep me upright. If I'm playing a king, I want to have as much stateliness as possible. I thought BJ's choice of "the Donner Party"— if you know what the Donner Party is, that was his nickname for us—for the four guys dressed all in blacks and grays, I thought, was quite good because it certainly contrasted with the rest of the color on the island. We came from an urban environment as opposed to out in nature's colorful surroundings. It made us feel a little darker in temperament. I always look in the mirror before I go on and try to focus on what I look like and how that feeds into my emotional life. This costume helped me with that. I don't know if BJ was planning a mustache and beard for me, but I thought that would add a little regality too, being a king; they liked that and we did it. Antonio had one too, but not Sebastian and Gonzalo. That style of mustache and goatee certainly helped me see myself as a regal character.

Flachmann: I want to get Henry involved in this. You have beautiful costumes and a staff and all sorts of trappings, a lot of which you get rid of in the play. How does that affect your performance, or does it?

Woronicz: A lot of that is discovered in rehearsal. I spend most of the night in my pajamas, so it's very comfortable until they put that robe on me—the robe gets kind of heavy, you know. But, as my fellow actors are alluding to, it's a process. A good costume designer will spend time in rehearsal and in the fitting process making sure things work for the actor. If they are smart, they will do that because the last thing an actor wants to do is get in rehearsal and find it doesn't work—I can't bend over, or I have a collar and when I turn I do this! That's why we have a show-and-tell when we first start rehearsals, so we can each see what we're going to look like. You have that mental picture of how you're going to work in that direction. Every actor will use a different metaphor, but I always liken it to doing a sketch. You start with a very broad light crayon, and you're going to erase. As you get further into rehearsal, the lines get a little more solidified, and you start to color things in. Then the costume gets added in at some point and becomes part of the process as well. Some costumes, like Melinda's for Ariel, have to become the character and absolutely have to suit what she is doing or she's not going to be comfortable. Caliban's is the same way, and to lesser degrees the rest of us. I looked at my costume and said, "Great, I'm going to be in little linen pajamas for most of the time in the hot Utah summer. Perfect!"

Jones: I want to add a comment about what Henry was saying about a costume designer listening to the actors and making adjustments. When I first got my Caliban costume in the dress rehearsal, it had a facial piece that actually came over my face. It spread across my nose, came down my smile lines, and connected to the bottom so it was literally one whole piece. When we got into our first dress rehearsal, I spent the whole show adjusting it because the pieces that crossed my smile lines were so tight, they prevented me from talking. The next day the costume designer called and said we are going to get rid of all that so you can use your face—which is important in theatre. That's a costume designer realizing that what he thought initially would work didn't, and he was amenable to getting rid of it. The makeup designer came up with a palate that took over that space that I think works, yet allows me the freedom to express myself as I need to. That's a perfect example of what Henry was talking about.

Flachmann: That's great Corey. Let's stick with you for a minute, if you don't mind, Corey. Talk a little bit more about Caliban. We've been talking this week about Caliban being an anagram of cannibal and whether there's anything monstrous within your character. In fact, I think that's a good question for everybody—if there's any monstrosity in your character, does it come out at all? Does it get released? So Corey, could I start with you on that, talking a little bit more about Caliban and the type of creature, if that word is permitted, he is.

Jones: This is my first experience with Caliban. I'd never seen *The Tempest*, never done it, and all I heard about Caliban was that he's a monster. It really frightened me a little bit. Do I want to play a monster for the summer? I got the play and read it and realized that that was people's perception of him, but who he really was, was not monstrous, at least from my perspective. His cause became apparent to me, his argument, and once I identified that, he became likeable, loveable, and human to me because I found something notable and legitimate for me to anchor myself in: "I want my home back. I was here first. I have become a prisoner, and if I get my home back, I'll get my freedom." That's something everybody can find noble—that's what we all want—freedom and a place to call our own. Identifying that allowed me to find a sort of humanity in Caliban. Then I included those ancillary things—the way he smells, the way he walks, the way he talks, his inclination to be in the moment and present in nature. He's very much of nature, thus he's very much in tune with his instincts, part of which is to procreate. In that moment where Prospero says, "You tried to rape my daughter," Caliban doesn't see it that way. He sees Miranda as someone who is close to me that I could procreate with, which is what naturally, I'm instinctively programmed to do. I see everything else on this island procreating; why shouldn't I?

I tried to look at Caliban from a non-monstrous point of view and try to understand why he makes the choices he needs to make, then let the audience and those around me color him as a monster. But I tried to make him as noble as possible. Shakespeare gives him some really beautiful language in the play. Here is a guy who pre-Miranda/Prospero was probably using guttural utterances and probably some African words. He was making sounds that he heard from the island. But the intruders taught him this language which he has a great facility with for someone who learned it later in life. He's really embraced it and found the color of it, even to the point that he knows how to use it to curse; as he says to Miranda, "You taught me how to curse." It's funny, I find a lot of

beauty in the guy who was referenced as the monster, so I took that approach and let the reaction from the audience be what it may be.

Flachmann: So you're not an evil character, you're just misunderstood?

Jones: Exactly, exactly.

Flachmann: Melinda?

Parrett: It's a really hard question. I don't think there is anything innately monstrous in Ariel. I think being an element of the air, it's really hard to qualify and quantify emotion. It's not the same. Any emotion that she—"it"—acquires is from watching people or getting an idea of what that emotion might be. When she says, "Do you love me master?" after seeing the lovers kiss, it's not about a sexual love or even a romantic love. It's an idea of affection, acceptance. Do you value me? As for the monstrous quality, I don't think so. If anything, it's a level of grace and openness and, yes, there are things that she wants. She wants freedom. She's done all of these things: She's helped Prospero survive on this island and carried out all of these tasks so that his project can be carried out. To a certain point there are things that she will not do. He has the line about Sycorax, ". . . for you are too delicate a spirit to carry out her earthly and abhorrent commands"—there's a line she will not cross. When he says, "My charms have come to head, what's the time," I say, "On the sixth hour, at which time, my lord, you said our work should cease." I did what I said I was going to do—come on, look at what you've done. These people are grieving. I just think that there is nothing monstrous about Ariel—well, the harpie—[to Woronicz] first of all, you told me to do it. I think, if anything, it's essential to have Alonzo, Antonio and Sebastian get to the level of remorse that they need to feel, but she doesn't hurt them physically. Yes, she might make their swords heavy, and it's a scare tactic that could be considered monstrous, but I think she knows what she needs to do in order to be free. There's teasing them with things, dropping things on them and poking them—sending lightning bolts. I don't think it's monstrous, it's mischievous, okay? I've got to do this, I've got to do this, I've got to do this. But there's a certain point, I draw the lines so.

Flachmann: Lovely, thank you. I wanted to at least have the panel touch on the question of nature versus nurture in the play, particularly in reference to Melisa teaching Caliban language. Does it not take, does it not stick? Is there a point at which we cannot change someone's innate personality? I want to get Henry involved

in this, too, because you can really look at a lot of what you do as magician in the play as correcting or changing other people's behavior. Setting up trials for them, setting up spectacles with the goddesses. So could we start with Melisa on that?

Pereyra: That makes me think of *Hamlet*, actually in that quote, "There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so." Prospero has taught Miranda everything she knows because this is the only world that she has ever known and he's the only person. Everything she thinks is good or bad is not necessarily from what she's discovered, but from what she's been taught. I wondered if Prospero hadn't told her, "You can't have any sexual relationship with anybody until after you are married." She thought what Caliban had been doing was wrong because that's what she's been taught and because Prospero has reacted by kicking him out and making him a slave. She figures, "Okay, that was bad. He told me it was bad." But when I meet somebody that's good, like Ferdinand, then I might call him a goodly person. Prospero tells her the first time she meets Ferdinand, "Oh, okay, I should like him, yes, I do like him." And then Prospero tugs with her what should be good and what shouldn't be. When it comes to Caliban, I don't think that she has any ideas to whether he can't be taught clearly because she feels like she can teach him and she does. So I think we are a big product of our environment regardless of whether we think so or not.

Flachmann: I want to give Corey equal time on this. Are you teachable as a character?

Jones: Is Caliban teachable from Prospero and Miranda? Tough language, exactly. There's that element. I was trying to think in the course of the play what happens in the course of the play. What do I learn?

Flachmann: Especially at the end, Corey, if I could lead you onward a little bit. Is there any kind of reconciliation there between you and Prospero? Is that a learned script or have you just been subjugated?

Jones: I will say that in thinking of how he is trying to resolve this issue—how do I get my home back, how do I get my freedom?—Caliban's only remedy to the problem is to destroy because I don't think he knows that there is another option: that they could leave. Everybody he has come upon on this island has appeared to him; but he didn't see the shipwreck, so he has this sense of getting rid of things to destroy them. You have to kill it, and that's the only way it will go. By the end he senses that I

might have gone about this the wrong way by seeking your death as a way to right my wrong. In that, it also makes the problem really pertinent for him that it's so bad that he's looking for death. But I do think that he learns a little bit as he says "Grace" and that he seeks for . . . I don't know if he's quite come to a place of full redemption by the end of the play because I think he's still trying to put it all together. I mean, it's a lifetime of subjugation versus a quick two minutes of this thing that he's hearing out of Prospero's mouth for the first time: pardon and these wonderful words and this look of concern and care that he probably hasn't seen since the early days—certainly not since the rape attempt. So it's a tenderness that he responds to and that's another thing that just came to mind. Probably for the first time in a long time, there is a tenderness, a sense of love that he hasn't had since they took him in his care that he probably misses—somebody to show kindness and love. So I do think there is sort of that journey that he comes to and is taught at the end.

Woronicz: If I can just add to that, observing Caliban and looking at the play, Caliban is imminently teachable. He's a quick learner. He learns all kinds of things. He learns this language. As Corey says, he speaks some of the most beautiful language in the play and has a relationship with the spirits that is kind of fascinating. But I think the big teaching moment for him is that he backs the wrong horse. He gets these two drunks and thinks he's got this plot going, and he learns, "What a double ass was I to take this drunkard for a god." That's the greatest learning experience, I think, when you realize you've really backed the wrong horse. From Prospero's perspective of the many themes in this play, certainly nature versus nurture is a big one. We know there are paraphrases of some of Montaigne's essays in this play, one of them about the Caliban and the cannibal and whether or not you can teach the noble savage. Shakespeare seems to come down on the side that we are who we are. After his revelation from the spirit Ariel, from the non-human element, that he must be human, his decides to give up his magic and drown his book.

The thing about the book, about learning, whatever that symbolizes, when Trinculo and Stephano show up, Stephano turns his bottle into a book. Kiss the book, it's about where the wisdom is, where the knowledge is, and Shakespeare—and this might be reading into the biography again—seems to be saying of the young grammar school boy from Stratford who didn't have a university education, that maybe books aren't that important in the long run. They can twist us around in some ways. Prospero

says at one point, "This monster on whose nurture nature will never stick, all my pains humanely taken, all lost, quite lost." His body is misshapen, so his mind is going to be misshapen. But that's before he has the revelation about what he's done wrong. I think, personally, for Prospero, the hardest person to forgive in the whole play is Caliban for what he tried to do to his most precious thing in his life—his daughter. And I think it's fairly recent, recent enough that it's very hot and fresh in him. But it's the one that's least settled in terms of the forgiveness because there is only one little exchange where Prospero says, "Go to my cell, take with you your companions. As you look to have my pardon, trim it handsomely." Caliban says, "Yes, I will. I'll seek for grace." Then I say, go on, get out. BJ, the director, gave us this last little moment where we look at each other and we give each other a nod of okay, it's going to be your island, we're leaving. He bides his time, it's going to be skamals for days and costering filberts.

Flachmann: Thank you. BJ Jones, when we first started talking about the play back last September and October and sharing emails about the play and the designers are getting involved, he was really interested in having a young, active Prospero. You see a lot of productions of *The Tempest* where Prospero is old and doddering and walking around on a cane. I just want to ask this question generally of Henry and the other actors. I think we have done a great job in finding the right Prospero for the role. Does that affect the production in any interesting ways?

Woronicz: It has to. Whoever you cast in that lead role is going to have an energy that goes through the play. If he's a doddering old man, everybody has to take care of the old guy and help him remember his lines, which is hard enough as it is. Again, as with all Shakespeare's plays, there's a certain amount of baggage that can accumulate, one of which is Prospero as the wise old magician. But as most of us are trained to do, we look at the text. What does the text tell us? At one point—there is some debate about this line—Prospero says to Ferdinand, "I'm giving you here a third of my life." Does that mean she's fifteen, he's forty-five? Obviously, he's not an old man when they come to the island. They've been there for twelve years. He was still active and had withdrawn from his political duties, which opened the door for his brother. So I think, of course, that influences what happens with the rest of the production.

Flachmann: Corey, is he a formidable opponent as a younger man?

Jones: I think so. It's certainly fuels my cause in having a Prospero that I fear. I only get one scene with Henry until the end, but that scene has to last me through the entire play. That's why I stick with the fools, even though at some point, of course, I realize these aren't the gods I thought they were. But my cause is still strong enough that I stick with them. Look, you might not be the gods I thought you were, but you can still do some service if you can just get him out of the way because I need help. I can't do it alone. Caliban, from my sense of it, is a strong man. I mean he carries wood around. He's logging wood around the island all the time for these guys. He's physically strong, but he recognizes not only Prospero's mystical powers, but also something in his command of himself and language that Caliban realizes he can match. It helps that he's a worthy adversary by being a strong, virile Prospero.

Flachmann: Melisa does this affect your relationship with Henry at all?

Pereyra: Yes, absolutely. Because of the way Henry plays Prospero, I was able to find a very strong, assertive, and feisty Miranda. I don't think I could have found that had I not had somebody to fight with and to fight for also. The speech that Prospero and Caliban and Miranda have, that scene they have together at the beginning of the play when she goes off on Caliban and calls him abhorrent slave and even goes on to insult him and tell him why he has been put away in this rock—that's not necessarily for me, but it's because I see the way this event has affected Prospero, and that makes me—not want to protect him because he doesn't need my protection—but to rally the troops and say, "Yea, dad, you're right! Let's do this. What else are you going to do to him because he deserves it?" The strength that Prospero has—like father, like daughter—Miranda carries a lot of that with her, as well as his anger and his compassion and his ability to love. She has all that inside, as we all carry things from our parents. This scene mirrors that, and it's so beautifully written besides.

Flachmann: Fred, let's get you involved in this.

Stone: I think it works really well especially because of Prospero's journey of starting at such a passionate, vengeful place. The anger has to be dissipated, and the physicality that comes from that is very helpful for establishing the journey to forgiveness. If he isn't that passionate and physically alive in his hatred at what he wants to accomplish, you don't see as much of a change in

the end. I think that's really important—that he's extremely vital, physically alive, passionate, and very angry.

Flachmann: Talk about that change in Alonso would you please, Fred?

Stone: The change in Alonso? When he hits this island, he's focused so much on his own pain of losing his son, it turns him around to such an extent from whatever he was doing back in Naples that he is now going through an ordeal. As Gonzalo says at the end of the play, "We've all found out who we are through this journey." Alonso certainly finds out who he is, especially when he's reunited with his son and realizes that this is the most important thing in his life. He doesn't really realize that until he loses his son. It takes that loss for him to grow up and to realize what's most important in life rather than running Naples.

Flachmann: That's lovely.

Woronicz: I just want to add something about a final note about the casting of Prospero. It's not about the actor's age; it's about how the actor and the director want to portray who Prospero is. I did Prospero about five years ago, and this guy's much more angry, much more vital and energized. I fell somewhat into the mistake that you make with a Prospero as the wise old man who's nice to everybody. He gets a little angry at some point, but he's kind of a wise old man. The danger of playing Prospero as a wise know-it-all who really has all this wisdom is conveying a general wash of wisdom and loveliness. He's not really a human being.

Flachmann: I'm going to ask a final brief question and then we'll open it to questions from the audience. Henry has talked about one of the traps that he avoided. I don't know if you want to talk about another one, but I would like to know from each of you what special challenges there were in your role and how you solved them? Or you could focus on one special challenge.

Parrett: As I said before, when you're approached to play a character that you have never really thought is in your range, that's a challenge in itself, to figure out how to approach it to make it work for you so that it is believable. It's really hard to talk about a character that is non-human. It's hard to qualify the emotional and rational. I'm not looking at it from a human point of view, and that's really hard to describe. I'm obviously a human, so you could very well take the text and say, okay, I'm going to say these lines and choose to say it this way and I'm going to move this way and wear my costume. I didn't want to do that. I didn't want to be this surface Ariel or just a flighty little spirit running around with no relationship to Prospero or anybody else on the island. I wanted to

bring a humanity to something that isn't human, and that's really hard. I made it easier by watching the humans on the isle, which is not only a challenge, but also a joy. I am so involved in what everybody else is doing in the show. Seventy-five percent of the show, I'm just watching the others, which is how I rationalized how she has an idea of what emotion is and what human interaction is. So Ariel is learning, too. Nature versus nurture. She's learning, too, and that was a huge challenge for me.

Jones: One of the biggest challenges for me as an actor playing Caliban was spending most of my time pursuing my cause with the two fools because they obviously have no huge stake and eventually no interest in what I'm interested in. Not only that, but Jamie and Rick, as two actors on stage, are enjoying themselves so much in those roles that I'm literally, as actor and character, pulling them to stay on course! Come back to the course! We joked when we first opened that this scene is about fifteen minutes now, but come August, it's going to be twenty-five minutes by the time Jamie's through injecting all the bits that he's going to discover during the course of the play. It provides a worthy obstacle for my character to overcome that these guys don't share my interest while I'm trying to get them to understand that if you can do this with me, this is what you'll get. Between the alcohol—blame it on the alcohol—between that and their general buffoonery as characters, they keep getting off course. It provides a really strong challenge, both as character and actor, to stay on course and focus them to keep the objective sharp and in focus.

Pereyra: One of the traps in Shakespeare's plays, particularly for ingénues or for lovers in general, is just a general wash of love, a general wash of wonder, and I wanted Miranda to have so much more than that. We were talking about nature versus nurture and that she has grown up on this island. The only person that she has known is this monster. She eats with her hands, she sits on the floor. There is no courtly manner of being, and I wanted the way that she grew up, her past, to really influence the way that she walks on stage. When she says, "Yeah, gimme that log. No big deal," she can do this because she is part of this island and eventually she'll be part of something else. Time to discover something else, but for the time the audience gets to see her, all she's known is this place. I wanted that to make her strong and to make her an island girl. That's who she is; she's not just some sensitive girl in love. When she sees Ferdinand, she thinks, "Yeah, what is that, I want it. What do I do to get that?" It's very decisive and very strong, as opposed to "Oh he looks so good, let's get

married." No, it's LET'S GET MARRIED! She really means it. That's one of the challenges, too, because it is really easy to look at Jeb—who's a very handsome man and, yeah, he looks nice—and kind of get wrapped up in the very surface kind of acting and a general color; but we wanted to make sure that we stayed true to the story and that we discovered things, as you do, one moment at a time so that they really hit our hearts. We do this for three months. We have to fall in love as vulnerably and as openly and as honestly as we can, every time. In that love scene, that is what we go for. It's intimidating and scary and also one of the most rewarding experiences I've ever had on stage.

Flachmann: Thanks, Melisa. Fred, challenges?

Stone: The obviously most important one is the loss of a child or feeling that that child is dead. I don't have any children, so I had to dig deep to find what I could relate that to and what that pain would be like. The other guys that I'm with are not going through that. They're philosophizing about the island or they're having fun mocking Gonzalo, and I'm in a totally different state. So I have to fight against giving in to whatever is going on with them and keep my focus on trying to find my son, if he's alive. I think that kind of focus and determination was my challenge.

Flachmann: Thanks, Fred. Excellent. We are going to open this to questions and comments from the audience. Who has a question or comment?

Question: Corey, we have spoken a bit about the ages of Prospero and Miranda. How old is Caliban? Does Caliban have any sense of his parents?

Jones: Two great questions. I was actually thinking about this the other day. How old was I when my mom, Sycorax, died? How long was I on the island by myself before Miranda and Prospero came? And then how long did it take for them to teach me, then the incident with Miranda, and then how long have we been in this place where I've become subservient? I was thinking I was probably a young child when they came. Young enough to know some things, but not so old that I couldn't learn some things, too. And so I'm thinking this has probably been, I believe he says, twelve years?

Question: There are a couple of references that we've been on the island twelve years. But also it says about Sycorax, put her in the vine tree for a dozen years. She arrived here with child. Sometime in that twelve years, she died.

Jones: Exactly. So we get a window based on the math between twenty-four to thirty years and so yes, we are looking at a thirty-year-

old virgin. I'm full man. I'm a grown man. As for the second part, about my father, I've vacillated between different scenarios. Was he a sailor? When I was in graduate school, there was a playwright who wrote a play on Sycorax and her story. It was a really beautiful play because it talked about her and Angers and again how she had facility with the dark arts; but she wasn't a mean, evil witch. It's all about perspective; who's telling the story shapes how things are perceived. In this story, she was just a misunderstood woman who had certain powers with nature. So she was imprisoned by these sailors; one of the sailors in the play raped her, and that's my father. That play, which is just one playwright's idea, stayed with me and is an option. Another was something along the line of she encountered a man back in Angers and for some reason she was banished. I vacillate between those two, but lean more towards somebody that she ran across in Angers and for some reason she had to leave. But those are two great questions. That's the back story that we don't hear, but as an actor you think about.

Flachmann: Great. This gentleman is a theatre professor at USC so we're not surprised that was a great question. Other questions or comments?

Question: That's the back story but what's the front story—no one else on the island. No little Calibans?

Jones: I think the prospect of freedom, at least at this point where we end the play, is more important to him. It's what we see that he is fighting for more so than I'm looking for a mate. And I don't necessarily think that he wanted to destroy Miranda. He wanted to destroy Prospero with the hopes that Miranda would be left behind. And then he would take care of Stephano and Trinculo after Prospero was out of the way. I think that was his plan was to get him out of the way and then take care of those two idiots. Then I have the island with Miranda. I think that was his ultimate goal, but he doesn't realize and didn't foresee it. First of all, he didn't know where they came from. He doesn't know Milan, so he didn't think there would be other Milanese citizens coming on the island that he thinks again are akin to Prospero. These are gods, these are people with this power and they are all going to leave and leave him alone. I don't think it will dawn on him until he realizes he's alone. And I think there will be a moment of sadness where he will be lonely and then he'll rediscover that sense that he had pre-Prospero, Miranda. But I do think it will be a lonely moment for him that he'll miss his captors.

Woronicz: It's always interesting to me that we assume that Caliban will be left there. We don't know, I mean there might be

a moment as they start to leave that Prospero says why don't you come with us? Bring him to civilization. Who knows?

Jones: And I'll teach poetry at the Milanese University.

Woronicz: He'll open a small clamshell bakery. Young skamals. He's very marketable. That's my favorite thing about the play is everybody who encounters Caliban wants to sell him. All three, and the last thing that Antonio says is, "He's quite marketable."

Flachmann: This is Don Weingust who is our new Director of the Center for Shakespeare Studies here at Southern Utah University. Glad to have you with us, Don.

Weingust: My question ties into the possibility of your going to Milan. Congratulations on the production: a wonderful production. At the end, the culpability of a plot against Prospero; these knuckleheads are yours; this thing of darkness I acknowledge. What are you working with? Is the nature of the relationship ownership? Calling him yours?

Woronicz: It's a very profound moment. That's always a line that's jumped out at me, referring to Caliban as something that is his. I think on a fundamental level he realizes his culpability in creating this malevolent force because of the way he punished him. Justifiably, for a period of time in his mind; Caliban tried to rape his daughter, so he came down on him. He didn't kill him, but turned him into a slave and makes him do these menial tasks for him that Prospero himself admits that we can't do without. He makes our fire; he fetches our wood. He does all these things that Prospero is not used to doing that actually serve us. So I think that's for me become a moment where he catches himself. These two guys belong to you, but this *thing of darkness*? I always found it interesting that Shakespeare, a very deliberate writer, puts that at the end of a line—*this thing of darkness* is at the end of a verse line where you can have a little pause before *I acknowledge mine*. I think it might even be at the *I: this thing of darkness I* (pause) *acknowledge mine*. You find a rhythm that makes sense to you. But I think that's a moment where Prospero has to realize that he's culpable for what has happened to Caliban. There's a private moment that Melisa and I find afterward that's not something rehearsed. These things you find in performance that make moments work and we found them with each other—oh, that's what that's about, and that's partly why we do it—and after that moment, I turn away from Caliban. I turn to look at her and, these are tricky things to talk about—you don't want to jinx them onstage—but I look at her and I realize that she's standing there with Ferdinand and she's going to be okay. She's going to be all right, and it's an internal

moment for the actor that allows me to get to the next moment, which is about forgiving him. Those are the things that we look for in rehearsal and in performance that I call "lining up the gun sights." You want to get everything lined up so you can find your way through the show and that things make sense in spite of all the contradictions that human beings are capable of embodying. That's that moment for me, but I'm not sure how that plays for you about the *thing of darkness*. I mean we've never talked about it, it just kind of happened.

Jones: No, we haven't, and certainly I think for Caliban, all he's known, at least recently—again, since the rape—is this place of subjugation and suffering at the hand of Prospero, and so him thinking about what happened to me after this tempted moment with Miranda, what he did to me, what will he do now that he knows I tried to kill him? It's going to be ten times worse. That's where my head is, and the fact that there is this compassion and forgiveness coming from him at the end of that moment where it seems like he's going to come down on me, it's such a huge surprise and shock and I do I think Caliban's not quite sure how to take it because it's a tenderness he hasn't seen for years, since the thing happened. So it's something strange. He takes it, accepts it, and he's grateful that he's not being pinched to death, then goes off with the fools. I think my resolution of that moment ends up happening off stage as he's trying to put the pieces together. What was that about? What's going on? Did these people have something to do with it? But Shakespeare doesn't give me any lines, so it is non-verbally that I come to some type of resolution off stage.

Pereyra: After Caliban is offered that kindness and forgiveness by Prospero, he speaks such beautiful things. You just have those two or three lines that you say . . .

Jones: He says, "As you seek my pardon trim it handsomely," and I say, "Aye, that I will, and I will seek for grace hereafter."

Pereyra: Yes, "and I will seek for grace." It's the first time that the language Miranda has taught him is being used to say something nice, and at the end of the day it's going to be okay. That is so powerful to me to watch Prospero not only call him his own, but also if Caliban's his own, then we're like brothers—very dysfunctional family here, right? Then when he says, "I will seek for grace," that is all he ever had to do. If he had done that from the beginning, then maybe things would have been different. That is one of those great, small, really fast, fast moments that Shakespeare puts in there, where it's going to be all right. It's very

powerful for Miranda to watch, even though I'm not directly a part of it.

Flachmann: Thank you. Other questions or comments?

Question: This is for Henry. Why does Prospero have such an affinity for the magic arts? And what's his relationship to his magic at the point . . .?

Woronicz: There was a great history in the time of understanding the time of the Magus. The Magus was a kind of white magician: philosophers, people who were trying to turn lead into gold, the alchemist and things like that. It was an interest in those magical arts that were not necessarily dark arts. They were positive arts. We get the impression that Prospero got interested in his books; he says early on, "These became my study." He talks about these certain arts that I got interested in, other-worldly things and things that are ephemeral. His fascination with Ariel is the fact that she's air, but also this manifested energy. There's something about her, and that's the connection we find when she says she can feel. I just want to see if I can feel her, but he doesn't want to break the spell. It becomes the secret, the journey. He's interested in these larger ideas, and I think that's part of the dramaticality in the play. He's gotten so far outside himself, he's forgotten what the self is. And I think that connects to the second part of your question that he's done all these things, and he goes into some big things that he's done. He's rifted Joe's oak; he's raised thunderbolts; and he's even raised the dead. This gets into Biblical metaphors and allusions, but he says, "Whatever the rough magic is, there's something rough." It's a great phrase, rough magic. He's going to give it up, and there's a release in that about letting it go and getting back to just living in the world. He's going to retire to Milan, "my Milan." I'm going to my Milan and I'm going to think about getting ready for being dead. The moment of giving it up is letting go. It's symbolic of letting go of the revenge and all the things he's been holding on to for twelve years.

Question: Fred, talk about your daughter you lost in marriage. You're never going to see her again.

Stone: That's right, I've lost my daughter. That's true, I lost my daughter as well. I don't know what else to say about that.

Question: How do you see the character dealing with loss? Alonso dealing with loss of his son? Prospero looking at the loss of Miranda to Ferdinand, the loss of Caliban, the loss of Ariel. Ariel's looking at the loss of Prospero, Caliban's lost his mother, lost Miranda, lost Prospero. How do you think—

Woronicz: We're all on a lost island. That's a tricky question or that's a hard question to answer because that's the journey of the play. We are all dealing with things that we let go of. And how do I think I'm dealing with it? I'm dealing with it the best I can in terms of working my way through what the play tells me I'm giving up. Now all those different qualities of loss are different colors of loss because her loss is actually gaining a sense of wonder, getting back to what she wants to be. "To the elements be free." And she goes. And the last thing he says to her is, "Fare thou well." And that's where she wants to be. My loss—and then I'll shut up—is a loss that's been coming for some time. The loss of Miranda is a joyous loss because it's getting her taken care of. Those Elizabethans and Jacobeans are all tuned into those dynastic marriages. You've got to line it up, and that's partly what he's doing. He's finding the young prince that he's going to marry his princess daughter to and, as Alonso says, "I would they were King and Queen of Naples," but you don't know what's going to happen. That's a happy loss for him but it's also, there's a line from the Desiderata that says "Surrender gracefully the things of youth." If we can do that, we've got it made, right? We're talking about our knees and our hips, our grey hairs and everything. All the beautiful young people we see rollicking through life and they just don't get it. They just don't get it. But that's a loss that's part of the actor's job. I'm fifty-eight years old, so it's no surprise to me that most of my life is behind me and so to get a role like Prospero, you're learning. DaVinci said, "All this time I thought I was learning how to live, but I was learning how to die." And that's what we are all doing, we're learning to let go.

Parrett: I would just like to add, there is an element of loss for me because, yes, all I've wanted through the entire play—I want my freedom, I'm going to do this for you. Did I do it well? But it's also about acceptance, and as the play progresses, Ariel you did this great, you did this great, and then it comes to the moment that you are going to be free. And I think that even though I'm a spirit, what does that mean? I'm released to the elements. So this moment, at the end, I can say, "Yes, I got what I wanted; I'm free now," but I think that just as much as he relied on me, I relied on him for a feeling of purpose. So for me it is difficult. It is a loss as well, but it's barely touched on and then I'm blown away. I'm happy in the air blowing over Disneyland!

Stone: What was the question again? How do I deal with my loss? Not very well, but it's so joyous at the end when I find

my son and I'm restored, and I think that's a whole change and reformation. I've already talked about the loss.

Flachmann: We have time perhaps for one more brilliant question.

Question: What did Shakespeare actors think about…

Woronicz: Is the show going to be over before the pub closes? I think that was a lot of it. Who knows, there are historical accounts of actors talking about acting and we hear things through Shakespeare's plays about how they might have felt about stuff. It's hard to say. Again we can go back to full circle, start where we started. We like to project what they might be thinking. I'm sure they had these same kinds of discussions to some degree. I mean they didn't have Stanislovsky's training and the idea of a fourth wall would have been ridiculous to them because there's a thousand people standing in front of them that they are not going to talk to. And I think their playing style was quicker. They probably didn't have deep discussions about what this play was about mainly because they had about four or five days of rehearsal. And imagine doing *Hamlet* with four or five days of rehearsal and then you did *Henry VI* the next day and then you did *Richard II* the next day and then you did *Hamlet* again and then you did *Henry IV*. They would have about nineteen or twenty plays in their heads at any one time, so it's hard to say what they would have in terms of discussions. But a good friend of mine who is the Director of Education at the Globe Theatre in London, Patrick Spottiswoode, guarantees that the actors would sit around the pub talking about their characters because that is what they still do.

Flachmann: Last question.

Question (for Melinda Parrett, whose matinee performance as Reno Sweeny in Cole Porter's *Anything Goes* ended less than three hours before *The Tempest* began): How did you manage physically to do a whole day's worth? Then what is your Shakespeare background?

Parrett: I grew up dancing. I started dancing when I was eight. That was my background until I was probably eighteen or nineteen, and I was in dance companies. Somewhere along the way, I started speaking and singing. It wasn't actually until I went to a performing arts conservatory where I touched on Shakespeare, and all of the exposure I had to it was in studio work. I had never done main stage Shakespeare until I came here and they told me I was playing Kate in *The Taming of the Shrew*. I consider this my training. I am a professional actor, but I've learned more about myself working here because people just say, you are going to do

this, and I say, well, if you think I can do it, then I'm going to find a way to do it. But as far as the physical, that's been a real treat because I'm able to go back into what I feel really comfortable doing, and that's in my body and not so much in speech. This is why I have such wonderful people I work with to learn from every day. It's been a nice melding of experience, a real treat.

Flachmann: Thank you. What a wonderful round table. We thank the actors for spending so much time with us this morning, and we particularly thank you Wooden O scholars and Shakespeare lovers for coming to the festival and supporting this wonderful place. Thanks.